STAFFDEL MACKEY PUSHES AMIA BOMBING CASE

UNCLAS BUENOS AIRES 000146 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS STATE FOR WHA PDAS CHARLES SHAPIRO AND S/CT DEBORAH MCCARTHY NSC FOR DAN FISK AND JUAN ZARATE FBI FOR CTD/IRAN-HIZBOLLAH UNIT FOR SSA E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PINR PREF PREL PTER KJUS AR SUBJECT: STAFFDEL MACKEY PUSHES AMIA BOMBING CASE REF: BUENOS AIRES 2844 AND PREVIOUS ¶1. (U) This cable is sensitive but unclassified, and not for Internet distribution. ¶2. (U) This is an action cable. Please see paragraph 14. -------------- Summary -------------- ¶3. (SBU) House Committee on International Relations (HIRC) Senior Counsel John Mackey and HIRC Democratic Deputy Chief Counsel Paul Oostburg Sanz traveled to Argentina January 10-13 to review the status of the current investigation into the 1994 Jewish Community Center (AMIA) terrorist bombing. Prosecutors are making progress and expect to issue new indictments against a number of Iranian nationals within months. Upon issuance of those indictments, Argentina will need U.S. help at Interpol to counter an expected Iranian campaign against the issuance of international capture notices. The Staffdel's visit was very helpful in reinforcing to relevant officials and bombing victims the longstanding U.S. commitment to seeing justice done in this case. End Summary. -------------- The Trip -------------- ¶4. (U) House Committee on International Relations (HIRC) Senior Counsel John Mackey and HIRC Democratic Deputy Chief Counsel Paul Oostburg Sanz traveled to Argentina January 10-13 to review the status of the current investigation into the 1994 Jewish Community Center (AMIA) terrorist bombing. (Note: The Staffdel also worked on regional narcotics issues, and those discussions are summarized in septel. End Note.) The Ambassador and Country Team members briefed the Staffdel before its meetings with the prosecutors in charge of the current investigation, high-ranking MFA officials, and numerous groups representing the Jewish community in Argentina. -------------- Prosecutors Moving Forward -------------- ¶5. (SBU) The Staffdel met January 11 with Special AMIA Prosecutor Marcelo Martinez Burgos, one of two prosecutors heading the AMIA Special Investigative Unit (the other, Alberto Nisman, was traveling and unavailable). Mackey began by stressing that the U.S. Congress was disappointed to see that the previous investigation had gotten off track (reftels),but views the current investigation with U.S. government support as a serious inquiry. He explained that the Staffdel was not visiting Burgos to talk about any of the Investigative Unit's possible conclusions, but rather to get a sense of when the Unit would reach those conclusions. Oostburg Sanz added that while Congress understands the difficult circumstances facing investigators, there is frustration among members regarding the long time this case has taken to come to conclusion. Argentina and the world have a responsibility to bring the perpetrators to justice. Mackey opined that the current investigation was likely the last chance to see justice done in the AMIA case. ¶6. (SBU) Both staffers said Congress backed the ongoing U.S. Embassy support for the Special Investigative Unit's investigation and preparations for new and additional indictments in the case. Our common goal is to avoid a repeat of the debacle at Interpol in September 2005, when Interpol's Executive Committee voted unanimously to cancel the "red notices," or international capture orders, for the 12 Iranian nationals indicted by Argentina for their roles in the AMIA attack. The Staffdel assured Burgos that the U.S. Congress backs the Administration's full diplomatic support to help Argentina make its case to reinstate the red notices based upon any new indictments. With that in mind, the Staffdel emphasized the importance of close coordination between the Special Investigative Unit and the USG. Such coordination will allow for timely diplomatic intervention to counter a certain Iranian campaign against reinstatement of the notices. ¶7. (SBU) Burgos told the Staffdel that he was unable to predict exactly when his office would be issuing new indictments, but that "developments" were likely during the period between May and July 2006. He added that he would like to issue indictments before July 18, the anniversary of the bombing. (Note: Burgos said that any new indictments would involve only AMIA's "international connection" (i.e. Iranian nationals). His office does not have any immediate plans to re-open cases against those Argentines alleged to have comprised the "local connection," who were all acquitted in 2004 (reftels). The GOA is currently appealing those acquittals. End Note.) Burgos admitted that Argentina faces an uphill battle in Interpol, but pointed out that his is a new case that Interpol will have to judge on its own merits. The organization will not be able to use the same arguments it used to cancel the red notices. Still, the case is not as strong as it could be due to an absolute lack of cooperation from Iran, and incomplete cooperation from Lebanon, according to Burgos. The U.S.'s support at Interpol is therefore crucial. -------------- MFA Takes Hard Line With Iran -------------- ¶8. (SBU) The Staffdel also focused on the AMIA case during a January 10 meeting with MFA Undersecretary for Foreign Policy Ambassador Luis Cappagli and members of his staff. Mackey and Oostburg Sanz stressed the importance of the case to the U.S. Congress, and encouraged Argentina to take all steps possible toward justice for the victims. Cappagli complained about Iran's unwillingness to cooperate, but said that Argentina does not have a lot of cards to play because of the low level of the bilateral relationship. MFA Middle East Director Ambassador Ramon Villagra Delgado told the Staffdel that Argentina is "disappointed and angry" at the lack of results from the AMIA investigation, and said that the frustration expressed by the Staffdel regarding the length of time the case has dragged on "is the frustration felt by every decent Argentine." Villagra explained that Iran used to be Argentina's largest trading partner in the Middle East, but after AMIA Argentina shut down the trade relationship completely. Villagra also said that "there is no possibility that Argentina will ever get to any agreement with Iran short of Iran honoring its word to provide full cooperation to the investigation. We don't trade the blood of our people for anyone's money." ¶9. (SBU) Tracking Embassy efforts, Mackey encouraged the MFA to begin work with friendly nations toward a better Interpol result the next time. Cappagli agreed, but said that Argentina has to be realistic and cannot ignore the fact that very few nations at Interpol thought Argentina's groundwork was solid enough to maintain the red notices. Cappagli also noted that taking action before new indictments are issued could be construed as GOA interference with the domestic justice system, which would give Iran the ability to argue that the new indictments were politically motivated. The DCM said the red notices incident at Interpol was a sad example of governments not fully understanding the case and confusing its international aspects with the internal. He stressed the Embassy's long-term commitment to assist in the case, and told Cappagli that the U.S. would use its diplomatic and political muscle in another push to support Argentina if/when new indictments are issued. ¶10. (SBU) The Staffdel questioned why Argentina has failed to take a harder public line against Hizbollah, such as by arguing for its inclusion on the UNSCR 1373 terrorist list. Villagra answered that "Argentina knows all about Hizbollah," but cannot make any changes to its policy until an Argentine judge rules that Hizbollah was involved in AMIA. Argentina has not acted against Hizbollah to date because of concerns about the stability of Lebanon, where Hizbollah has a strong parliamentary representation, according to Villagra. ¶11. (SBU) The Staffdel also asked Cappagli about Venezuela and Bolivia, with Oostburg Sanz noting Congress' particular concern about the deterioration of democracy in Venezuela, especially as it relates to the rule of law and the concentration of power in the executive branch. Cappagli said that presidents Chavez and Morales are best dealt with through constructive engagement and not by "isolating these countries." Oostburg Sanz emphasized that Congressional leaders do not seek to isolate Chavez, but that he makes alternative courses of action almost inevitable, as evidenced by the rebuke of Codel Hyde in November 2005. Oostburg Sanz also said that it is a pity that Argentina, a leader for so many decades in the region, is beginning to be seen by Members of Congress as a follower of Venezuela and Chavez because of its failure to pressure Venezuela on key democracy and rule of law issues. -------------- The Jewish Community -------------- ¶12. (SBU) Much of the Staffdel's time in Argentina was dedicated to meetings with Jewish community organizations. Those meetings allowed the Staffdel to hear a range of views about the progress of the investigation and the role and comfort level of the Jewish community in Argentina. The Staffdel's schedule included meetings with the AMIA leadership; the directors of AMIA sister organization DAIA; Argentina's branch of the Simon Weisenthal center, local religious leaders; and victims' associations and their legal representation. There is overwhelming consensus in the Jewish community on the importance of pressing forward vigorously with the investigation and seeking new indictments. Jewish leaders of AMIA and DAIA vowed to continue to lobby the GOA to make the AMIA case a top foreign policy priority. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶13. (SBU) Staffdel Mackey's visit was a real boost to the Embassy's longstanding commitment to see justice done in this case. It was important for the relevant Argentine officials and organizations to see that the U.S. Congress and Executive continue to speak with one voice on this issue, that both branches are still watching developments closely, and that the U.S. remains fully involved and willing to assist in any way possible. -------------- Action Request -------------- ¶14. (SBU) The Staffdel recommended that the USG be fully coordinated and ready to act when new indictments are issued and international arrest warrants are forwarded to Interpol. Specifically, the staffers suggested that State (S/CT, L, WHA) should coordinate a USG position with DOJ, with one office from State or DOJ assuming responsibility (and accountability) for overall management of the USG effort in support of Argentina's position at Interpol. The staff of the HIRC plans to follow up with State and DOJ to ensure USG preparedness. GUTIERREZ