AMIA SPECIAL PROSECUTORS CALL ON AMBASSADOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L BUENOS AIRES 002637 SIPDIS SIPDIS WHA FOR A/S SHANNON, DAS DUDDY, DMCCARTHY WHA/BSC FOR BARNES, FRIEDMAN, MOSS NEA/IR FOR HWOOSTER S/CT FOR ARNOLD SIERRA NSC FOR JOSE CARDENAS FBI FOR CTD IRAN-HIZBALLAH UNIT AND OIO AMERICAS UNIT E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/28/2016 TAGS: PTER KJUS PREL PGOV AR FBI SUBJECT: AMIA SPECIAL PROSECUTORS CALL ON AMBASSADOR Classified By: Ambassador Wayne for reasons 1.4(b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: On November 27, AMIA prosecutors Alberto Nisman and Marcelo Martinez Burgos called on the Ambassador to express their deep appreciation for the USG's support for their investigation and publicly for our public support following the release of their report. They noted that their investigation continues, looking particularly into the Tri Border Area (TBA) and Buenos Aires networks that facilitated the 1994 attack. They stated that the Interpol delay in emitting the "Red Notices" was an inconvenience but not unexpected, given the case's history. Nisman said he wished his own government was more forthcoming in voicing support but did see as positive the fact that the Foreign Ministry was pulling together an interagency group (including the Prosecutors) to discuss next steps. Ambassador assured the Prosecutors of continued U.S. support, briefly describing our diplomatic efforts, and encouraged them to work with the Judge and Argentina's Interpol representative to respond aggressively to Iran's efforts to derail the capture notices. We also noted the upcoming 3 1 talks in Buenos Aires, stating that this would be an excellent opportunity for Argentina to brief on the AMIA issue and solicit support. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Drs. Alberto Nisman and Marcelo Martinez Burgos, lead prosecutors in the AMIA case, called on the Ambassador November 27 to discuss the status of the case. DCM, A/LegAtt and PolOff sat in on the meeting. Nisman thanked the Ambassador for the USG's valuable support to their investigation and for the public statements of support following the release of their investigative report October ¶25. Nisman stated that he wished he could get a similar show of support from his own government. He noted that his team continues to work on the investigation and is focused particularly on trying to uncover more information about the Islamic networks operating in the TBA and in Buenos Aires at the time. ¶3. (C) Ambassador asked if Nisman had seen some of the negative press that has come out that basically described Nisman's report as a recirculation of the previous investigation and based on intelligence files and the testimony of unreliable witnesses. Nisman said that he had quietly responded to the authors of the press articles. To the Ambassador he very strongly defended the investigation, the report and the strength of evidence and witnesses. He noted that several of the witnesses were former senior Iraqi government officials, e.g. Bani Sadr, with direct knowledge of events surrounding the conception of the attack. He explained that not a single intelligence file was cited as evidence in his report; rather that the intelligence served to support the evidence gathered through other sources, or to generate new leads that were later corroborated via independent evidence. ¶4. (C) Turning to Interpol and the capture notices, the Ambassador asked if Nisman and Martinez Burgos knew if anyone had responded to the Interpol Secretary General's notification that he would not be issuing Red Notices until both Iranian and Argentine authorities had an opportunity to express their views. Nisman said he did not think anyone had. The Ambassador noted how important it was for Argentina to reach out for support and start building an international coalition. He said that it often takes significant urging, even of our best friends, to build this kind of support. The Ambassador explained that he had raised the AMIA case, and made the same points, to the Foreign Minister, and to the Interior and Justice Ministers as well. A/LegAtt stressed the importance of engaging quickly with Interpol and not leave the field open to the Iranians to have the last word. ¶5. (C) The Ambassador explained that the U.S. would be working quietly here, in Washington and in capitals to build support for Argentina's legitimate right to disseminate the capture notices and to seek to bring terrorists to justice. The Ambassador stressed the importance of reaching out to the countries represented on the Interpol Executive Committee to make sure they were aware of Argentina's position. Nisman said that he would talk to Judge Canicoba Corral and to Argentina's Federal Police Interpol Chief to discuss responding to the Secretary General. ¶6. (C) Nisman also noted that the Foreign Ministry had been talking to them and other agencies and has put together an interagency process to look at the issues. Nisman offered that he was going over to the MFA that afternoon for a meeting. He said that he and Martinez Burgos had offered their services to help inform other governments and were at the MFA's disposition. Ambassador noted that he had made the same suggestion to senior officials in several of his meetings as a way to explain to governments, first hand, the strength and complexity of the case against the indicted individuals. PolOff noted the upcoming 3 1 meeting in Buenos Aires and that it would be an excellent opportunity to raise the AMIA issue and solicit support. Nisman said he believed that 3 1 would be one of the issues of the MFA meeting. ¶7. (C) Comment: Nisman was very appreciative of the public expressions of support he had received from the U.S., and others and said that this was very important, particularly for the GoA, to feel it had international support. He asked the Ambassador and USG to do all it could to solicit more such support from other countries. It is discouraging that apparently no one in Buenos Aires had thought to respond officially to the Interpol Secretary General, but we believe we have energized Nisman to work with the Judge and the Argentine Interpol representative to at least consider it. A/LegAtt will follow up with the Interpol representative to see where things stand. It is encouraging, however, that the GoA is starting to discuss in a coordinated fashion how to initiate a diplomatic effort. Embassy will continue to engage here to support those efforts, including contact in the next days with the MFA. WAYNE