EGYPT: NSC SENIOR DIRECTOR MICHAEL DORAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L CAIRO 006328

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR SENIOR DIRECT MICHAEL DORAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/11/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KDEM EG
SUBJECT: EGYPT: NSC SENIOR DIRECTOR MICHAEL DORAN
DISCUSSES REFORM WITH ACTIVISTS


Classified by CDA Stuart Jones for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


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Summary
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1. (C) In an October 3 meeting with pro-reform Egyptians on
the margins of the Secretary's visit to Cairo, NSC Senior
Director Michael Doran reiterated the USG's commitment to
supporting political reform and freedom in Egypt and BMENA.
Yomn El-Hamaqi (a member of Egypt's Consultative Council and
on the ruling party's General Secretariat) expressed
confidence that political reform is on track. Doran's other
interlocutors, including independent parliamentarian Anwar
Esmat Sadat (nephew of the late president),Ghada Shahbender
of Shayfeenkum, and Saad Eddin Ibrahim of the Ibn Khaldun
Center, were markedly more critical of the GOE's commitment
to authentic reform. They discussed a wide range of issues,
including charges of manipulation of the media by the
security apparatus as means to undercut independent
reformers. With the exception of NDP member El-Hamaqi, the
group agreed that the USG should press the NDP and GOE to
honor President Mubarak's 2005 campaign promises, which would
help to fight the perception that the USG has backed away
from reform in Egypt. End summary.


2. (C) In addition to Doran's four interlocutors, post had
invited two others: leading Judges Club activist and a
vice-president of the Court of Cassation, Hisham
El-Bastawisi, who declined to attend after he failed to
receive GOE authorization to participate, and Shura Council
member Ossama El-Ghazaly Harb, who resigned from the NDP in
early 2006 and is seeking to establish a new secular party,
the National Democratic Front. Harb called in sick at the
last minute.

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The Good News on Reform
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3. (C) Dr. Yomn El-Hamaqi, who is chair of the Economics
Department at Ayn Shams University, said that she is pleased
with the "very reasonable trajectory" of reform in Egypt.
She asserted that Egypt was experiencing "dramatic
legislative changes" and said that the NDP is making a major
push to expand its appeal among women and youth, although she
admitted that "youth participation" remains a major
challenge. El-Hamaqi noted that Egypt's creaky education
system, which focuses on rote memorization and fails to
prepare secondary and tertiary graduates for the job market,
is part of the problem. El-Hamaqi concluded that despite
areas for improvement, reform in Egypt "is going well."


4. (C) Shahbender strongly disagreed with El-Hamaqi's
assessment and argued that in education and other fields, the
failure of the governmental system had created an opportunity
for the Islamists to create an informal system (of education
support and health care, for example) that addresses the
actual needs of the citizenry, and builds the Islamists'
legitimacy among ordinary Egyptians.

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The Yellow Press
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5. (C) Doran asked whether the Egyptian public uncritically
accepted the Egyptian media's depiction of independent
reformers as "foreign agents" when they receive small USG
democracy grants. After all, the GOE receives nearly $2
billion in USG assistance each year. Shahbender said that
the GOE's control of the state-run media--along with certain
low-circulation and nominally-independent newspapers, like
Roz El-Youssef, which is widely believed to be financed by
Gamal Mubarak ally Ahmed Ezz and to be closely linked to
SSIS--allows it to "spin" reform issues in ways that do in
fact successfully discredit any perceived critics of the GOE.
Sadat described his effort to start joint parliamentary
consultations with the Israeli Knesset during the Lebanon
crisis in July, which led to furious media attacks decrying
him as a Zionist. Sadat suggested that the GOE was behind
the attacks. Sadat said that most of the editors and
publishers in charge of the GOE-controlled media are
old-school Nasserists who are willing to twist reportage for
political purposes or financial reward. Ibrahim added that
"the top level of the regime" believes that it has a monopoly
on relations with, and receiving assistance from, outside
powers. The GOE jealously guards this perceived prerogative
by labeling anyone else as "foreign agents."

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A Pervasive Culture of Fear
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6. (C) Shahbender asserted that SSIS is "much more present"
on university campuses than are the Muslim Brotherhood (MB).
SSIS involvement in campus politics aims to send the message
to young people that they should not stray into areas of
development, advocacy, or opposition politics. Shahbender
claimed that all of Doran's interlocutors, with the exception
of NDP member El-Hamaqi, "would pay a price" for meeting
Doran. Sadat echoed this, saying "Security is very tough
here, and it is everywhere." Shahbender said legislation
(primarily Law 84/2002) allows the GOE to curtail the
independence and grass roots outreach of Egypt's NGOs.

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Whither the Islamists?
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7. (C) Ibrahim noted that the GOE's successful intimidation
and oppression of the secular opposition had not worked
against the Islamists. Thanks to the emergency law, secular
opponents and activists were effectively under "house arrest"
since they cannot have a rally or public meeting without SSIS
approval. By contrast, the Muslim Brotherhood, he asserted,
has access to 100,000 mosques, and can "meet, organize, and
serve its constituency five times per day." Ibrahim noted
that Islamists had only won two percent of the parliamentary
seats in 1984, but 20 percent in 2005. "The regime would
like to scare you to death" with this statistic, but, he
argued, the MB's success was largely the result of its
effective mobilization of a relatively small, committed
cadres of activists who seized the advantage in the face of
very low turnout by ordinary Egyptians. The MB, said
Ibrahim, may have already peaked, and they could be easily
routed at the polls if only the larger body of secular,
moderate Egyptians were empowered and encouraged to
participate.

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Links between reform and Arab-Israeli Peace?
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8. (C) Doran sought to probe the perceived linkages between
internal reform and international relations, especially the
Arab-Israel conflict. All of his interlocutors emphasized
that a comprehensive and just resolution to the Arab-Israel
issue was crucial to the success of political reform, but
they differed as to the reasons why. El-Hamaqi said that the
political leadership cannot fully focus on reform as long as
the Arab-Israeli issue is unresolved. Shahbender argued that
USG support for democratic reform inside various Arab states
seems hypocritical when at the same time the USG supports
Israel's actions in Lebanon and maintains the need for the
Guantanamo detention facility. Ibrahim argued that a
successful Arab-Israeli peace would significantly reduce Arab
"anger" at the U.S. "The Arab people don't hate Americans,"
said Ibrahim, but "they are angry at Americans" for their
perceived support for "injustice in the region."
Demonstrated commitment to producing a fair and just peace
would defuse the prevailing "surface anger" currently
directed at the U.S. Solving the Arab-Israeli conflict, said
Ibrahim, would take away the pretext for inaction on reform
that Arab leaders have long resorted to.

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"Democracy Must Remain Topmost"
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9. (C) Shahbender said the Egyptian people had welcomed
President Bush's call for democracy in Egypt and there was no
doubt that there is a long-term confluence of interest
between the USG's strategic push for democratic governments,
as the best guarantor of stability, and the interests of
ordinary people in the Middle East, who seek democratic
governance and protection of individual freedom. But
Shahbender also said the USG had sent "mixed signals" on
reform during the past two years. Doran assured the group
that President Bush remains deeply and personally committed
to spreading democracy and expanding freedom in BMENA, and he
noted that our diplomatic efforts and assistance programs
will continue to reflect this fact.

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Honor the Promises
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10. (C) Summarizing the consensus of Doran's non-NDP
interlocutors, Saad Eddin Ibrahim said the USG should "exert
all of its persuasive power" to urge President Mubarak to
"honor his own promises." Ibrahim said that none of
Mubarak's 2005 campaign promises had yet been realized. He
said that the USG should continue to press for at least six
items:

--lifting of the state of emergency;
--relaxation of the political parties law, to allow the
emergence of new, secular parties, which would blossom at the
expense of the MB;
--reform of the Constitutional articles 76 and 77, which
govern candidacy rules and term limits for the president;
--strengthening the independence of the judiciary;
--strengthening the independence and integrity of the media;
--relaxation of controls over NGOs and civil society.

Such actions by the GOE, said Ibrahim, would benefit Egypt
and converge with U.S. interests. USG diplomatic pressure on
the GOE would eliminate the perception that the USG "is
backing away from reform."


11. (U) NSC Senior Director Doran cleared this message.
JONES