ARAB LEAGUE'S AMRE MOUSSA TO SENATOR KERRY ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L CAIRO 007165 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/15/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER UNSC EG LE SUBJECT: ARAB LEAGUE'S AMRE MOUSSA TO SENATOR KERRY ON LEBANON AND REGIONAL ISSUES CLASSIFIED BY CHARGE D'AFFAIRES STUART JONES FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) SENATOR JOHN KERRY MET WITH ARAB LEAGUE SECRETARY GENERAL AMRE MOUSSA ON NOVEMBER 15 TO DISCUSS EVENTS IN LEBANON, IRAQ, AND THE REGION. MOUSSA BRIEFED ON HIS LEBANON MEDIATION, CLAIMING LIMITED SUCCESS ON ELECTION-RELATED ISSUES, AND NOTED PLANS TO VISIT BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, AND SAUDI ARABIA IN COMING DAYS. MOUSSA ADVOCATED DIRECT U.S.-YRIA DIALOGUE, ADMITTED THAT SECTARIAN DIVIDES DAAGED LEAGUE MEDIATION EFFORTS IN IRAQ, AND ACCUSD WASHINGTON OF CEDING ITS PALESTINE POLICY TO IRAEL. MOUSSA BELIEVED A NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE MIDLE EAST WOULD HELP WASHINGTON EFFECTIVELY COUNTR IRAN. MOUSSA WAS HOPEFUL AFTER RECENT DIPLOMATIC DEVELOPMENTS ON DARFUR, BUT ADMITTED THAT ARAB LAGUE FUNDING FOR THE AFRICAN UNION MISSION FELL AR SHORT OF COMMITMENTS. FUNDS CARRIED TO RAFAH Y PALESTINIAN PRIME MINISTER HANIYEH WILL BE DEPSITED INTO AN ARAB LEAGUE BANK ACCOUNT FOR TRANSFR TO ABU MAZEN. END SUMMARY. -------------- LIMITED PROGRESS WITH LEBANESE -------------- ¶2. (C) DURING A 90MINUTE MEETING ON DECEMBER 15, MOUSSA DESCRIBED IS BEIRUT TALKS AS A PARTIAL STEP TOWARD AGREEMENT ON KEY ISSUES BY DISPUTING LEBANESE FACTIONS. MOSSA SAID HE MET SEPARATELY WITH PM SINIORA, PARLAMENT SPEAKER BERRI, MARONITE LEADER GENERAL AOU, ORTHODOX PATRIARCH SFEIR, HIZBALLAH LEADER NASALLAH, AND PRESIDENT LAHOUD BETWEEN DECEMBER 12-1. MOUSSA CLAIMED THAT THE PARTIES ENTERTAINED AGREAT DEAL OF MISUNDERSTANDING AND MISINFORMATION BOUT THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL. THEREFORE, HE ROPOSED HAVING MARCH 8 AND MARCH 14 REPRESENTATIES SIT TOGETHER AND REVIEW DOCUMENTATION RELATED O THE TRIBUNAL. MOUSSA SAID HE GOT AGREEMENT THT TWO REPRESENTATIVES FROM EACH SIDE, ALONG WITH THE TWO LEBANESE JUDGES WORKING WITH THE UN ON THETRIBUNAL, WOULD MEET TO REVIEW THE TRIBUNAL DOCUENTS. HOWEVER, HE SAID THE PARTIES DID NOT AGREETO MEET THIS WEEKEND AS HE PROPOSED AND HAD ATTAHED OTHER (UNSPECIFIED) CONDITIONS. ¶3. (C) MOUSA SAID HIS SECOND FOCUS WAS ON "GOVERNMENT" STRCTURES. SPECIFICALLY, MOUSSA SAID HE SOUGHT TO ADRESS THE MARCH 8 FORCES' DEMAND FOR A BLOCKING MIORITY IN CABINET. HE PROPOSED AN EXPANDED CABINT OF 30 MINISTERS WHERE MARCH 8 FORCES WOULD BE IVEN 10 POSITIONS, MARCH 14 FORCES WOULD HAVE 19POSITIONS, AND THE 30TH PORTFOLIO WOULD GO TO A NEUTRAL" MEMBER. MOUSSA SAID THE PARTIES AGREED TO THE SINGLE NEUTRAL MEMBER IDEA, BUT THE CRITERIAFOR SELECTING THAT INDIVIDUAL WAS STILL TO BE DEERMINED. RETURNING TO THE TRIBUNAL ISSUE, MOUSSASAID HE WAS TRYING TO "UNTANGLE" THE LEGAL/CONSTTUTIONAL ISSUES SURROUNDING THE MARCH 14 GROUP'S ESIRE TO PUSH FORWARD THE TRIBUNAL LEGISLATION, HILE THE MARCH 8 GROUP DENIED THE LEGITIMACY OF HE PRESENT GOVERNMENT. MOUSSA ADDED THAT HE WOULDTRAVEL "NEXT WEEK" TO SYRIA AND SAUDI ARABIA TO ELP "EASE THE SITUATION," AND WOULD RETURN TO BEIUT FOR MORE TALKS. ASKED HOW LONG IT WOULD TAKE TO RESOLVE THE STAND-OFF MOUSSA SAID THINGS WILL BECOME "VERY DIFFICULT" IF NOT RESOLVED WITHIN WO WEEKS. IT IS IMPORTANT, HE ADDED, TO "RAISE TH ARAB PROFILE" ON THE ISSUE, TO COUNTER IRAN'S INLUENCE. ¶4. (C) MOUSSA CLAIMED SUCCESS IN CONVINCING PRESIDENT LAHOUD AND OTHER PLAYERS THAT PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN "EIGHT OR NINE MONTHS" SHOULD BE BASED ON THE CURRENT PARLIAMENT, NOT A NEW ONE. THIS ISSUE, MOUSSA SAID, "WAS SETTLED." SIMILARLY, HE ADDED THAT ALL AGREED THAT PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS WOULD ONLY TAKE PLACE UNDER A NEW PRESIDENT, AND THAT A NEW ELECTION LAW WILL ONLY BE PROMULGATED UNDER A NEW PRESIDENT. MOUSSA ALSO CLAIMED SUCCESS IN CONVINCING MARCH 8 LEADERS THAT THEIR DEMONSTRATORS SHOULD NOT BLOCK ROADS OR TAKE OTHER PROVOCATIVE STEPS TO STRANGLE THE POLITICAL PROCESS. THE SITUATION, HE ADDED, REMAINS "FRAGILE." ¶5. (C) ASKED ABOUT HIZBALLAH LEADER NASRALLAH'S ATTITUDE TOWARD THE PRESENT CRISIS, MOUSSA SAID THAT DURING THEIR 3-HOUR MEETING, NASRALLAH DISPLAYED CONFIDENCE AND COMPOSURE, AS WELL AS ASSUREDNESS THAT NEW ELECTIONS - IF HELD TODAY - WOULD PUT HIM IN A NATIONAL LEADERSHIP POSITION. ASKED ABOUT SYRIA'S ROLE IN LEBANON, MOUSSA SAID THAT SYRIAN INFLUENCE COULD NEVER BE EXCISED FROM LEBANON - AN ARGUMENT, HE SAID, FOR THE U.S. TALKING DIRECTLY WITH DAMASCUS ABOUT LEBANON AND THE REGION. IT IS CRITICAL, HE CONCLUDED, THAT WASHINGTON NOT FRAME THE LEBANON CRISIS AS ONE OF "WINNERS AND LOSERS," AS SUCH TALK HINDERS THE POLITICAL FLEXIBILITY OF THE LEBANESE AND MAKES VIOLENT CONFLICT MORE LIKELY. -------------- SYRIA: ARAB-ISRAELI DISPUTE -------------- ¶6. (C) ASKED ABOUT THE BAKER-HAMILTON REPORT RECOMMENDATION TO TALK DIRECTLY WITH SYRIA, MOUSSA STATED HIS VIEW THAT DIRECT TALKS BETWEEN THE USG WITH DAMASCUS WOULD "SOFTEN" SYRIAN POLICIES IN LEBANON, IRAQ, AND WITH THE PALESTINIANS. BUT, WASHINGTON MUST AVOID THE IMPULSE TO DEMAND SPECIFIC STEPS BY THE SYRIANS, AS THIS WOULD ONLY PROLONG THE REGIME'S SENSE OF "ALIENATION" AND STRENGTHEN ITS BONDS WITH TEHRAN. MOUSSA ALSO CAUTIONED AGAINST "MIXING THE INTERESTS OF THE U.S. WITH THOSE OF ISRAEL." IN OTHER WORDS, HE EXPLAINED, PEOPLE IN THE REGION DON'T KNOW "WHERE WASHINGTON'S INTERESTS END AND WHERE ISRAEL'S BEGIN," AND ARE THEREFORE SUSPICIOUS AND UNSYMPATHETIC. ARGUING FOR THE U.S. TO RECLAIM AN "HONEST-BROKER" ROLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, MOUSSA SAID WASHINGTON HAD TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN ITS INTERESTS AND THOSE OF ISRAEL. KERRY COUNTERED THAT ON THE QUESTION OF ISRAEL'S EXISTENCE, U.S. AND ISRAELI INTERESTS WERE ONE. MOUSSA REJOINED THAT THE ARAB STATES HAD UNANIMOUSLY AGREED ON RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL, AS CLARIFIED IN THE BEIRUT INITIATIVE: "DON'T WASTE YOUR TIME ON SOMETHING ALREADY DECIDED." WASHINGTON SHOULD CEASE RAISING ISSUES ON BEHALF OF ISRAEL, AND LOOK AFTER ITS OWN INTERESTS, HE ADDED. MOUSSA ALSO CAUTIONED THE U.S. FROM PUBLICLY IDENTIFYING FRIENDS AND FOES IN THE REGION (I.E., "ARAB MODERATES") AS SUCH TERMS MADE ARAB REGIMES UNCOMFORTABLE. ¶7. (C) ASKED WHAT SYRIA COULD DO TO SHOW A NEW, COOPERATIVE ATTITUDE ON REGIONAL ISSUES, MOUSSA SAID SYRIA HAD ALREADY STEPPED UP EFFORTS TO DEAL WITH BORDER INFILTRATION INTO IRAQ FOLLOWING BILATERAL ENGAGEMENT WITH WASHINGTON, AND HAD RECENTLY IMPROVED ITS DIPLOMATIC TIES TO BAGHDAD. NEVERTHELESS, ASAD'S BELIEF THAT THE HARIRI TRIBUNAL IS A POLITICAL TOOL BEING USED BY THE WEST TO "GET HIM," HINDERS HIS COOPERATION, MOUSSA SAID. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF THE TRIBUNAL, HE ADDED, CAN ONLY BE AGREED VIA NATIONAL LEBANESE DEBATE, WHERE STANDARDS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ARE MET. IN THE END, MOUSSA SAID, SYRIA WILL ADJUST ITS POLICIES BASED ON THE BROADER REGIONAL SCENE AND ITS SPECIFIC INTERESTS VIS-A-VIS GOLAN AND IRAQ. -------------- IRAQ DISCUSSION -------------- ¶8. (C) ON IRAQ, MOUSSA LAMENTED CONTINUED FOCUS ON SUNNI-SHIA DIFFERENCES, NOTING THE DIFFICULTY IN RETURNING THE "SECTARIAN GENIE" BACK TO ITS BOTTLE. MOUSSA RECOUNTED EGYPT'S SHIA PAST AND MODERN CULTURAL INFLUENCES TO EMPHASIZE THE CRITICAL IMPORTANCE OF COHABITATION. IT IS A MISTAKE, HE SAID, TO EMPHASIZE EGYPTS "SUNNI" CHARACTER, JUST AS IT WAS WRONG TO FOCUS ON IRAQ'S SECTARIAN DIFFERENCES. THE U.S. MUST RE-CAST ITS IRAQ POLICY AND HELP RESTORE ORDER THERE VIA A VIABLE POLITICAL PROCESS. ONLY A NATIONAL RECONCILIATION PROCESS, HE CONTINUED, WOULD ADDRESS THE ISSUE OF HALTING MILITIAS, SINCE THERE IS "NO VIABLE IRAQI MILITARY" TO TAKE ON THESE FORCES. PERHAPS, HE MUSED, IT WOULD NOT BE A BAD IDEA FOR THE U.S. TO INCREASE ITS TROOP STRENGTH IN IRAQ BY 30 THOUSAND TO TAKE ON THE MILITIAS IN AND AROUND BAGHDAD, WHILE A POLITICAL ACCOMMODATION IS CRAFTED. ¶9. (C) REGARDING ARAB LEAGUE RECONCILIATION EFFORTS IN IRAQ, MOUSSA SAID HE PROPOSED ORGANIZING A CONFERENCE IN BAGHDAD NEXT MARCH OR APRIL. WHILE RESULTS OF AN EARLIER MEETING OF IRAQI POLITICAL FIGURES AT ARAB LEAGUE HEADQUARTERS IN CAIRO WERE POSITIVE, THE PARTIES - ONCE BACK IN IRAQ - DID NOT FEEL COMPELLED TO CARRY OUT THEIR COMMITMENTS, HE SAID. ASKED ABOUT PRESIDENT MUBARAK'S ADVICE TO KERRY TO RETURN A "STRONG MAN" TO POWER IN IRAQ (SEPTEL),MOUSSA DID NOT BELIEVE IT POSSIBLE TO "SELECT" SUCH A FIGURE. NOR, WOULD "ANOTHER SADDAM" BE IN THE INTEREST OF DEMOCRACY OR THE IRAQI PEOPLE. -------------- DEALING WITH HAMAS -------------- ¶10. (C) MOUSSA RESPONDED TO A QUESTION ABOUT DEALING WITH HAMAS BY RECALLING HIS JANUARY 2005 POST-HAMAS ELECTION ADVICE TO BRING THE GROUP INTO THE PALESTINIAN POLITICAL BODY AND THEN MODERATE IT. RETURNING TO AN EARLIER THEME, MOUSSA ACCUSED WASHINGTON OF DOING ISRAEL'S BUSINESS VIS-A-VIS HAMAS, INSTEAD OF PURSUING ITS OWN NATIONAL INTERESTS. ON THE ISSUE OF A DECEMBER 14 ATTEMPT BY PALESTINIAN PRIME MINISTER HANIYEH TO BRING A LARGE SUM OF CASH INTO GAZA VIA RAFAH, MOUSSAS CHIEF OF STAFF HISHAM YOUSSEF CONFIRMED REPORTS THAT HANIYEH LEFT USD 35 MILLION DOLLARS WITH HIS STAFF IN ARISH, AND THAT THE FUNDS WERE TO BE DEPOSITED INTO THE ARAB LEAGUE'S ACCOUNT FOR PALESTINIAN ASSISTANCE. THE FUNDS, YOUSSEF TOLD THE DCM, WOULD THEN BE CHANNELED TO PALESTINIAN PRESIDENT MAHMOUD ABBAS. -------------- NUCLEAR PROGRAMS -------------- ¶11. (C) KERRY RAISED THE ISSUE OF IRAN'S DEFIANCE OF THE IAEA, AND THE ARAB RESPONSE. MOUSSA INSISTED THAT NO ARAB STATE WANTED TO ACQUIRE A NUCLEAR WEAPON, BUT, NONE WOULD CHALLENGE IRAN'S NPT-GUARANTEED RIGHT TO PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY. THE MAIN CONCERN OF THE ARABS, HE SAID, IS THE SEEMING "DOUBLE-STANDARD" OF U.S.-LED EFFORTS TO COUNTER IRAN'S AMBITIONS WHILE DOING NOTHING TO PRESS ISRAEL TO ACCOUNT FOR, AND DISMANTLE ITS PROGRAM. IF THE U.S. FOCUSED ON RIDDING THE ENTIRE REGION - INCLUDING ISRAEL - OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, REGIONAL SUPPORT WOULD FOLLOW. ASKED ABOUT RUSSIAN AND CHINESE INFLUENCE OVER IRAN'S NUCLEAR AMBITIONS, MOUSSA BELIEVED THEY TOO WERE "CONCERNED," BUT WOULD NOT BE PERSUADED TO RESORT TO SANCTIONS. MOUSSA DISAGREED WITH KERRY'S ASSERTION ON THE LIKELY EFFECTIVENESS OF "TRUE MULTILATERAL" SANCTIONS ON IRAN, AND WARNED THAT IF THE USG SUCCEEDED IN IMPOSING SANCTIONS, TEHRAN WOULD RETALIATE VIA IRAQ. -------------- DARFUR -------------- ¶12. (C) REPLYING TO A QUESTION ON DARFUR, MOUSSA COMPLAINED THAT DURING HIS RECENT VISIT TO WASHINGTON, A MEMBER OF CONGRESS HAD CALLED FOR U.S. BOMBING OF KHARTOUM IN RETALIATION FOR ITS POLICIES IN DARFUR. HE CRITICIZED U.S. POLICY AT THE "OVER-USED" SECURITY COUNCIL - AND AMBASSADOR BOLTON SPECIFICALLY - FOR ALIENATING THE SUDANESE REGIME AND PUTTING IT INTO A CORNER. THE PASSAGE OF UNSCR 1706 WITH CHAPTER 7 LANGUAGE, HE SAID, DID MORE DAMAGE THAN GOOD AND RESULTED IN "SHUTTING DOWN" THE GOSS WILLINGNESS TO COMPROMISE. RESPONDING TO A QUESTION REGARDING THE ARAB LEAGUE MARCH 2006 SUMMIT COMMITMENT TO FUND THE AFRICAN UNION'S DARFUR MISSION FROM OCTOBER 1 TO DECEMBER 31, MOUSSA ADMITTED TO ONLY HAVING RECEIVED USD 5 MILLION DOLLARS FROM AL MEMBERS, WHICH WOULD BE TRANSFERRED SOON TO THE AU. HE ADMITTED THAT HE WAS EMBARRASSED TO TRANSFER SUCH A PALTRY SUM AND, ONLY HALF-JOKINGLY, REQUESTED WASHINGTON TO "PRESS ITS RICH GULF FRIENDS" FOR DARFUR CONTRIBUTIONS. ¶13. (U) SENATOR KERRY'S DELEGATION DID NOT HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO REVIEW THIS MESSAGE. JONES