DARFUR: EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT MUBARAK'S MESSAGE TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 002137 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/06/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM MOPS PTER EG SU SUBJECT: DARFUR: EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT MUBARAK'S MESSAGE TO SUDAN'S BASHIR REF: A. KHARTOUM 829 ¶B. CAIRO 2104 (NOTAL) Classified by ECPO Minister Counselor Michael Corbin for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary. According to a senior MFA contact, Egyptian President Mubarak's message to Sudanese President Bashir in Khartoum April 4 was that Sudan was not given a "blank check" at the Arab League summit for its Darfur policies. Mubarak reportedly pressed Bashir to quickly conclude a peace deal in Abuja and accept a UN role in Darfur. Still, GOE officials remain leery of a "premature" deployment of UN troops to Darfur, especially if deployed with a Chapter VII mandate, and believe USG policy toward Khartoum is counter-productive. Egypt will continue to support the African Union (AU) mission in Sudan (AMIS) for now, and may send more monitors. GOE contacts believe an African Union/Arab League-managed Darfur-Darfur-Dialogue (DDD) will help strengthen a peace deal. The GOE believes the impending visit by Vice President Taha to Abuja in the coming days augers well for progress in the peace talks. Likewise, MFA and Arab League contacts believe USG observers in Abuja have contributed positively of late to getting rebels there to negotiate seriously, and believe additional U.S. public pressure on the rebels would ensure further progress. End summary. ¶2. (C) During an April 6 meeting with Emboff, MFA Sudan Affairs Director Ambassador Maasoum Marzouk described the brief April 4 visit to Khartoum by President Mubarak to meet with Sudanese President Bashir. Marzouk echoed readouts from other GOE sources (refs A and B) and said Mubarak was very direct with Bashir: the political support Sudan received from Arab leaders at the Khartoum Arab League summit was not a "blank check" - Khartoum must promptly reach a peace deal in Abuja. The UN must also be accepted as an eventual player in Darfur, as in the south. But, Marzouk added, the UN role should be to monitor a peace deal, not enforce one. ¶3. (C) Marzouk stressed that Egypt's priority in Sudan is a successful implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). Should CPA implementation stall or fail, he said, the country could return to a state of civil war and chaos - an outcome that would directly and negatively affect Egypt's national security interests. ¶4. (C) Marzouk described U.S. Darfur policy as self-defeating, saying it had stirred strong resistance from the entire Government of National Unity (GNU),had prolonged the suffering of Darfur civilians, and had led to the creation of a fertile breeding ground for Islamic extremists. Marzouk pleaded for the USG to rethink its "aggressive" stance toward the GNU and help resolve the conflict as quickly as possible - "like you did in Naivasha." The U.S. should publicly set negotiating deadlines and put the rebels on notice that they can not stall, he said. Marzouk also mentioned the free flow of light weapons in Darfur, suggesting that the U.S. might work to ameliorate that flow. ¶5. (C) Marzouk said that the GOE recently counseled Sudan's Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Samani al Wasila in Cairo that Washington's foremost desire for Darfur was a peace deal that ended the violence and suffering there. Egyptian diplomats conveyed that the U.S. was not "out to get" Sudan - a belief Marzouk said was increasingly taking hold with regime members and the wider public. Such sentiments scared Egypt, as the "Turabi elements" would take advantage to recruit militants and extremists. The notion of Darfur becoming a breeding ground for terrorists and extremists scares Egypt, and needs to be dealt with, he added. Egypt is likewise concerned about growing instability in Chad as a result of the situation in Darfur. ¶6. (C) On the issue of rehatting African Union forces in Darfur with UN blue helmets, Marzouk shared GOE concerns that planning for such a deployment was premature, without serious efforts taken to reach a peace deal in Abuja. An eventual expansion of the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) to include Darfur would be a reasonable expectation, but not "prematurely." An enhanced AMIS can do the job for less money than the UN, he argued, citing what he considered excessive costs and ineffectiveness of the UN mission in Congo - a mission he said he knew well from his tenure as Egypt's Ambassador in Uganda. A deployment of UN forces to Darfur was no guarantee of peace there, he said, and might actually make things worse if not handled delicately, and sequenced in a manner that took into consideration African dignity, and the complexities of such tribal conflicts. ¶7. (C) Even with a peace deal in Abuja, Marzouk said that the Darfur-Darfur-Dialogue (DDD) must be vigorously pursued, preferably managed jointly by the African Union and the Arab CAIRO 00002137 002 OF 002 League. Since a majority of Darfurians did not feel that the two main rebel groups (JEM and SLM) adequately represented their interests, the DDD was necessary to guarantee a lasting peace. It was important for the underlying social tensions in Darfur, to be addressedb through this dialogue. Note: Marzouk did not address whether the DDD might be used by the GOS to further delay UN deployments to Darfur after a peace agreement in Abuja is reached. End note. ¶8. (C) Asked about further possible Egyptian contributions to AMIS, and any possible UN force in Darfur, Marzouk repeated Foreign Minister Aboul Gheit's recent public statement that Egypt was willing to provide additional monitors to AMIS. It was unlikely, Marzouk believed, that further military troops would be available for an expanded UNMIS. ¶9. (C) Comment: The comments from Marzouk, along with those of other senior GOE and Arab League officials, reveal the careful balance being walked by the GOE in trying to be supportive of their Arab neighbor, facilitate continued implementation of the CPA, and counseling that the UN will be absolutely necessary for the eventual stabilization and reconstruction of Darfur. End comment. RICCIARDONE