EGYPT: FLASH AIRLINES CRASH REPORT RELEASE: NO

C O N F I D E N T I A L CAIRO 001883 SIPDIS SIPDIS NEA FOR ELA NEA PLEASE PASS NTSB (FHILLDRUP) ABU DHABI FOR FAA (PBARTKO) PARIS FOR ZEYA MONTREAL FOR ICAO C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (ADDED CLASS AUTH AND REASON) E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/27/2016 TAGS: PREL EAIR ECON EG SUBJECT: EGYPT: FLASH AIRLINES CRASH REPORT RELEASE: NO CLOSURE TO CONTROVERSY REF: EMBASSY CAIRO - NTSB CORRESPONDENCE CLASSIFIED BY MINISTER COUNSELOR MICHAEL CORBIN FOR REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D) -------------- Summary -------------- 1.(C) The final investigation report into the January 2004 Flash Airlines Boeing 737 crash in the Red Sea off Sharm El Sheikh did not draw any definitive conclusions, but pointed toward four "possible" technical faults as the cause of a "severe upset" from which the pilots could not recover. These findings disagree with those of the U.S. and French investigators, which indicate that physiological and human factors likely led to the disaster. The lead French investigator highlighted this disagreement in his comments at the report release, unleashing a hail of criticism from members of the Egyptian pilot's family and local press seeking to exonerate the crew of any fault. As promised, the Egyptian investigative team appended both the U.S. NTSB and French BEA comments to the report. At least one local paper has pointed to reports of compensation already paid to some victims families by a fund, which includes the aircraft's manufacturer, as proof of a technical fault. End summary. -------------- No Major Surprises -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Econoff attended on March 23 the Ministry of Civil Aviation's (MCA) official release of the final report on the January 2004 Flash Airlines Boeing 737 crash in the Red Sea off Sharm El Sheikh. The crash killed 148, 134 of whom were French tourists. Post received an official copy of the final report on behalf of the NTSB and will forward via diplomatic pouch. Post obtained an electronic version of the 1,313-page report and, at the NTSB's request, passed a copy to a regional Boeing representative to be transmitted via their channels. ¶3. (SBU) The final report appears to closely resemble earlier drafts, citing four "possible causes" and five "possible contributing factors." The "possible causes" listed focused on technical faults, with the autopilot system receiving the most attention. This list excluded pilot error or physiological factors, although the "contributing factors" list does mention the role potentially played by spatial disorientation (SD) in preventing the pilot from recovering the aircraft. Despite their disagreement with NTSB and French Bureau d'Enquetes et d'Analyses pour la securite de l'Aviation Civile (BEA) conclusions that SD was the primary cause of the crash, the Egyptians, based on Post's initial perusal, have apparently appended in full the NTSB and BEA comments to the final report. -------------- Highlighting Contradictions -------------- ¶4. (C) The lead MCA investigator Capt. Shaker Qelada did not highlight differences in opinion among the investigators during his presentation, but did acknowledge that they existed and could be read in the report. The lead French investigator, Paul-Louis Arslanian did, however, highlight in his comments the BEA's belief that physiological factors (SD) were to blame and that the report did not adequately reflect this. He stated that "the plane remained pilotable at all times," thereby ruling out any potential technical fault as the cause of the crash. Qelada seemed taken aback by Arslanian's public contradiction, and Econoff overheard Qelada describing his surprise and displeasure to the French Consul General at the conclusion of the event. ¶5. (SBU) Some local journalists, upon hearing Arslanian's remarks, interrupted proceedings to decry any mention of potential human factors in the crash. Members of the Egyptian pilot's family, who said they had been told all along technical faults caused the crash, vehemently denied any pilot fault and sought to highlight the alleged payment of compensation to some French family members, other recent Boeing 737 crashes, among other issues, as proof of a technical cause for the crash. They also argued to the audience, and to the regional satellite press afterward, that American political pressure must have been exerted on the MCA to include any mention of human error in the final report. -------------- Compensation Conspiracy? -------------- ¶6. (SBU) The question of a settlement allegedly paid to a small number of French victims' families reappeared frequently during the Q&A portion of the event, with the Egyptian family members hounding the head of now-defunct Flash Airlines on the issue. He explained the compensation fund mechanism (which included four American companies and Flash Airlines, he said) and noted that the ones to have received a settlement thus far were those with some "American ties" that allowed the U.S. courts to become involved. All others have not yet received compensation and were involved in legal pursuit of same. The French victims' families representative acknowledged this as well. -------------- The Victims' Families -------------- ¶7. (SBU) Caught in the middle of the proceedings were the representatives of the families of the French deceased, whose statements were interrupted on numerous occasions by the vocal defense of the pilot by his family and some local press. The families' questions seemed to focus primarily on the conduct of the investigation, particularly the non-retrieval of what may have been critical pieces of wreckage. Qelada noted that the depth of the wreckage site prevented full retrieval of the wreckage, and the securing of the Flight Data Recorder and Cockpit Voice Recorder were sufficient to conduct the investigation. Assuming the technical cause for the crash as stated in the report, the families' representatives inquired whether steps had been taken to prevent future occurrences. Qelada confirmed the cooperation of the aircraft and equipment manufacturers from the very beginning of the investigation. The families' representatives appeared to be unconvinced by both the technical and physiological findings of the three investigative bodies, arguing that not enough had been done to get to the root cause of the accident. -------------- Press Coverage -------------- ¶8. (SBU) Despite the heavy presence of local, regional, and French press at the event, coverage in the Egyptian press has been relatively light, with wire service reports focusing on Arslanian's comments contradicting the Egyptian report. One article in the pro-gvernment daily Rose El Yousef did, however, focus on the compensation queston, arguing that previous payments constitute an admission of a technical fault. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶9. (C) Despite high emotions, the proceedings ran largely as expected, with the GOE report focusing on "possible" technical causes rather than the human/physiological factors outlined in the NTSB and BEA findings (although the GOE at least mentioned spatial disorientation as a contributing factor). The apparent appending of the full NTSB and BEA report comments would fulfil promises made to the Ambassador by the MCA, although the NTSB will need to review the final report to ensure all comments were included. While the MCA stuck to its word that they would not turn the report release into an anti-US or anti-Boeing media circus, Boeing and Honeywell (the maker of the autopilot system) will likely face continuing questions over the compensation question. Egypt has agreed to conduct an FAA technical safety review in the near term prior to their next scheduled IASA safety inspection. Both events will provide a good opportunity for the MCA to confirm its commitment to air safety and the prevention of future disasters. RICCIARDONE