EGYPT'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE MEETING ON THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L CAIRO 002723 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/09/2016 TAGS: PREL PARM EG KNNP SUBJECT: EGYPT'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE MEETING ON THE PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE REF: A. STATE 66885 ¶B. CAIRO 2417 Classified by ECPO Minister Counselor Michael Corbin for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is an action request. Please see paragraph four. ¶2. (C) MFA's Disarmament Director Dr. Hossam Aly told poloff that a recent National Committee meeting to review the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) (Refs A and B) included representatives of all relevant ministries, including the Ministry of Defense, the Egyptian Atomic Energy Agency, Customs and Immigration, the Directorate of Military Intelligence, and the Egyptian General Intelligence Service. Aly said that while Defense and Foreign Ministry officials have a clear understanding of PSI, some of the other participants lacked substantive background. Some raised questions suggesting that endorsing the PSI would expose Egyptian flagged ships to increased vulnerability to interdiction or be misused to disrupt traffic in and revenues from the Suez Canal. Aly passed poloff a non-paper (see para four below) containing all of the questions raised at the meeting. He acknowledged that USG officials had already answered a number of the questions and, in reviewing the questions with poloff, conceded that many of the concerns raised were unfounded, but still requested answers. Aly cautioned that suspicion exists on PSI. He also said that GOE officials do not understand why the USG can say that over 70 countries support the initiative, but cannot provide a comprehensive list of the countries. ¶3. (C) Dr. Aly said that the MFA would convene another National Committee meeting to continue the PSI discussion, but noted that an endorsement in the near term was unlikely. (Note: Ministry of Defense officials continue to tell us that they are not interested in pursuing the PSI because maritime counterproliferation cooperation, which is handled on a case-by-case basis, works very well, and there are recent cases to prove this. End note). ¶4. (C) Action requested: Please assist post with answering questions 1, 4, 6, 7, 8, 10, 12, 14, and 15 in the non-paper below. Post can answer the remaining questions using background material that Washington has already provided. Begin text of non-paper as received from MFA: Questions on PSI ¶1. As an arrangement without a Secretariat, rules of procedure, or a review possibility, what other international arrangements can PSI compare to; ¶2. Are countries that announced their support for PSI immune against interdiction of their vessels? ¶3. Are they more vulnerable to the interdiction of their vessels? ¶4. Does joining PSI entail the facilitation of foreign access into national territorial waters or national territory? ¶5. Do national activities and internal transport fall under the object of PSI potential interdiction procedures? ¶6. Are there any means to verify intelligence data being relied on to request an interdiction? ¶7. What is the difference in status and nature of membership between the 11 core members and the rest? ¶8. How often have interdictions taken place since the announcement of PSI (How many operations have taken place? Where? What is the percentage of cases in which suspect cargo was located?) ¶9. Does interdiction cover commercial vessels only or cover military vessels as well? ¶10. What are the effective measures against confusion of civil dual purpose items with WMD components; ¶11. Is PSI a stable arrangement or does it represent a basis for further development which will also commit current members? ¶12. Does the State closest to the interdiction point choose which other States take part in the operation? ¶13. Is interdiction normally conducted by the State in its territorial domain or vicinity or does PSI allow foreign conduct (or contribution) to such interdiction? ¶14. Are there countries which have joined PSI and then pulled out of it? ¶15. Is there any connection between the obligations imposed by PSI and those imposed by international instruments on WMD disarmament and non-proliferation? (i.e, Can a country that is not a member of the NPT take part in the interdiction of suspected nuclear shipment? Or can a country that is not a CWC member take part in an interdiction of a suspected chemical weapons shipment? Will a country that is not a member to the NPT be controlled under PSI and its potential illicit nuclear shipments be a primary object of interdiction?) ¶16. Would there be a need to adapt national legislation to PSI? If yes, to what extent? ¶17. Which national authorities are normally involved in the implementation of PSI? End text of non-paper. RICCIARDONE