PM A/S HILLEN DISCUSSES FMF, SINAI SECURITY, IRAN,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CAIRO 002648 SIPDIS SIPDIS ROME (FOR LAROCCO) E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/06/2016 TAGS: PREL PHUM MASS UN EG IS IR SU KPAL KNNP KMFO SUBJECT: PM A/S HILLEN DISCUSSES FMF, SINAI SECURITY, IRAN, AND DARFUR WITH FOREIGN AND DEFENSE MINISTERS REF: A. STATE 20173 ¶B. STATE 66050 ¶C. STATE 68575 Classified by DCM Stuart Jones for reasons 1.4(b) and ( d). -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Visiting PM A/S Hillen, joined by the Ambassador, discussed Darfur, security assistance, Sinai security and regional cooperation with FM Aboul Gheit and Defense Minister Tantawi April 30. On Sudan, Aboul Gheit said that Egypt would only send more forces to Sudan with Khartoum's full support. Tantawi said the GOE would try to convince Sudan to accept an international UN force. On Iran, Aboul Gheit deflected strong concerns raised by A/S Hillen about Iran's nuclear program and urged the U.S. not to avoid discussion of the Israeli nuclear program. Tantawi warned the U.S. against using non-diplomatic tactics to resolve the matter. On Sinai security, both Aboul Gheit and Tantawi voiced relief that the U.S. intends to maintain current levels of support for the Multinational Observer Force (MFO). On security assistance, Tantawi welcomed Hillen's assurance of the Administration's full support for current funding levels. On U.S. concerns about funding to Hamas, Aboul Gheit stressed that the means must be found quickly to fund food and essential services for the Palestinians. End summary. -------------- Aboul Gheit on Darfur, Regional Affairs, MFO -------------- ¶2. (C) Darfur: Aboul Gheit, noting he had just sent the Secretary a message on Sudan, told A/S Hillen and the SIPDIS Ambassador April 30 that Sudan was willing to sign an agreement on the Darfur crisis, but that the rebels were stalling. He said urgent and forceful action would be needed to break the deadlock and called for Deputy Secretary Zoellick to travel immediately to the region to assist. Aboul Gheit also suggested that the United States had committed a tactical error in announcing in advance firm support for use of UN peacekeepers and possibly also NATO assets. He said that a more subtle effort to win GOS support first might have been more successful and would have prevented stalling by the rebels. He lamented that the U.S. did not consult more closely with the GOE. It was now time to "ask Cameron Hume to bang on the table," and press hard. ¶3. (C) Aboul Gheit said that Egypt would be willing to send more forces to Sudan, but only upon the request and with the full support of the GOS. Acknowledging the complexity of the internal dynamics, he stressed the importance for any military force entering Sudan to be African. To avoid any anti-colonial sentiment, any non-African forces should not, he warned, be of European origin. ¶4. (C) Iran: In response to Hillen's comments on the U.S. commitment to resolving the Iran nuclear dispute diplomatically, Aboul Gheit asked if the U.S. worry was just about Iran or about freedom from nuclear weapons in the Middle East region as a whole. Hillen said the U.S. is presently focused on Iran and will not link the issue with Israel. Aboul Gheit complained about what he said the Arab public views as a U.S. double standard, and urged that nuclear policies be applied even-handedly. By continuing to shield the Israelis, he said, the credibility of the U.S. was being undermined. Aboul Gheit pressed the United States to work to create a nuclear-free Middle East and said Egypt supported the U.S. in the IAEA because its position was consistent with support for the creation of the nuclear weapons free zone. ¶5. (C) Iraq: A/S Hillen stressed that the U.S. will not leave Iraq until it is democratic, stable, able to maintain internal security, and is not a threat to its neighbors. Aboul Gheit replied that Egypt and the United States see "eye-to-eye" on Iraq, but said that the issue is how to achieve our joint objectives to bring about positive changes. Hillen emphasized that the Arab League should seize the opportunity to play a role in Iraq. CAIRO 00002648 002 OF 003 ¶6. (C) MFO: FM Aboul Gheit welcomed A/S Hillen's statement that the United States does not intend to lessen its commitment to the MFO. Egypt does not want to lose the MFO, and is committed to improving security for MFO forces, Aboul Gheit said. Hillen told Aboul Gheit that the U.S. would support talks between the U.S., Egypt, Israel, and the MFO aimed at ensuring that the Treaty of Peace does not impede Egypt's efforts to meet its counterterrorism objectives in the Sinai. Aboul Gheit responded that the Sinai is solely in Egypt's control, but conceded that the situation on the border could be subject to discussion. ¶7. (C) Hamas: In reply to concerns raised by the Ambassador about international funds flowing to Hamas through Egyptian banks, Aboul Gheit warned that means must be found quickly to meet the needs of the Palestinian people for food and essential supplies. It was not enough, he said, for the U.S. and others to cut off Hamas without regard for the consequences. He said that the U.S. had recently rejected every option in the London meetings. Egypt does not want to further weaken Abbas, nor does it want "an explosion" on its border. Aboul Gheit noted that most of the PA employees are or were Fatah supporters. They would soon switch over to Hamas if they continue to be unpaid to find ways to feed their families, he said. ¶8. (C) UN Issues: The Ambassador urged Egypt to support Guatemala (per Ref A) in the up-coming election for Non-Perm Rep to the UNSC. Aboul Gheit, noting he was having lunch that day with the Guatemalan Ambassador, indicated that the GOE would carefully consider voting for Guatemala over Venezuela. Aboul Gheit did not respond substantively to the Ambassador's request (per Ref B/C) that Egypt not support UN Human Rights Council membership for Iran or other countries with records of human rights abuses. (Note: The relationship between Egypt and Iran is such that Egypt's support for the Iranian candidacy is highly unlikely. End note). -------------- Tantawi on FMF, Iran, MFO, and Darfur -------------- ¶9. (C) Defense Minister Tantawi and A/S Hillen, joined by the Ambassador, discussed the International Medical Center (IMC),FMF and regional cooperation, Sudan, and the MFO during their April 30 meeting. On the IMC, Tantawi said he does not want to close the hospital, but may need to because the operating costs are so great compared to the meager revenue. Hillen thanked the Minister for his cooperation in suspending treatment of non-authorized personnel while the Department resolves the matter according to the law. ¶10. (C) FMF: Hillen told Tantawi that the Administration supports the full FMF package for 2007 and will look for more opportunities to strengthen the strategic partnership with Egypt. Egypt's cooperation on issues such as Iran, Iraq, and Sudan is key, Hillen noted. (Note: In a follow-on meeting, other MoD officials warned that the U.S. should not try to use FMF to leverage political reform. Hillen explained that democratic reform is a priority for the Administration and that given this reality, Egypt should be prepared to address Washington's questions on this issue. End note.) ¶11. (C) In response to Tantawi's query on Iran, A/S Hillen reiterated the U.S. commitment to solving the matter diplomatically and asked for Egypt to play a leadership role to influence Iran to cooperate with the international community. Tantawi stressed that addressing the Iranian situation via means other than diplomacy would be very dangerous. He also reminded Hillen that Egyptian-Iranian relations are bad but confirmed the GOE's support for the U.S. on Iran. ¶12. (C) Egypt's field hospital in Afghanistan, Hillen observed, is a good example of how Egypt's humanitarian contributions support U.S. security objectives. Hillen urged Tantawi to explore ways to maximize the hospital's impact, possibly by establishing a link with an Afghan medical school to train Afghan doctors and nurses. Signaling his receptiveness to the idea, Tantawi directed his staff to CAIRO 00002648 003 OF 003 research the matter and report back to him. ¶13. (C) Darfur: When Hillen raised the urgency of the Darfur crisis, Tantawi expressed doubt that Sudan could be convinced to accept an international UN mission in Darfur. But after Hillen explained that the President is focused on this issue and asked Egypt to urge the Government of Sudan to accept a humanitarian force, Tantawi agreed to try. (Note: In a follow on meeting with other MoD officials, Hillen again stressed the urgency of the Darfur matter and asked for Egypt's support in influencing the Government of Sudan. End note). ¶14. (C) MFO: On the MFO and security in the Sinai, Hillen said that the he does not anticipate any drawdown in U.S. troops, particularly given the April terrorist incidents. It will be important, Hillen said, not to allow the Treaty of Peace to impair Egypt's counterterrorism program. He noted that the U.S. would support discussions with Egypt, Israel, and the MFO to ensure that Egypt's counterterrorism efforts can continue. The Minister acknowledged the complexity of the situation in the Sinai. RICCIARDONE