Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06CAIRO6770
2006-11-07 15:27:00
SECRET
Embassy Cairo
Cable title:
IRAQ: ENCOURAGING ADDITIONAL EGYPTIAN AND ARAB
VZCZCXYZ0000 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHEGA #6770 3111527 ZNY SSSSS ZZH ZUI RUEWMCF5904 3111515 O 071527Z NOV 06 FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0000 INFO ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
S E C R E T CAIRO 006770
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/07/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS PTER UNSC EG IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQ: ENCOURAGING ADDITIONAL EGYPTIAN AND ARAB
LEAGUE ENGAGEMENT
REF: A. STATE 181228 (NOTAL)
B. CAIRO 3924 (NOTAL)
C. CAIRO 5799 (NOTAL)
D. CAIRO 4168 (NOTAL)
CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR FRANCIS RICCIARDONE FOR REASONS 1.4
(B) AND (D).
-------
SUMMARY
-------
S E C R E T CAIRO 006770
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/07/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS PTER UNSC EG IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQ: ENCOURAGING ADDITIONAL EGYPTIAN AND ARAB
LEAGUE ENGAGEMENT
REF: A. STATE 181228 (NOTAL)
B. CAIRO 3924 (NOTAL)
C. CAIRO 5799 (NOTAL)
D. CAIRO 4168 (NOTAL)
CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR FRANCIS RICCIARDONE FOR REASONS 1.4
(B) AND (D).
--------------
SUMMARY
--------------
1. (S) EGYPT'S ENGAGEMENT ON IRAQ, BOTH BILATERALLY AND
MULTILATERALLY, CONTINUES TO BE QUIET BUT CONSISTENT. PER
REFTELS, EGYPT IS IN FREQUENT COMMUNICATION WITH IRAQI
GOVERNMENT LEADERS, HOSTS HIGH-LEVEL IRAQI DELEGATIONS, AND
IS INTERESTED IN DEEPENING BILATERAL TIES AS THE SECURITY
SITUATION IN IRAQ PERMITS. EGYPT MAINTAINS ONLY A SMALL
DIPLOMATIC PRESENCE IN IRAQ SINCE THE ABDUCTION AND MURDER OF
ITS ENVOY TO BAGHDAD, WHILE BAGHDAD HAS YET TO POST AN
AMBASSADOR TO CAIRO. THE GOE IS A STRONG AND POSITIVE VOICE
WITHIN THE ARAB LEAGUE CONTEXT, ENCOURAGING EFFORTS AT
RECONCILIATION AMONG IRAQI GROUPS. ENGAGEMENT BY BOTH EGYPT
AND THE LEAGUE COULD CERTAINLY INCREASE, ALTHOUGH WE DOUBT
OUR ENTREATIES ON THIS POINT WILL BE MORE CONVINCING THAN
EGYPT'S OWN ASSESSMENTS OF ITS POLITICAL AND SECURITY
INTERESTS THERE. EGYPTIAN BUSINESSES CONTINUE TO SEEK
INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES IN IRAQ, AND EGYPT IS CURRENTLY IN
CONSULTATIONS WITH A LONDON-BASED FIRM ON THE ISSUE OF
FORGIVING IRAQI DEBTS. END SUMMARY.
--------------
EGYPT SUPPORTIVE OF IRAQI GOVERNMENT
--------------
2. (S) EGYPT IS CLOSELY MONITORING EVENTS IN IRAQ, PRIMARILY
VIA THE EGYPTIAN GENERAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. CAIRO REMAINS
OPPOSED TO MILITARY COMMITMENTS IN IRAQ, BUT HAS KEPT ITS
OFFER ON THE TABLE TO TRAIN IRAQI POLICE AND MILITARY ON
EGYPTIAN SOIL. GOE LEADERS ARE IN TOUCH WITH IRAQI
COUNTERPARTS, AND INVITED PRIME MINISTER MALIKI AND OTHER
INFLUENTIAL IRAQIS TO VISIT EGYPT. CAIRO HAS BEEN A LEADER
AMONG ARAB STATES IN DIPLOMATIC ENGAGEMENT WITH SUCCESSIVE
IRAQI GOVERNMENTS. ITS INTELLIGENCE SERVICES WORK WITH US
AND THE GOI IN THE COUNTER-TERRORISM FIELD. ACCORDING TO MFA
DEPUTY ASSISTANT MINISTER FOR ARAB AFFAIRS AMAL MORAD, EGYPT
IS CURRENTLY WORKING WITH A PRIVATE LONDON-BASED ACCOUNTING
FIRM HIRED BY IRAQ TO CALCULATE EXACT FIGURES OWED BY THE GOI
TO EGYPT, GOVERNMENT-OWNED COMPANIES, AND ON REMITTANCES TO
EGYPTIAN WORKERS. MORAD COULD NOT CITE A PRECISE FIGURE, BUT
STATED THAT THE FIGURE WAS "CONSIDERABLE FOR EGYPT, BUT SMALL
IN COMPARISON TO OTHER DEBTORS;" PROBABLY IN THE "HUNDREDS OF
THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS." ONCE THE FIRM CALCULATES FIGURES, THE
GOE AND THE GOI COULD NEGOTIATE TERMS OF DEBT FORGIVENESS.
MORAD WAS NOT AWARE OF ANY MAJOR ASSETS OWNED BY THE GOI THAT
REMAINED IN EGYPT. ASKED ABOUT UPCOMING POLITICAL EVENTS OR
SENIOR IRAQI VISITS, MORAD SAID THAT FOREIGN MINISTERS OF
IRAQ AND ITS NEIGHBORS WOULD MEET SOON IN CAIRO. THERE WAS
NO NEWS OF A VISIT TO EGYPT BY IRAQI PM MALIKI, ALTHOUGH
MEMBERS OF IRAQ'S NATIONAL RECONCILIATION COMMITTEE WERE
CURRENTLY IN EGYPT TALKING WITH IRAQI EXPATRIATES.
--------------
ARAB LEAGUE REMAINS ENGAGED
--------------
3. (C) DUE IN PART TO EGYPTIAN PRESSURE, THE ARAB LEAGUE
CONTINUES ITS "RECONCILIATION" PROJECT WORK IN IRAQ,
SPEARHEADED BY MOROCCAN DIPLOMAT MOKHTAR LAMANI. THE LEAGUE
HAS HOSTED NUMEROUS DIPLOMATIC GATHERINGS ON IRAQ, AND HAS
OFFERED MORAL SUPPORT TO SUCCESSIVE IRAQI GOVERNMENTS.
LEAGUE INFLUENCE OVER ITS MEMBER STATES POLICIES ON IRAQ,
HOWEVER, IS LIMITED. THE LEAGUE HAS BEEN ACCUSED BY IRAQ'S
SHIA AND KURDISH LEADERS AS BIASED IN FAVOR OF IRAQI SUNNIS,
A CHARGE THAT HAS STYMIED EFFORTS BY THE LEAGUE TO SUPPORT
NATIONAL RECONCILIATION. SECRETARY GENERAL AMRE MOUSSA
REMAINS IN CLOSE CONTACT WITH BOTH SENIOR GOI LEADERS AND
POLITICAL PLAYERS INSIDE IRAQ, INCLUDING NON-TERRORIST
RESISTANCE LEADERS. MOUSSA'S ACTIONS ON IRAQ ARE STRONGLY
INFLUENCED BY EGYPT.
--------------
RESPONSES TO REF A QUESTIONS
--------------
4. (S) QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS (REF A):
- QUESTION: WHAT WOULD BE REQUIRED FOR THE GOE TO BE MORE
ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN IRAQ? WHAT WILL GOE REQUIRE OF IRAQ
BEFORE IT IS WILLING TO INCREASE SUPPORT?
- RESPONSE: THE SECURITY SITUATION IN IRAQ IS THE SINGLE
BIGGEST IMPEDIMENT TO GREATER GOE INVOLVEMENT IN IRAQ. EGYPT
WILL NOT SEND TROOPS TO IRAQ.
- QUESTION: WHAT STRATEGY SHOULD THE USG TAKE IN ENGAGING
GOE TO ENCOURAGE GREATER SUPPORT?
- RESPONSE: WE HAVE CONSISTENTLY ARGUED THAT THE IRAQIS
WEAKEN THEIR OWN CASE IN CAIRO BY NOT SENDING AN AMBASSADOR
HERE WITH BOTH STATURE AND SKILL. THE U.S. SHOULD PRESS THE
GOI TO SEND A CAPABLE, SENIOR-LEVEL ENVOY TO BEGIN CHANGING
ATTITUDES OF BOTH THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT AND LOCAL OPINION
SHAPERS. AN ARTICULATE IRAQI SPOKESMAN IN CAIRO COULD ALSO
PROMOTE IRAQI VIEWS TO PAN ARAB PRESS ORGANS.
- QUESTION: WHAT SPECIFIC CONTRIBUTIONS - FINANCIAL,
POLITICAL, SECURITY, OR OTHER - COULD THE GOE MAKE TO IRAQ,
ASSUMING IT WAS APPROACHED IN THE CORRECT MANNER AND AT AN
APPROPRIATE LEVEL?
- RESPONSE: EGYPT HAS CONSISTENTLY TURNED DOWN ENTREATIES TO
CONTRIBUTE TROOPS FOR IRAQ, AND IS UNLIKELY TO CHANGE
DIRECTION ON THIS ISSUE. THE AREA WHERE COOPERATION IS
GREATEST, AND PERHAPS CAPABLE OF FURTHER EXPANSION, IS IN THE
COUNTER-TERROR AND INTELLIGENCE-SHARING FIELDS. AS NOTED,
EGYPT IS EAGER TO TRAIN TROOPS OR POLICE ON EGYPTIAN SOIL.
- QUESTION: WHAT ARE THE GOE'S OPINIONS ON THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN IRAQ AND SYRIA? HOW WILL THE HOST GOVERNMENT
PERCEIVE ANY CHANGE, EITHER FOR THE BETTER OR WORSE, IN THE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN IRAQ AND SYRIA? HOW COULD THE GOE BE
USED TO INFLUENCE SYRIAN BEHAVIOR TOWARD IRAQ?
- RESPONSE: EGYPTS STRAINED RELATIONS WITH SYRIA STEM FROM
DEEP DISAGREEMENTS OVER THE LATTERS RELATIONS WITH THE
IRANIANS, PALESTINIAN MILITANTS, AND HIZBOLLAH IN LEBANON.
EGYPT KNOWS THE NEGATIVE ROLE SYRIA PLAYS VIS-A-VIS IRAQ, BUT
HAS LIMITED LEVERAGE OVER DAMASCUS, AS WITNESSED IN OTHER
AREAS. PRESIDENT MUBARAK HAS REPEATEDLY URGED PRESIDENT ASAD
TO CURB THE TRAFFIC OF FOREIGN FIGHTERS TO IRAQ, BUT ALSO
URGES US TO ESTABLISH OUR OWN CHANNELS TO DAMASCUS.
- QUESTION: WHAT ARE THE GOE'S OPINIONS ON THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN? HOW WILL THE HOST GOVERNMENT PERCEIVE
ANY CHANGE, EITHER FOR BETTER OR FOR WORSE, IN THE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN? HOW COULD THE GOE BE
USED TO INFLUENCE IRANIAN BEHAVIOR TOWARD IRAQ?
- RESPONSE: THE GOE'S RELATIONS WITH TEHRAN (NO FORMAL TIES)
ARE MARKED BY ENMITY AND SUSPICION. PRESIDENT MUBARAK AND
HIS SENIOR MINISTERS ARE CLEAR ON THIS POINT. THE EGYPTIANS
FEAR IRANIAN INROADS INTO IRAQ, AND ARE CONCERNED BY
EXPANDING IRANIAN INFLUENCE ON EGYPT'S DOORSTEP IN GAZA,
WHICH THEY SEE AS A DIRECT RESULT OF U.S. POLICY IN IRAQ.
RICCIARDONE
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/07/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS PTER UNSC EG IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQ: ENCOURAGING ADDITIONAL EGYPTIAN AND ARAB
LEAGUE ENGAGEMENT
REF: A. STATE 181228 (NOTAL)
B. CAIRO 3924 (NOTAL)
C. CAIRO 5799 (NOTAL)
D. CAIRO 4168 (NOTAL)
CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR FRANCIS RICCIARDONE FOR REASONS 1.4
(B) AND (D).
--------------
SUMMARY
--------------
1. (S) EGYPT'S ENGAGEMENT ON IRAQ, BOTH BILATERALLY AND
MULTILATERALLY, CONTINUES TO BE QUIET BUT CONSISTENT. PER
REFTELS, EGYPT IS IN FREQUENT COMMUNICATION WITH IRAQI
GOVERNMENT LEADERS, HOSTS HIGH-LEVEL IRAQI DELEGATIONS, AND
IS INTERESTED IN DEEPENING BILATERAL TIES AS THE SECURITY
SITUATION IN IRAQ PERMITS. EGYPT MAINTAINS ONLY A SMALL
DIPLOMATIC PRESENCE IN IRAQ SINCE THE ABDUCTION AND MURDER OF
ITS ENVOY TO BAGHDAD, WHILE BAGHDAD HAS YET TO POST AN
AMBASSADOR TO CAIRO. THE GOE IS A STRONG AND POSITIVE VOICE
WITHIN THE ARAB LEAGUE CONTEXT, ENCOURAGING EFFORTS AT
RECONCILIATION AMONG IRAQI GROUPS. ENGAGEMENT BY BOTH EGYPT
AND THE LEAGUE COULD CERTAINLY INCREASE, ALTHOUGH WE DOUBT
OUR ENTREATIES ON THIS POINT WILL BE MORE CONVINCING THAN
EGYPT'S OWN ASSESSMENTS OF ITS POLITICAL AND SECURITY
INTERESTS THERE. EGYPTIAN BUSINESSES CONTINUE TO SEEK
INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES IN IRAQ, AND EGYPT IS CURRENTLY IN
CONSULTATIONS WITH A LONDON-BASED FIRM ON THE ISSUE OF
FORGIVING IRAQI DEBTS. END SUMMARY.
--------------
EGYPT SUPPORTIVE OF IRAQI GOVERNMENT
--------------
2. (S) EGYPT IS CLOSELY MONITORING EVENTS IN IRAQ, PRIMARILY
VIA THE EGYPTIAN GENERAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. CAIRO REMAINS
OPPOSED TO MILITARY COMMITMENTS IN IRAQ, BUT HAS KEPT ITS
OFFER ON THE TABLE TO TRAIN IRAQI POLICE AND MILITARY ON
EGYPTIAN SOIL. GOE LEADERS ARE IN TOUCH WITH IRAQI
COUNTERPARTS, AND INVITED PRIME MINISTER MALIKI AND OTHER
INFLUENTIAL IRAQIS TO VISIT EGYPT. CAIRO HAS BEEN A LEADER
AMONG ARAB STATES IN DIPLOMATIC ENGAGEMENT WITH SUCCESSIVE
IRAQI GOVERNMENTS. ITS INTELLIGENCE SERVICES WORK WITH US
AND THE GOI IN THE COUNTER-TERRORISM FIELD. ACCORDING TO MFA
DEPUTY ASSISTANT MINISTER FOR ARAB AFFAIRS AMAL MORAD, EGYPT
IS CURRENTLY WORKING WITH A PRIVATE LONDON-BASED ACCOUNTING
FIRM HIRED BY IRAQ TO CALCULATE EXACT FIGURES OWED BY THE GOI
TO EGYPT, GOVERNMENT-OWNED COMPANIES, AND ON REMITTANCES TO
EGYPTIAN WORKERS. MORAD COULD NOT CITE A PRECISE FIGURE, BUT
STATED THAT THE FIGURE WAS "CONSIDERABLE FOR EGYPT, BUT SMALL
IN COMPARISON TO OTHER DEBTORS;" PROBABLY IN THE "HUNDREDS OF
THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS." ONCE THE FIRM CALCULATES FIGURES, THE
GOE AND THE GOI COULD NEGOTIATE TERMS OF DEBT FORGIVENESS.
MORAD WAS NOT AWARE OF ANY MAJOR ASSETS OWNED BY THE GOI THAT
REMAINED IN EGYPT. ASKED ABOUT UPCOMING POLITICAL EVENTS OR
SENIOR IRAQI VISITS, MORAD SAID THAT FOREIGN MINISTERS OF
IRAQ AND ITS NEIGHBORS WOULD MEET SOON IN CAIRO. THERE WAS
NO NEWS OF A VISIT TO EGYPT BY IRAQI PM MALIKI, ALTHOUGH
MEMBERS OF IRAQ'S NATIONAL RECONCILIATION COMMITTEE WERE
CURRENTLY IN EGYPT TALKING WITH IRAQI EXPATRIATES.
--------------
ARAB LEAGUE REMAINS ENGAGED
--------------
3. (C) DUE IN PART TO EGYPTIAN PRESSURE, THE ARAB LEAGUE
CONTINUES ITS "RECONCILIATION" PROJECT WORK IN IRAQ,
SPEARHEADED BY MOROCCAN DIPLOMAT MOKHTAR LAMANI. THE LEAGUE
HAS HOSTED NUMEROUS DIPLOMATIC GATHERINGS ON IRAQ, AND HAS
OFFERED MORAL SUPPORT TO SUCCESSIVE IRAQI GOVERNMENTS.
LEAGUE INFLUENCE OVER ITS MEMBER STATES POLICIES ON IRAQ,
HOWEVER, IS LIMITED. THE LEAGUE HAS BEEN ACCUSED BY IRAQ'S
SHIA AND KURDISH LEADERS AS BIASED IN FAVOR OF IRAQI SUNNIS,
A CHARGE THAT HAS STYMIED EFFORTS BY THE LEAGUE TO SUPPORT
NATIONAL RECONCILIATION. SECRETARY GENERAL AMRE MOUSSA
REMAINS IN CLOSE CONTACT WITH BOTH SENIOR GOI LEADERS AND
POLITICAL PLAYERS INSIDE IRAQ, INCLUDING NON-TERRORIST
RESISTANCE LEADERS. MOUSSA'S ACTIONS ON IRAQ ARE STRONGLY
INFLUENCED BY EGYPT.
--------------
RESPONSES TO REF A QUESTIONS
--------------
4. (S) QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS (REF A):
- QUESTION: WHAT WOULD BE REQUIRED FOR THE GOE TO BE MORE
ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN IRAQ? WHAT WILL GOE REQUIRE OF IRAQ
BEFORE IT IS WILLING TO INCREASE SUPPORT?
- RESPONSE: THE SECURITY SITUATION IN IRAQ IS THE SINGLE
BIGGEST IMPEDIMENT TO GREATER GOE INVOLVEMENT IN IRAQ. EGYPT
WILL NOT SEND TROOPS TO IRAQ.
- QUESTION: WHAT STRATEGY SHOULD THE USG TAKE IN ENGAGING
GOE TO ENCOURAGE GREATER SUPPORT?
- RESPONSE: WE HAVE CONSISTENTLY ARGUED THAT THE IRAQIS
WEAKEN THEIR OWN CASE IN CAIRO BY NOT SENDING AN AMBASSADOR
HERE WITH BOTH STATURE AND SKILL. THE U.S. SHOULD PRESS THE
GOI TO SEND A CAPABLE, SENIOR-LEVEL ENVOY TO BEGIN CHANGING
ATTITUDES OF BOTH THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT AND LOCAL OPINION
SHAPERS. AN ARTICULATE IRAQI SPOKESMAN IN CAIRO COULD ALSO
PROMOTE IRAQI VIEWS TO PAN ARAB PRESS ORGANS.
- QUESTION: WHAT SPECIFIC CONTRIBUTIONS - FINANCIAL,
POLITICAL, SECURITY, OR OTHER - COULD THE GOE MAKE TO IRAQ,
ASSUMING IT WAS APPROACHED IN THE CORRECT MANNER AND AT AN
APPROPRIATE LEVEL?
- RESPONSE: EGYPT HAS CONSISTENTLY TURNED DOWN ENTREATIES TO
CONTRIBUTE TROOPS FOR IRAQ, AND IS UNLIKELY TO CHANGE
DIRECTION ON THIS ISSUE. THE AREA WHERE COOPERATION IS
GREATEST, AND PERHAPS CAPABLE OF FURTHER EXPANSION, IS IN THE
COUNTER-TERROR AND INTELLIGENCE-SHARING FIELDS. AS NOTED,
EGYPT IS EAGER TO TRAIN TROOPS OR POLICE ON EGYPTIAN SOIL.
- QUESTION: WHAT ARE THE GOE'S OPINIONS ON THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN IRAQ AND SYRIA? HOW WILL THE HOST GOVERNMENT
PERCEIVE ANY CHANGE, EITHER FOR THE BETTER OR WORSE, IN THE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN IRAQ AND SYRIA? HOW COULD THE GOE BE
USED TO INFLUENCE SYRIAN BEHAVIOR TOWARD IRAQ?
- RESPONSE: EGYPTS STRAINED RELATIONS WITH SYRIA STEM FROM
DEEP DISAGREEMENTS OVER THE LATTERS RELATIONS WITH THE
IRANIANS, PALESTINIAN MILITANTS, AND HIZBOLLAH IN LEBANON.
EGYPT KNOWS THE NEGATIVE ROLE SYRIA PLAYS VIS-A-VIS IRAQ, BUT
HAS LIMITED LEVERAGE OVER DAMASCUS, AS WITNESSED IN OTHER
AREAS. PRESIDENT MUBARAK HAS REPEATEDLY URGED PRESIDENT ASAD
TO CURB THE TRAFFIC OF FOREIGN FIGHTERS TO IRAQ, BUT ALSO
URGES US TO ESTABLISH OUR OWN CHANNELS TO DAMASCUS.
- QUESTION: WHAT ARE THE GOE'S OPINIONS ON THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN? HOW WILL THE HOST GOVERNMENT PERCEIVE
ANY CHANGE, EITHER FOR BETTER OR FOR WORSE, IN THE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN? HOW COULD THE GOE BE
USED TO INFLUENCE IRANIAN BEHAVIOR TOWARD IRAQ?
- RESPONSE: THE GOE'S RELATIONS WITH TEHRAN (NO FORMAL TIES)
ARE MARKED BY ENMITY AND SUSPICION. PRESIDENT MUBARAK AND
HIS SENIOR MINISTERS ARE CLEAR ON THIS POINT. THE EGYPTIANS
FEAR IRANIAN INROADS INTO IRAQ, AND ARE CONCERNED BY
EXPANDING IRANIAN INFLUENCE ON EGYPT'S DOORSTEP IN GAZA,
WHICH THEY SEE AS A DIRECT RESULT OF U.S. POLICY IN IRAQ.
RICCIARDONE