SCENESETTER FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY SILVERBERG'S

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 000172 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/12/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER KUNR PHUM IS IZ LE SY SU EG UN SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY SILVERBERG'S VISIT TO CAIRO Classified by DCM Stuart Jones for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Embassy Cairo warmly welcomes your visit. It has been difficult to gain Egyptian cooperation on UN reform. During his meeting with Ambassador Tahir-Kheli in December Foreign Minister Aboul Gheit signaled a willingness to compromise, but this has not yet materialized. The FM will likely remind you that Egypt takes seriously its role as a leader of developing nations in multilateral fora. But in reality, Egypt has used alleged "non-aligned", OIC or Arab block "consensus" to actively thwart U.S. objectives. Your visit presents an opportunity to remind the GOE that a more efficient, transparent, and effective UN would benefit all nations. The concept of reform has become an element on Egypt's internal agenda as well, and despite setbacks in the 2005 elections, Mubarak continues to pledge his commitment to democratic reform. As a regional leader, Egypt exerts a positive influence, particularly in the Palestine/Israel and Syria/Lebanon situations. End summary. ¶2. (C) UN Reform: Egypt's stance on the range of UN reform initiatives has been unhelpful. Both the FM and your counterpart, Assistant Minister for Multilateral Affairs Naela Gabr, told Ambassador Tahir-Kheli during her early December visit to Cairo that Egypt would like to find ground for greater cooperation with the U.S., but we see no tangible results yet. Your meetings present an opportunity to continue a high-level dialogue and press for progress across the Board. ¶3. (C) The FM will likely leave substantive discussions to his Assistant Minister. You can expect Ambassador Gabr to engage you on the details of Egypt's position on each of the pending proposals. In short, Egypt's positions on key issues are as follows: -- Management reform: supports slowing process of reform; believes reform not urgent; -- Mandate review: opposes review of all mandates over five years old; suspicious of review of mandates that impact Palestinians; -- Human Rights Council: wants same size; limited use of country specific resolutions; opposes adopting criteria for membership; -- Ethics Office: believes office not necessary; Ambassador Gabr has requested a description of the proposed mandate and estimated cost; -- Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism: supports including language that would exempt acts by national liberation movements and include acts by national militaries. ¶4. (C) Egypt and the UNHCR: Relations between the GOE and UNHCR are badly strained as a result of a December 30 incident in which at least 27 Sudanese refugees were killed when Egyptian police broke up a three-month-long sit in at a small park near Cairo's UNHCR offices. The GOE is defensive about the incident, and blames UNHCR for creating the situation and then criticizing the Egyptian response. The GOE detained about 2000 protesters but released all but approximately 460, who are now under review by UNHCR, pending deportation. While working hard to promote greater communication/cooperation between the GOE and UNHCR, we have refrained from publicly criticizing the GOE's inept handling of the incident. ¶5. (C) Egypt and the IAEA: In the IAEA, Egypt has emphasized NPT universality (Israel) over compliance (Iran), but Iran's decision on January 10 to remove the seals at the Natanz enrichment facility has disturbed the GOE. Cairo may take note that the Egyptian Director General of the IAEA, Mohammed el Baradei, has acknowledged the seriousness of this latest breach. There may be cause to hope that Egypt will realize that it should join the international community in calling for an emergency meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors to consider referring Iran to the UNSC. ¶6. (C) Domestic Political Overview: Although Mubarak has reaffirmed his commitment to democratic reform and political pluralism, there have been setbacks in recent months. In particular, the GOE intervened in the later rounds of recent parliamentary elections to staunch impressive gains by the Muslim Brotherhood. Reported election irregularities included the use of bribery, violence and threats of violence to influence voters, barring voters from entering polling stations, and rigging vote counting. The GOE also convicted on forgery charges and jailed political opposition leader Ayman Nour on December 24. Observers agree that Nour's real offense was challenging Mubarak, and implicitly his son Gamal as a potential future President. Nour's conviction, which came at significant expense in terms of international criticism, only further marginalizes a secular opposition that was wiped out in the parliamentary elections. Nonetheless, Mubarak has vowed to continue democratic and economic reform, albeit at a pace set by the GOE, not dictated by international friends or critics. ¶7. (C) Economic Overview: Because the Egyptian leadership recognizes that free market policies are essential to create growth and jobs and, in the long term, preserve social peace, the GOE's economic reform agenda will likely continue. When Mubarak announced a new cabinet on December 31, he retained all previously-appointed economic reformers and placed some additional ministries under the leadership of new reformers. Egypt's reformers are pushing for a Free Trade Agreement and are disappointed that the U.S. has postponed an announcement of FTA negotiations. ¶8. (C) External Relations: Senior GOE officials have consistently urged Bashar al Assad to cooperate fully with the Mehlis commission's investigation of the Hariri assassination. At the same time, officials press us to refrain from taking strong action against Syria and warn that a post-Asad regime could prove worse than the status quo. On Israel/Palestine, Egypt's influence is also positive. The Egyptians had developed a close working relationship with Sharon and have been key to brokering agreements on Gaza withdrawal, the movement of Palestinians in and out of Gaza, and training Palestinian security forces. On Iraq, the GOE has supported the political process by hosting Iraqi leaders and publicly backing the presence, for now, of U.S. forces in Iraq. Nonetheless, the GOE differs with us fundamentally on democracy in Iraq and believes that Iraq needs a "tough but fair" leader to keep the peace. RICCIARDONE