MILITARY LIAISON DISCUSSES WEAKNESSES IN EGYPTIAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 007071 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/03/2011 TAGS: PREL PTER MARR KPAL EG IS SUBJECT: MILITARY LIAISON DISCUSSES WEAKNESSES IN EGYPTIAN COUNTER-SMUGGLING EFFORTS REF: A. CAIRO IIR 6 899 0033 ¶B. CAIRO 6936 ¶C. CAIRO 7012 ¶D. CAIRO IIR 6 899 0034 ¶E. CAIRO 6771 Classified By: DCM Stuart Jones for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) Liaison Chief MG Nagy (protect) gave poloff an uncharacteristically candid assessment of the shortcomings in Egypt's counter-smuggling efforts in the Sinai during a December 4 meeting. Suggesting that the GOE could do more to combat smuggling, MG Nagy described multiple factors impeding success including: poor coordination and conflicting views on counter-smuggling strategies among the Ministries of Defense and Interior, and the General Intelligence Service (EGIS),the failure to cultivate Bedouin allegiance, improved tactics among smugglers, and a lack of personnel and resources needed to address the problem. Nagy also reiterated Egypt's serious concerns about Israeli threats to use smart bombs along the Philadelphi corridor to destroy tunnels. Nagy stressed that this would have a devastating impact on Egyptian-Israeli relations. Nagy also lamented Israel's inaction on Egypt's request to increase its border forces at Gaza. Although interdictions are up, Nagy's insights suggest that because of conflicting and competing agendas inside the government and ineffective strategies, the smuggling problem is unlikely to abate in the near term. End summary. -------------- --- DMI views of obstacles to smuggling interdiction -------------- --- ¶2. (C) Military Liaison Chief MG Nagy told poloff on December 4 that poor coordination and conflicting views on counter-smuggling strategies among the Ministries of Interior and Defense, and EGIS, complicate Egypt's smuggling interdiction effort. While Egyptian coordination with Israeli counterparts is strong, Nagy said the Egyptian ministries, each of which has an independent intelligence unit, do not share information well with each other and occasionally even adjust information before passing it to the other ministries involved. Nagy suggested that the Ministry of Interior should bolster significantly its scrutiny of vehicles as they cross the Suez Canal. Searches in Rafah are "too late," and the 750-man Border Guard Force (BGF) is stretched too thin to handle the problem on their own. Nagy said when DMI proposed putting a cement wall at Rafah, Defense Minister Tantawi refused, citing concerns about political optics. ¶3. (C) Failure to cultivate Bedouin allegiance, and periodic crack-downs following Sinai bombings, also impeded counter-smuggling efforts, MG Nagy said. He explained that the Interior Ministry's Central Security Police (CSP) pay Bedouin for information on terrorism and smuggling. While these tips have led to tunnel and arms/explosives cache discoveries, the strategy has not significantly improved Bedouin-police relations. The lack of a military presence in Sinai's Zone C exacerbates Bedouin alienation from the GOE, Nagy asserted, because MoD cannot develop rapport with the Bedouin by giving them humanitarian assistance. MoD annually sends only three medical convoys each to the North and South Sinai Bedouin and gives an unspecified amount of food aid. He added that due to corruption, the Bedouin sheikhs do not distribute aid equitably, and thus the assistance does not generate good will among the Bedouin. ¶4. (C) MG Nagy said variations in smuggling tactics present another challenge to smuggling interdiction. For example, Bedouin use of female smugglers is problematic because BGF cannot search them. Nagy said DMI complained to the Bedouin sheikhs about this, but suggested he was not confident the sheikhs would be able to control the problem. On a possible Sudan-Sinai smuggling link, MG Nagy said "we are certain" it exists, but could not provide specifics. He speculated that smugglers deliver weapons to Sinai shores via the Gulf of Aqaba and then overland into Gaza. ¶5. (C) The direct involvement of Palestinian security in smuggling is another frustration, MG Nagy added. He said that when a Palestinian soldier died in a tunnel on November 25 (ref A),the Palestinians asked Egypt for permission to CAIRO 00007071 002 OF 002 send in more soldiers before Egypt blew it up. Nagy said he denied their request and flooded the tunnel, noting it was clear that the Palestinian soldiers were involved in "dirty business" (NFI). ¶6. (C) Egyptian concern for the humanitarian crisis in Palestine also impacts GOE counter-smuggling, Nagy suggested. He explained that EGIS Director Soliman said he would oversee the destruction of the tunnels in cooperation with Abu Mazen "once there is stability in Gaza." (Note: GOE officials have repeatedly said that the lack of normalized border crossings between Egypt and Gaza prevents humanitarian goods from entering Gaza. End note.) -------------- The Israel Factor -------------- ¶7. (C) Israeli threats to use smart bombs to destroy tunnels on the Palestinian side of the Gaza border remain a concern, MG Nagy said. He confirmed that his IDF counterpart, General Deckel, said Israel had already made a decision to bomb, but had not resolved the issue of timing. MG Nagy said he told General Deckel that Egypt would treat the bombing as an act of war and asked to be notified before impending bombings. Nagy expressed doubts that Israel will give Egypt a warning. (Note: Nagy may be exaggerating Israel's position here, but Israel's repeated threat to use "smart bombs" is deeply disturbing to the Egyptians. End note.) ¶8. (C) Nagy said he would ask Israel during the upcoming Joint Military Committee meetings, scheduled for December 13, to consent to the presence of the 500 CSP in the Al Arish/Rafah areas. Nagy expressed doubts that Israel will agree. (Note: Nagy has said earlier that Israel tolerates the presence of the CSP to bolster BGF efforts, but is reluctant to accept their permanent presence. End note.) On the deployment of more BGF at the Gaza border, MG Nagy said Egypt had not raised the issue with Israel since former Israeli DefMin Mofaz rebuffed Field Marshal Tantawi's request for two additional "regiments" (approximately 1,500 more troops total). -------------- Comment -------------- ¶9. (C) GOE officials have been increasingly forthcoming on the issue of Sinai smuggling in recent briefings to emboffs. Although interdictions are up, Nagy's comments suggest that because of conflicting and competing agendas inside the government and ineffective strategies, the smuggling problem is unlikely to abate in the near term. Post reiterates ref E suggestions on the merits of possible interagency support to Central Security police in the Sinai. RICCIARDONE