K,OMICS REVISITED: KIRCHNER,S ECONOMIC POLICIES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BUENOS AIRES 001624 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR WHA TOM SHANNON, JOHN MAISTO, AND CHARLES SHAPIRO NSC FOR DAN FISK TREASURY FOR DAS NANCY LEE USCINCSO FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/21/2016 TAGS: ECON PGOV ENRG ETRD EFIN AR SUBJECT: K,OMICS REVISITED: KIRCHNER,S ECONOMIC POLICIES EDGING OFF COURSE REF: A. BUENOS AIRES 1151 ¶B. BUENOS AIRES 1594 Classified By: CDA a.i. Hugo Llorens for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) ¶1. (C) Summary: During the first three years of his mandate, President Kirchner's rhetoric on economics was worse than his bite. Despite sometimes inflammatory, nationalist rhetoric, attacks on the IMF, oil companies, bondholders, various business sectors and orthodox economists, Kirchner did little to try to steer Argentina off the fundamentally pro-market, capitalistic economic model it adopted in the 1990s (even as he attacked this model repeatedly). Beginning in early 2006, however, the GOA's economic policies have edged to the left, and for the first time, are beginning to interfere in a substantive way with the functioning of the basic model. This is most clear in the GOA's anti-inflation approach, where the GOA's policies effectively turn entire sectors into regulated utilities, with the GOA examining their cost structures and setting prices based on a "reasonable" profit. In energy, it is pushing to deepen the state,s role in energy exploration and production even though its model has resulted in an effective halt in new exploration and a significant deterioration in reserves. This increasing state role is of concern, and the intrusion into the private sector's pricing decisions is a significant deviation from the market-led model. The policies are not being driven by ideology but by the very short-term political focus of the administration. Fortunately for Kirchner, a market-based exchange rate regime continues to make Argentina's economy highly competitive and favorable international prices for key exports continue to propel economic activity to impressive new heights. Indeed, exports are at record levels, GDP is set to rise nearly 9 percent in 2006 for the fourth consecutive year, and unemployment has dropped from one-quarter of the work force in 2002 to 9.7% currently. Kirchner's strong record as someone who delivers results will greatly benefit him politically in 2007. Ultimately, however, the economic costs of these short-term policies will emerge and be paid by someone, somewhere. How Kirchner allocates those costs likely will be a major theme in his second term. The private sector, which so far has said very little in opposition to Kirchner's policies, is likely to receive much of the bill. End summary. -------------- Unorthodox Inflation Policy -------------- ¶2. (C) The GOA's anti-inflation policy is decidedly unorthodox. First, the Argentine Central Bank (BCRA),whose statutory mission is fighting inflation, plays no role in the anti-inflation fight, and in fact, may be accelerating it. The BCRA's priority is accumulating reserves, as directed by the President and, secondarily, keeping interest rates low to stimulate continued growth. As reported reftel A, M2 in the first quarter surged 26 percent while the economy grew at an 8-9 percent pace. ¶3. (C) Second, the GOA official in charge of anti-inflation policy is Guillermo Moreno, now the Secretary of Internal Trade at the Economy Ministry, even though he openly says that he continues to work for Planning Minister De Vido, his long-time mentor. Moreno's job is to negotiate "voluntary" price agreements with industry sectors that freeze prices for basic goods (those that affect the Basic Consumption Basket that is used to measure inflation). Moreno does this by demanding their books, examining their costs, and then setting their prices on a cost-plus basis, effectively turning them into regulated utilities. For the companies, this means guaranteed profits, no price competition, and no new entrants to compete against them. The GOA explanation for this approach is that market-set prices are the result of oligopolistic suppliers abusing their market power, and that there is no economic basis for price increases. The BCRA adds to this explanation that price increases are the result of the delayed adjustment of relative prices since the 2002 devaluation, and are not being fueled by monetary emissions. ¶4. (C) In this light, the GOA's imposition of a six-month BUENOS AIR 00001624 002 OF 004 beef export ban on March 8 of this year as part of its anti-inflation policy was only somewhat less orthodox than the basic policy. The ban went into effect because Moreno was unable to reach a price restraint agreement with the beef sector, which has 200,000 producers that are loosely organized into several trade groups that cannot bind their members. Argentina consumes only about 45 percent (by volume) of a beef carcass. Prior to the ban, all parts not consumed in Argentina were exported. The ban applies to the whole carcass, even those parts that would not be consumed in Argentina, resulting in substantial losses to producers. The ban had its desired effect - domestic prices of beef fell by 25 percent over several months - but the supply situation worsened, and the GOA is now trying to give low-interest loans to increase supplies. The GOA has partially lifted the export ban, allowing 40 percent of the prior export levels to be exported, but it also imposed an export permit system that is not functioning well. Currently, exports are only at about 20 percent of levels prior to the ban. The end result is that one of the key sectors of the export-led Argentine economic recovery has been deeply damaged. ¶5. (C) The GOA's strongest anti-inflation anchor has been its fiscal accounts. The GOA is well on its way to its fourth consecutive primary fiscal surplus, an unprecedented run of sound fiscal management in modern Argentine history (the previous record was two years). Yet this is mainly a revenue story; spending has grown at a 30 percent annual pace under Kirchner. In the first quarter of 2006, spending exceeded the growth in revenues for the first time during the Kirchner administration. At the provincial level, spending has surged due to wage increases (following in lockstep the 10 percent increase provided by the GOA). GOA subsidies to industries have grown to ARP 21.5 billion (USD 7.1 billion) this year, 22 percent of the 2006 budget. ¶6. (C) As Argentina goes into a presidential election year, and with inflation running at 12-15 percent, it is hard to imagine that spending will not continue to grow, regardless of revenues, or that the GOA will not give public sector workers a wage increase. The GOA also has stashed approximately ARP 5 billion into off-budget fiduciary trust funds for roads, public works and other purposes, and the GOA is expected to increase spending from these accounts next year as well. The potential loss of the fiscal anchor would be a significant, negative signal for the Argentine economy. -------------- The Growing State Role in Energy -------------- ¶7. (C) The Kirchner Administration has always wanted a state presence in the energy sector. In 2004, Energy Secretary Cameron told Econoffs that the Administration believed that energy resources should be owned and priced by the GOA to stimulate growth and employment, but said that they accepted the private sector-led model. Kirchner created the state energy holding company, Enarsa, in 2004. While Enarsa remains mainly a shell, it has a growing role as the holder of remaining GOA property interests in the energy sector, and is available as the entity to reclaim portions of energy concessions that the private sector decides it will not pursue or develop. ¶8. (C) The Kirchner Administration knew in 2003 that Argentine industry faced possible energy shortages. Natural gas prices had been pesified and frozen at very low levels. The market was looking for price signals to ramp up exploration and development, to take advantage of the low costs of production following the 2002 devaluation. Instead, the Kirchner Administration,s energy policy was based on expanding supply from Bolivia (where it was buying gas at a "solidarity price" of USD 3.2 per million cubic meters) and kept prices frozen. For the past three years, while Argentine companies faced sporadic gas and electricity shortages and mining and industrial investments were being shelved because of uncertainty about energy supply, the Kirchner Administration stuck to its Bolivia supply strategy, while the situation in Bolivia deteriorated. On June 29, President Kirchner finally signed an agreement with Bolivian BUENOS AIR 00001624 003 OF 004 President Morales that provides for gas at a price of USD 5 per million cubic meters until the end of the year, and for a major increase in supply if new pipeline capacity is added. The GOA will now have to figure out how it is going to allocate this price increase (56 percent),while avoiding an inflation increase. While the supply side of the agreement is positive, it doesn't solve the electricity or transmission problems. Two new power plants need to be built, and a pipeline to supply them, to alleviate shortages. That will take another two years. ¶9. (C) Meanwhile, gas reserves have dwindled to just nine years consumption. The GOA has offered a carrot (low interest loans for exploration, so long as Enarsa is brought in as partner) and a stick (review of concession contracts and rescissions of contracts where companies have not complied with investment requirements). But it still will not offer price signals to stimulate production. Indeed, the Administration seems to be moving in the direction of a state-owned energy sector that prices energy to stimulate employment and growth. -------------- Politics Uber Alles -------------- ¶10. (C) Politics and, in particular, Kirchner's focus on winning the 2007 Presidential elections in the first round, are the driving force behind these unorthodox economic policies. This is nothing new. In 2003, prior to Kirchner's election, then economic advisor De Vido told us that "economics will be subordinate to politics in a Kirchner Administration." ¶11. (C) Kirchner promised in his campaign that he would be his own Minister of Economy, and he has now made good on that pledge. As noted in reftel B, Kirchner's authoritarian style and focus on accumulation of power, as well as a fractured and inept opposition, have made him one of the most powerful elected presidents in recent Argentine history. Kirchner's economic policies also are the result of his closed management style, where he consults with only a very small inner circle that has little private sector experience. That inner circle is made up of lawyers and long-time cronies whose main focus is domestic politics. These advisors are loathe to tell Kirchner he is wrong. While Kirchner may consult with reputable experts from time to time (e.g., Finance Secretary MacLaughlin, Central Bank director Luis Corsigilia),these are not true Kirchner insiders and their influence is limited. ¶12. (C) As seen through the prism of short-term domestic politics, the GOA's energy policy is a win-win: Kirchner gets to beat up on foreign companies, blame them again for the 1990s, keep utility rates frozen to the benefit of the middle class and, if the foreign companies decide to pull out, he is "forced" to re-nationalize the concessions, to 70 percent approval ratings. Similarly, the GOA beef ban makes political sense because the beneficiaries are the urban majority, a major constituency for Kirchner. Targeting companies for excess profits is also easy, because the GOA knows that anyone doing business in Argentina now is demanding very high rates of return (20-45 percent per year) as a risk premium. Kirchner is offering them a trade-off: agree to lower prices in exchange for legally fixing prices with their competitors at a profitable level. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶13. (C) By attacking private sector price gouging, regulating their profit levels and, in many cases, using subsidies to keep prices low, Kirchner is for the first time beginning to tinker with the delicate internal mechanics of the market-led economic model. His increasingly state-led energy policy has not yet produced the supply needed to keep the economy growing. The policies are not being driven by ideology but by the very short-term political focus of the administration. Fortunately for him a market-based exchange rate regime BUENOS AIR 00001624 004 OF 004 continues to make Argentina's economy highly competitive and favorable international price for key exports continue to propel economic activity to impressive new heights. Indeed, exports are at record levels, GDP is set to rise nearly 9 percent in 2006 for the fourth consecutive year, and unemployment has dropped from one quarter of the work force in 2002 to 9.7% currently. Kirchner's strong record as someone who delivers results will greatly benefit him politically in 2007. Ultimately, however, the economic costs of these short-term policies will emerge and be paid by someone, somewhere. How Kirchner allocates those costs likely will be a major theme in his second term. The private sector, which so far has said very little in opposition to Kirchner's policies, is likely to receive much of the bill. LLORENS