SCENESETTER FOR GENERAL ABIZAID'S VISIT TO CAIRO

C O N F I D E N T I A L CAIRO 005317 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/23/2011 TAGS: PREL PARM PTER MOPS EG IS IZ IR SU LE KNNP SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR GENERAL ABIZAID'S VISIT TO CAIRO Classified By: Classified by DCM Stuart Jones for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Welcome back to Cairo. Your visit allows us to reaffirm our nations' strong mil-mil cooperation at a time when the broader bilateral relationship and the U.S. image on the Arab Street shows signs of strain due to the crisis in Lebanon. In meetings with governmental and non-governmental contacts, emboffs are now routinely subjected to sharp critiques of U.S. policies in the Middle East and doubts about our status as an "honest broker" vis-a-vis Arab-Israeli issues. In spite of this tension and GOE concerns regarding our long-term commitment to FMF, the mil-mil relationship remains solid. Minister of Defense Field Marshal Tantawi looks forward to exchanging views with you on Lebanon and its reconstruction, Syria, Iran, Sudan, and the security situation in Iraq. End summary. -------------- Military Issues -------------- ¶2. (C) The Field Marshal will thank you for your efforts to ensure the continuation of the USD 1.3 billion in annual security assistance to Egypt. Although Egypt once again dodged a bullet this year in the Congressional budget process, scrutiny of the program will likely continue. You may want to stress the need to look for more opportunities to strengthen our mil-mil cooperation and to highlight Egypt's support for our regional objectives. You may also want to express your support for Chief of Staff LTG Samy Enan's upcoming counterpart visit to the U.S. As you know, a solution to the International Medical Center problem is within reach, but not yet final. Because there are still a number of issues pending, we have not briefed the MoD on the proposed solution. -------------- The Aftermath of Lebanon -------------- ¶3. (C) Political reaction: While senior GOE officials recognize the respective roles Hizbollah, Iran, and Syria played in sparking the latest war, Egyptians across the board are furious over the destruction caused by what they see as Israel's use of disproportionate force. Egyptians also criticize the U.S. for providing military support to Israel during the crisis. Seeking to address public outrage towards Israel, Foreign Minister Aboul Gheit said publicly that he could not rule out the possibility that Israel had planned the war and that the U.S. played a role in the planning. He called on the international community to compel Israel to pay Lebanon compensation, and led the OIC initiative seeking a UN Human Rights Council investigation into Israel's alleged human rights violations in Qana and elsewhere. GOE officials believe Hizbollah can only be disarmed via an internal Lebanese process and that the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Sheba'a Farms (and placing the area under UN control pending a final resolution) is critical to achieving a lasting solution. ¶4. (C) Reconstruction: Egypt continues to provide humanitarian support to Lebanon. They have delivered 18 C-130s of relief supplies and maintain a humanitarian field hospital in Beirut. The hospital has treated approximately 1,000 patients a day since its late July deployment. President Mubarak also instructed his Ministry of Electricity to assist with rebuilding Lebanon's destroyed power grid. Egyptian Ambassador to the U.S. Nabil Fahmy told Assistant Secretary Welch during a recent meeting that Egypt may also SIPDIS explore sending quick-assembly Bailey-type bridges to Lebanon. We are following up on this idea with Foreign Ministry officials. The Field Marshal would welcome any information you could share on the scope of support the U.S military (logistical, communications) will provide to Lebanon. ¶5. (C) The Syria angle: GOE officials were furious with President Asad following his August 15 speech praising Hizbollah and criticizing (as "half men") Arab leaders who rebuked Hizbollah for kidnapping the Israeli soldiers. They believe Asad's alliance with Iran and Hizbollah is misguided, and also worry about his fragile internal situation. On the streets of Cairo, by contrast, Asad's praise for Hizbollah as a "resistance" (vice terrorist) group resonates. You may want to explore this further with the Field Marshal. -------------- Iran: Egypt's Fear of a Shiite Influence -------------- ¶6. (C) Egypt's concern over Iran's efforts to extend its influence in the region has intensified in recent months. Both Iran's chief nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani and Foreign Minister Motakki asked President Mubarak in June and August 2006 respectively to normalize Egyptian-Iranian relations and join in the fight against Israel and the U.S. Mubarak adamantly refused, telling Motakki to "forget it" and giving him a tongue lashing for supporting Hizbollah and Hamas, and not negotiating with the P5 1 on Iran's nuclear program. Speculation on alleged plans for U.S. military strikes on Iran's nuclear sites continue to circulate, and Tantawi will likely seek your views on Iran's recent response to the P5 1 package. -------------- Sudan -------------- ¶7. (C) Egypt's help with our effort to convince Sudan to permit UN forces in Darfur is important, and Tantawi could influence GOE decision-making. You might mention the importance of preventing future stalling by Sudan's President Bashir. -------------- Internal Politics and Reform -------------- ¶8. (C) Our clear call for the GOE to lead the region, by example, towards democracy and freedom has achieved significant but limited results. As 2005 drew to a close, it was reasonable to hope that, notwithstanding the manifest imperfections of the 2005 elections, Egypt's reform movement was on track. However, the nine months since the parliamentary elections have not witnessed continued reform momentum. The December conviction of presidential challenger Ayman Nour on forgery charges (underscored by the May denial of his judicial appeal),the February decree to postpone local elections (which threatened to see major gains by the Muslim Brotherhood) until the spring of 2008, and the May decision to extend the Emergency Law for another two years, all contributed to a widespread perception that political reform in Egypt has slowed. ¶9. (C) We understand that the NDP plans to use its annual party conference, September 19-20, to reiterate and re-emphasize Mubarak's reform program. Additionally, when Parliament reconvenes in November, it will reportedly tackle a wide range of constitutional amendments. The party conference and the next session of Parliament should shed additional light on the scale and authenticity of political reform. The Field Marshal would prefer not to discuss internal politics with you. RICCIARDONE