SCENESETTER FOR A/S HILLEN'S VISIT TO CAIRO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 002475

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/26/2016
TAGS: PREL PTER MASS MOPS KMFO EG IR IS KNNP KPAL
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR A/S HILLEN'S VISIT TO CAIRO


Classified by DCM Stuart Jones for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).

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Summary
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1. (C) Embassy Cairo warmly welcomes your visit and the
opportunity to discuss security assistance, border security,
regional cooperation, and the MFO with the GOE. The Defense
and Foreign Ministers will likely press you for further
assurance of the Administration's support for the current
level of security assistance. Defense Ministry officials
will also seek your support to resolve the International
Medical Center matter and may ask about the U.S commitment to
maintaining troop levels at MFO. Given recent security
incidents in the Sinai, officials may ask about the
availability of U.S. assistance to bolster security on the
Egypt-Gaza border. End summary.

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Security in the Sinai
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2. (C) Security along Egypt's border with Gaza and in the
Sinai in general remains a key concern. The April 24
bombings in the resort town of Dahab and the suicide attacks
on April 26 represent the third and fourth terrorist
incidents in the Sinai in a year and a half. Poor education
and employment opportunities, arbitrary law enforcement, and
half-hearted development efforts conspired to give the
Bedouin few alternatives to their traditional pursuit of
smuggling. This, in turn, has made them vulnerable to
exploitation by terrorists. Developments in the occupied
territories, and particularly in Gaza, also complicate Sinai
security and have, on occasion, led to breaches in border
security.


3. (C) The deployment of 750 members of the Border Guard
Forces (BGF) has improved smuggling interdiction
significantly and allowed the GOE to control incidents such
as the break through of the border wall caused by the Al Aksa
Martyrs Brigade on January 4. However, the BGF are poorly
equipped, poorly trained and stretched thin. In light of
these gaps, the MoD asked the USG for a supplemental budget
of USD 300 million to fund BGF equipment needs, ranging from
helicopters and patrol boats to alarm wire, tunnel detectors,
and bullet proof vests. We ignored the request due to the
cost of new procurement and also because the Treaty of Peace
restricts the technical equipment that can be placed in the
Sinai. Defense Minister Tantawi has told GOI officials that
Egypt would like to place as many as 4,000 Border Guards on
the border. Although publicly satisfied with Egyptian border
security (and with counter smuggling efforts in particular),
GOI officials have said they are not yet ready to discuss
allowing more BGF in the Sinai. You may want to ask MoD
officials if there has been any progress on this issue.


4. (C) Given the potential impact of Sinai's security
challenges on regional security, there are obvious advantages
to bolstering USG support for GOE efforts to improve
security. Possible opportunities for USG-GOE cooperation
include:

-- providing training (possibly drawing, in part, on Export
Control and Border Security program funds) to BGF and law
enforcement officials (Note: topics could include
counter-smuggling, border patrol, WMD handling, crisis
response, and crowd control. End note.);

-- urging the GOE to use some FMF to fund Sinai-specific
needs (as permitted by the Treaty of Peace); and

-- urging the GOE to make Sinai development a priority so
that USAID resources could be directed to Sinai projects on
the rule of law, education, and health.


5. (C) Each area of potential cooperation involves
political and legal sensitivities stemming from the GOE's own
views of the status of the Sinai (as compared with other
regions of Egypt) and the fact that Sinai is administered as
a military zone. Consequently, progress will require a new
level of GOE buy-in. The 2006 visits of S/CT Ambassador
Crumpton and ISN A/S Rademaker piqued GOE interest in
furthering cooperation. In particular, Ambassador Crumpton
suggested to GOE interlocutors that State would explore
initiatives to support border security and A/S Rademaker
briefed GOE officials on training and other opportunities
available under the Export Control and Border Security
Program. Furthermore, some political leaders are clearly
looking for solutions for Sinai and are tired of the old way
of doing business there.

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MFO
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6. (C) The U.S. commitment to maintaining troop levels at
MFO is an issue of increasing concern among GOE officials.
Defense Secretary Rumsfeld's query to Defense Minister
Tantawi on the MFO raised a red flag for the Egyptians.
Consequently, on several occasions since that visit, Tantawi
has sought reassurance of U.S. support for maintaining the
status quo, arguing that the MFO would not have the same
influence regionally without a strong U.S. troop presence and
that Palestinian-Israeli developments argue against any
change in troop levels. MoD officials would welcome any
reassurance you can offer on this issue. You will have a
change to review the status of the MFO in your meeting with
the MFO's DG Representative.

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Military Assistance
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7. (C) President Mubarak regards the USD 1.3 billion in
military assistance to Egypt as the keystone of the
U.S.-Egyptian strategic relationship, but suggested recently
in both a TV interview and in a meeting with Senator Shelby
that he was prepared for an eventual reduction in assistance.
That said, because of Egypt's support for U.S. regional
objectives, such as on Iran, the Peace Process, Hamas,
counterproliferation, and Sudan, the GOE believes that
Congressional discussions about reducing or redirecting any
portion of this assistance are inappropriate. GOE officials
have said that any change would signal a downgrade in the
relationship and may impact cooperation in key areas. These
officials have also said that, on a practical level, reducing
military assistance would force them to look elsewhere (i.e,
Russia and China) for less expensive military equipment. We
have advised the GOE that they bear responsibility for
convincing Congress of Egypt's value to the U.S, but the GOE
believes the U.S. should press Congress harder to ensure
continued FMF support for Egypt. NEA A/S Welch recently
suggested to Tantawi that Egypt send troops to support a UN
mission in Darfur, and Tantawi promised to raise the matter
with Mubarak. Tantawi then told visiting Senator Shelby,
however, that further support for the AU mission was
preferable to UN involvement. While Tantawi is not the lead
on this foreign policy issue and his role is limited to
supplying troops, you should press on the need for a strong
effective force to ameliorate the humanitarian crisis in the
Sudan.

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Counterproliferation
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8. (C) Under Secretary Joseph urged the Defense and Foreign
Ministers to endorse the PSI's statement of the Principles of
Interdiction during his April 12-14 visit. While FM Aboul
Gheit pressed his staff (in Joseph's presence) to look at the
issue and report back to him, Tantawi told the Ambassador
directly (just before U/S Joseph's visit) that he prefers the
present arrangement by which the GOE supports (quietly) U.S.
counterproliferation requests, including interdictions, on a
case by case basis.

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Domestic Politics
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9. (C) President Mubarak told Egyptian newspaper editors
that his January meeting with Vice President Cheney and his
February meeting with Secretary Rice indicated that the USG
was satisfied with Egypt's reform process. This is not the
case. The GOE is proceeding with its economic reform agenda,
centered on an ambitious plan to create 4.5 million jobs over
the next six years, but few concrete results on political
reform have been observed thus far. The parliamentary
elections in 2005 went badly, and postponement of local
council elections until 2008 suggests that the GOE leadership
is moving cautiously. The February 3 Red Sea ferry accident
and the avian influenza crisis (12 human cases thus far) have
also put the GOE somewhat on the defensive. The opposition
bloc in the new Parliament, which includes 88 independent
deputies affiliated with the banned but tolerated Muslim
Brotherhood, has kept up a steady stream of criticism of the
GOE. Secular opposition activist Ayman Nour, who placed a
distant second to Mubarak in the September 2005 presidential
elections, remains in prison after his December 24, 2005
conviction on politically-motivated forgery charges. Nour's
appeal before Egypt's highest court will be heard on May 18.
Particularly in the wake of the Dahab attacks, both Aboul
Gheit and Tantawi will tell you that internal reform is
underway, but that security is of paramount importance.
RICCIARDONE