SPECIAL ENVOY NATSIOS'S OCTOBER 21 MEETINGS WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CAIRO 006581

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/21/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS PTER EAID EG SU
SUBJECT: SPECIAL ENVOY NATSIOS'S OCTOBER 21 MEETINGS WITH
THE EGYPTIAN FOREIGN MINISTER AND THE ARAB LEAGUE SECRETARY
GENERAL

Classified by DCM Stuart Jones for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary and comment: In separate October 21 meetings,
Presidential Envoy for Sudan Andrew Natsios discussed next
steps on Sudan with Arab League Secretary General Amre Moussa
and Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Aboul Gheit. Moussa
agreed the humanitarian situation in Darfur was bad but it
fell short of genocide; Aboul Gheit worried about the
prospect of Darfur refugees coming to Egypt. All agreed that
a peace-keeping force should not present a "white face."
Moussa was encouraging about North African Arab
participation, Aboul Gheit, less so. Both pressed for a
follow-on resolution to UNSCR 1706 assuring that Sudanese
officials would not be prosecuted and that the African Union
would continue to play a lead role. Aboul Gheit was
enthusiastic about providing the GOS sovereignty assurances,
namely by linking Chapter 8 implementation to UNSCR 1706.
Moussa thought resistance to restarting the Cease-Fire
Commission would come from the rebels, whereas Aboul Gheit
foresaw GOS objections. Moussa has asked Bashir to be
pro-active, including a possible Security Council speech.
Both interlocutors were willing to push Bashir to accept a
more robust peace-keeping operation; neither, however, was
willing to challenge Bashir's refusal to place the troops
formally under the UN. End Summary and comment.


2. (U) The US delegation in both meetings consisted of
Presidential Special Envoy for Sudan Andrew Natsios,
Ambassador to Egypt Francis Ricciardone, Chief of Staff AF/SE
Andrew Steinfeld, Charge d'Affaires to Sudan Cameron Hume,
and Embassy poloffs. Secretary General Moussa was
accompanied by Assistant Secretary General Ahmed Ben Helli,
Africa Office Director Samir Hosni, Chief of Staff Hisham
Youssef, Cabinet Staffer Zeid Al Sabban, and Spokesperson
Alaa Rushdy. Aboul Gheit was accompanied by Sudan Office
Director Sabre Mansour and Cabinet Staffers Ahmed Abu Zeid
and Ashraf Sweilam.

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Humanitarian Situation
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3. (C) During their one-hour introductory meeting, Arab
League Secretary General Amre Moussa agreed with Natsios that
the humanitarian situation in Darfur was very bad and is
having a destabilizing effect on neighboring countries.
However, he was quick to say that genocide is not occurring
and that the media is inflaming the situation. In a separate
meeting, Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Aboul Gheit cited
fears that Darfur refugees might descend upon Cairo, as
happened last year. He said that because of this, Egypt has
on-going humanitarian assistance efforts in Darfur, including
food shipments to the World Food Program and an Egyptian
field hospital. Aboul Gheit also asked to see US
photographs, mentioned by Natsios, that document destroyed
villages in Darfur.

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Creating Peace-Keepers Acceptable To Bashir
--------------


4. (C) Natsios thanked Moussa for his role in moving Bashir
to respond positively to the Annan/Konare letter requesting
UN support for a strengthened AU Mission In Sudan (AMIS).
Both Moussa and Aboul Gheit said they had seen some
encouraging movement from Bashir on the peace-keepers issue,
and emphasized the importance of, in Aboul Gheit's words, not
giving the peace-keepers a "white face." Aboul Gheit
suggested the force might wear both UN and AU emblems and
Moussa offered it might be led by an African or other "3rd
world" commander. Natsios emphasized the force must be
robust and efficient, and, for this to happen, it must fall
under UN mechanisms. He noted Sudan's refusal to release
communications equipment to AU troops as proof of the
Sudanese desire to keep the force ineffective. Natsios also
sought support for the force to be funded under the UN
peace-keeping budget.


5. (C) Moussa warned that overt US pressure on Bashir to
comply "or else" is not helping, and that Sudan is afraid of
a force that it sees as similar to the Multi-National Force
in Iraq. Natsios told both Moussa and Aboul Gheit the US
realizes that Bashir cannot accept 1706 directly.


6. (C) Natsios pressed both leaders to urge North African
countries to commit publicly to sending troops. Moussa was
receptive, but Aboul Gheit said that fighting must stop first
so that Arabs are not keeping the peace between Arab and
non-Arab factions. Aboul Gheit also complained that earlier

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Egyptian offers of military assistance to the UN and AU had
been rebuffed. (Comment: The offers were rebuffed because
Sudan is sensitive to an Egyptian presence in its affairs.
End Comment.) He said Egypt had offered to send 50
experienced officers to the UN for the recently accepted
beefed up UN support presence, but that the UN accepted only
one officer. In addition, the AU accepted only 85 of the 200
army soldiers and policemen Egypt had offered. The AU, Aboul
Gheit said, had not even responded to an offer to double
these numbers.

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GOS Wants Assurances Of 1706's Limited Mandate
-------------- -


7. (C) Moussa and Aboul Gheit both pressed for a follow-on
resolution to UNSCR 1706 to assure the GOS that the 1706
mandate would not expand to include prosecution of Sudanese
officials and non-African control of the peace-keeping force.
Moussa also criticized 1706 for coming too soon after the
Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA),which he thought would have
been effective had it been given more time to work. Natsios
re-affirmed to both leaders US support for 1706, but
acknowledged the US would be willing to look at some
modifications - the bottom line being the force's
effectiveness.


8. (C) As one possible compromise, Aboul Gheit
enthusiastically supported linking implementation of Chapter
8 to the provisions of 1706 and having both the UN and AU
accept an identical mandate - an idea raised in an ad hoc
brainstorming session. Aboul Gheit felt this would assure
the GOS that accepting 1706 would not open it up to possible
later prosecution, while at the same time making a second UN
resolution unnecessary.

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Talking Peace And The Cease Fire Commission
--------------


9. (C) All parties agreed on the importance of getting
non-signatories to agree to the DPA, even if that meant some
annexes to the agreement. European proposals for a large
conference outside of Darfur would be ineffective. Natsios
suggested to both Moussa and Aboul Gheit that restarting the
currently defunct Cease Fire Commission (CFC) would be an
important step in realizing a ceasefire Aboul Gheit believes
Sudan would still be unwilling to accept the participation of
non-signatories to the DPA in the CFC. Moussa, in contrast,
thought Bashir would not object, but that the rebel groups
themselves would refuse.

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Moussa Pressed Bashir To Take Action
--------------


10. (C) Moussa said he had called upon the GOS to develop its
own initiatives for peace rather than waiting for
international efforts. He asked Bashir to address the UN
Security Council on the Darfur issue (perhaps reiterating
Kofi Annan's request),and said Bashir seemed potentially
interested in doing so after November 23. Aboul Gheit also
thought Bashir might be willing to go before the Council
after the 23rd. Moussa promised to advise Bashir, if he does
speak to the Council, that statements calling peace-keeping
troops a "prelude to invasion" would not be helpful. Moussa
said Bashir was receptive
to Moussa's idea of an advisory board to deal with Darfur,
consisting of the UN, AU, AL, EU, Islamic Conference, and
others.

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Aboul Gheit Asks For PR
--------------


11. (C) Aboul Gheit asked Natsios to inform Congress on
Egypt's efforts to help in Sudan, including its
humanitarian efforts and its offers to send officers. He
also requested that Natsios highlight Egypt's efforts in his
interviews with Egyptian media that were to follow the
meeting.

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Moussa, Aboul Gheit Diverge On Urgency
--------------


12. (C) Natsios pressed both Moussa and Aboul Gheit for
prompt international action on Darfur, noting that the coming
change of the UN Secretary General and senior staff will

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leave a deep gap in Sudan expertise. Upcoming US
congressional elections may also affect US policy. Should
there be wide-scale killings in Darfur as a result of GOS
policy, the US administration may come under enormous
pressure to act, warned Natsios.


13. (C) Moussa agreed with Natsios's portrayal of the time
pressure and on the need to quickly present a united front to
the Sudanese. Aboul Gheit, however, said that thinking of
"imaginative solutions" was more important than working
quickly. He reiterated the importance of assuring the GOS of
the limits of the mandate of 1706.


14. (U) This message was cleared by the Natsios delegation.
RICCIARDONE