SCENESETTER: SECRETARY RICE'S OCT 3-4 VISIT TO

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 006106

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/27/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV ENRG MNUC KDEM PHUM EG
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER: SECRETARY RICE'S OCT 3-4 VISIT TO
CAIRO

Classified by Ambassador Francis Ricciardone for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION: Madame Secretary, warm
welcome to Cairo. President Mubarak and Omar Soliman have
been trying to ameliorate conditions in Gaza. They will look
to you for specific measures to support Abu Mazen,
specifically on salaries to workers and release of prisoners.
They are sensitive to Israeli criticism on cash flows to
Hamas and Israeli charges of smuggling via Rafah. Mubarak
wants to help end our impasse with Bashir but shares
misgivings over putting western troops in Sudan. You can
play to his regional statesman's role, while reassuring him
on the specific objectives of the UN force. The Egyptians
have been coy about the upcoming GA vote between Venezuela
and Guatemala. We urge you to highlight to Mubarak that a
Venezuelan seat will be a pro-Tehran seat. On democracy, the
government is poised to adopt a series of constitutional
amendments and other reforms. The Egyptian political class
is fiercely debating whether the results will open government
or simply ensure Pharaonic succession. You may find an
opportunity with Mubarak himself to urge NGO certification
for IRI and NDI. Not least, you can endorse Egyptian
interest in developing nuclear energy -- a potential boost
for our GNEP program. END SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION.

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Peace Process
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2. (S) We and the Egyptians want more of the same from each
other: more support for Abu Mazen, more isolation for Hamas,
and especially more leadership to get a larger peace process
going again. Omar Soliman has been deeply engaged in
negotiations for the release of Corporal Shalit, tied to a
prisoner release that would politically benefit Abu Mazen.
On September 27, he leaked his letter to Khalid Mishaal,
blaming him for the impasse and urging him to support a
national unity government that would recognize Israel. Both
he and Mubarak will seek US measures to help Abu Mazen and
ease the humanitarian crisis in Gaza. The Egyptians resent
Israeli public criticism of complicity in smuggling at the
Rafah border as domestic politicking. In fact
Egyptian-Israeli border cooperation is strong, and the
Egyptians are willing to accept even more technical
assistance than we have been willing to provide. The
Egyptians say they have no legal recourse against Hamas
agents carrying cash across the border, provided the carriers
file a customs declaration. The Ministry of Treasury is
reportedly looking to amend current law, but they are
unlikely to find a legal fix soon. If we ask for more GOE
action against cash transfers now, in effect we will be
asking for extra-legal measures, a sensitive request.


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Sudan
--------------


3. (C) Mubarak passed our message to Bashir when he passed
through Cairo on September 21, and urged an end to the
current impasse, but Mubarak shares Bashir's misgivings about
western troops arriving unwelcome in Sudan. In such a case,
Mubarak sees "another Iraq" or Islamist inspired anti-Western
insurgency. Hence, the Egyptians favor a face-saving formula
for Bashir with incentives. Egypt's priority remains the
continued national unity of Sudan, preservation of which
would ensure unhindered flow of Nile water to Egypt, and
avoiding further "East/West" conflict over Darfur. You can
play to Mubarak's elder statesman role while assuring him
that the UN's goal in Darfur is strictly humanitarian, with
no broader agenda.

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Egypt and the United Nations
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4. (C) Cairo has not yet committed to support the Guatemalan
bid for a Security Council seat. Left to their old NAMist
tendencies, the MFA and even Mubarak would likely favor
Venezuela. Mubarak will certainly make the decision. He
despises Tehran and perhaps has not yet made the connection
between Venezuela and an Iran-friendly seat in the UNSC. But
he also needs to hear from you that Egypt's vote and broader
influence in UN circles really matters to President Bush on
this issue.

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Egypt Announces Nuclear Energy Program
--------------


5. (C) The big newsmaker during last week's National
Democratic Party (NDP) conference was Gamal Mubarak's call
for development of an Egyptian nuclear energy capacity.
Perhaps wittingly, he played into our Global Nuclear Energy
Partnership initiative, enabling us to immediately declare
U.S. support. Journalists are still looking for a
U.S.-Egyptian breach or a conspiracy angle and you will
certainly be asked our views on the nuclear file.


6. (C) The Conference also unveiled -- only in the broadest
terms -- an ambitious program of constitutional reforms,
following on President Mubarak's campaign pledges of 2005.
Reformers in the NDP assure us that these measures, to be put
before Parliament in the coming weeks, will devolve power
from the presidency to the parliament and the cabinet and
also devolve central government powers to the regions. The
devil will be in the details. Many critics regard these
reforms as measures to install Gamal Mubarak as the next
President. Our message to the GOE and NDP leadership has
been: the bolder you are this coming parliamentary year, the
more will cheer you on.

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Reform and Political Environment
--------------


7. (C) The GOE has maintained its June freeze on the
activities of USAID-funded democracy organizations IRI, NDI,
and IFES. MFA officials and Gamal have signaled some
softening, but have told us this will require Mubarak's
assent. We suggest that you raise it with both Mubarak and
Aboul Gheit. Both will moan that IRI acted illegally by
conducting political activities before it even applied to
register. You can reply that IRI has apologized and both
institutes are still eager to contribute to Mubarak's own
reform agenda -- working with legal political parties and
parliamentarians. These prestigious American institutions can
become international witnesses and thus supporters to
Mubarak's efforts, but frankly they are at the point of
giving up on Egypt.


8. (C) GOE officials have repeatedly begged us not to raise
Ayman Nour with Mubarak. But Nour remains in jail,
reportedly suffering from diabetes and heart disease. Nour's
wife claims he is being deprived essential medical care.
Regime supporters claim he is faking. PM Nazif told us that
he sent Nour his own physicians, but Nour turned them away.
A presidential pardon on humanitarian medical grounds seems
the best way out for all concerned.


9. (C) Meanwhile, in recent months, the GOE has intensified
its campaign of detentions of Muslim Brotherhood (MB)
members, culminating in a new round of arrests, including
senior MB leaders. Many of them remain in custody in
violation of the legal limitation of 45 days on preventive
detention. We have made clear to Mubarak, Soliman and Aboul
Gheit that we hold no candle for the Brotherhood, but
repression seems to only play into its hands.

Again, we look forward to ensuring a successful visit.
RICCIARDONE