ARGENTINA'S PEACEKEEPING CENTER

C O N F I D E N T I A L BUENOS AIRES 000458 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR DAN FISK WHA FOR A/S SHANNON E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/24/2016 TAGS: MARR MOPS KPKO AR SUBJECT: ARGENTINA'S PEACEKEEPING CENTER REF: A. BUENOS AIRES 120 ¶B. BUENOS AIRES 291 ¶C. 05 BUENOS AIRES 3145 Classified By: Ambassador Lino Gutierrez, Reasons 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) DCM, accompanied by POLOFF, visited the Argentine Joint Peacekeeping Training Center (CAECOPAZ) February 24 to receive a briefing on CAECOPAZ's capabilities, as well as on ongoing Argentine contributions to PKO's in Haiti (about 600 troops),Cyprus (about 400 troops),Kosovo (about 130 troops) as well as individual observers to other PKO's. ¶2. (U) CAECOPAZ's mission is broken into three main phases: a) training before departure; b) monitoring during deployment; and c) debriefing and "decompression" after return. In operation since 1995, CAECOPAZ (located just north of Buenos Aires) has the capacity to train up to one battalion per rotation, but also offers courses for individuals. The U.S. maintains a full-time exchange officer at CAECOPAZ and has provided significant assistance in the form of an auditorium for lectures and equipment for computer simulations. However, due to Brooke sanctions, we have been unable to provide assistance since 2003. CAECOPAZ also hosts exchange officers from Brazil and Bolivia, and hopes to soon include officers from Canada, Chile, and the UK. ¶3. (C) The Director of CAECOPAZ, Colonel Tissolito, told DCM that the Haiti PKO represented a new era in Argentine contributions to international peacekeeping missions. Overall, he said, the deployment had gone well, and the Haitian residents in Gonaives (where the Argentine contingent is located) had received them well, particularly given the Argentines' quick provision of humanitarian assistance in the aftermath of Hurricane Jeanne in September 2004. Tissolito said the only significant problem was Argentina's lack of a "strategic logistical" capability, i.e. the flexibility to move spare parts and supplies to PKO operations when needed. As it now stood, the Argentine contingent in Haiti must wait for either the arrival of a new contingent every six months, or the supply ship San Blas (which also doubled as the Argentine's modest R&R facility). The San Blas, however, which has been in the Caribbean since November, is returning to Argentina in March. Tissolito said he was somewhat worried about the added stress the absence of an R&R facility could put on the Argentine peacekeepers. ¶4. (C) Speaking in broader terms, Tissolito said he detected two mindsets in the Argentine armed forces. There was the conventional, older view that still believed that the Argentine military's main purpose was to defend Argentine territory against outside attacks. The newer (and mostly younger) viewpoint held that Argentine forces needed to adjust quickly to a role of fighting asymmetrical warfare and especially develop and strengthen their peacekeeping capabilities. In this respect, he said, the new MOD Nilda Garre was a pleasant surprise for adherents of the latter view. Despite her left-wing credentials, Garre is strongly supportive of deploying Argentine for PKO duties. (She listed this as one of her top priorities in recent meetings with the Ambassador, A/S Shannon and DASD Pardo Maurer. See reftels.) Garre attended the January 27 sendoff at CAECOPAZ of the most recent Haiti PKO rotation, and visited the troops in Haiti Feb. 21. ¶5. (U) Reftels available at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/buenosaires.< /a> GUTIERREZ