STAFFDEL MACKEY PUSHES AMIA BOMBING CASE

UNCLAS BUENOS AIRES 000146

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR WHA PDAS CHARLES SHAPIRO AND S/CT DEBORAH MCCARTHY
NSC FOR DAN FISK AND JUAN ZARATE
FBI FOR CTD/IRAN-HIZBOLLAH UNIT FOR SSA

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PINR PREF PREL PTER KJUS AR
SUBJECT: STAFFDEL MACKEY PUSHES AMIA BOMBING CASE

REF: BUENOS AIRES 2844 AND PREVIOUS


1. (U) This cable is sensitive but unclassified, and not for
Internet distribution.


2. (U) This is an action cable. Please see paragraph 14.

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Summary
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3. (SBU) House Committee on International Relations (HIRC)
Senior Counsel John Mackey and HIRC Democratic Deputy Chief
Counsel Paul Oostburg Sanz traveled to Argentina January
10-13 to review the status of the current investigation into
the 1994 Jewish Community Center (AMIA) terrorist bombing.
Prosecutors are making progress and expect to issue new
indictments against a number of Iranian nationals within
months. Upon issuance of those indictments, Argentina will
need U.S. help at Interpol to counter an expected Iranian
campaign against the issuance of international capture
notices. The Staffdel's visit was very helpful in
reinforcing to relevant officials and bombing victims the
longstanding U.S. commitment to seeing justice done in this
case. End Summary.

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The Trip
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4. (U) House Committee on International Relations (HIRC)
Senior Counsel John Mackey and HIRC Democratic Deputy Chief
Counsel Paul Oostburg Sanz traveled to Argentina January
10-13 to review the status of the current investigation into
the 1994 Jewish Community Center (AMIA) terrorist bombing.
(Note: The Staffdel also worked on regional narcotics issues,
and those discussions are summarized in septel. End Note.)
The Ambassador and Country Team members briefed the Staffdel
before its meetings with the prosecutors in charge of the
current investigation, high-ranking MFA officials, and
numerous groups representing the Jewish community in
Argentina.

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Prosecutors Moving Forward
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5. (SBU) The Staffdel met January 11 with Special AMIA
Prosecutor Marcelo Martinez Burgos, one of two prosecutors
heading the AMIA Special Investigative Unit (the other,
Alberto Nisman, was traveling and unavailable). Mackey began
by stressing that the U.S. Congress was disappointed to see
that the previous investigation had gotten off track
(reftels),but views the current investigation with U.S.
government support as a serious inquiry. He explained that
the Staffdel was not visiting Burgos to talk about any of the
Investigative Unit's possible conclusions, but rather to get
a sense of when the Unit would reach those conclusions.
Oostburg Sanz added that while Congress understands the
difficult circumstances facing investigators, there is
frustration among members regarding the long time this case
has taken to come to conclusion. Argentina and the world
have a responsibility to bring the perpetrators to justice.
Mackey opined that the current investigation was likely the
last chance to see justice done in the AMIA case.


6. (SBU) Both staffers said Congress backed the ongoing U.S.
Embassy support for the Special Investigative Unit's
investigation and preparations for new and additional
indictments in the case. Our common goal is to avoid a
repeat of the debacle at Interpol in September 2005, when
Interpol's Executive Committee voted unanimously to cancel
the "red notices," or international capture orders, for the
12 Iranian nationals indicted by Argentina for their roles in
the AMIA attack. The Staffdel assured Burgos that the U.S.
Congress backs the Administration's full diplomatic support
to help Argentina make its case to reinstate the red notices
based upon any new indictments. With that in mind, the
Staffdel emphasized the importance of close coordination
between the Special Investigative Unit and the USG. Such
coordination will allow for timely diplomatic intervention to
counter a certain Iranian campaign against reinstatement of
the notices.


7. (SBU) Burgos told the Staffdel that he was unable to
predict exactly when his office would be issuing new
indictments, but that "developments" were likely during the
period between May and July 2006. He added that he would
like to issue indictments before July 18, the anniversary of
the bombing. (Note: Burgos said that any new indictments
would involve only AMIA's "international connection" (i.e.
Iranian nationals). His office does not have any immediate
plans to re-open cases against those Argentines alleged to
have comprised the "local connection," who were all acquitted
in 2004 (reftels). The GOA is currently appealing those
acquittals. End Note.) Burgos admitted that Argentina faces
an uphill battle in Interpol, but pointed out that his is a
new case that Interpol will have to judge on its own merits.
The organization will not be able to use the same arguments
it used to cancel the red notices. Still, the case is not as
strong as it could be due to an absolute lack of cooperation
from Iran, and incomplete cooperation from Lebanon, according
to Burgos. The U.S.'s support at Interpol is therefore
crucial.

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MFA Takes Hard Line With Iran
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8. (SBU) The Staffdel also focused on the AMIA case during a
January 10 meeting with MFA Undersecretary for Foreign Policy
Ambassador Luis Cappagli and members of his staff. Mackey
and Oostburg Sanz stressed the importance of the case to the
U.S. Congress, and encouraged Argentina to take all steps
possible toward justice for the victims. Cappagli complained
about Iran's unwillingness to cooperate, but said that
Argentina does not have a lot of cards to play because of the
low level of the bilateral relationship. MFA Middle East
Director Ambassador Ramon Villagra Delgado told the Staffdel
that Argentina is "disappointed and angry" at the lack of
results from the AMIA investigation, and said that the
frustration expressed by the Staffdel regarding the length of
time the case has dragged on "is the frustration felt by
every decent Argentine." Villagra explained that Iran used
to be Argentina's largest trading partner in the Middle East,
but after AMIA Argentina shut down the trade relationship
completely. Villagra also said that "there is no possibility
that Argentina will ever get to any agreement with Iran short
of Iran honoring its word to provide full cooperation to the
investigation. We don't trade the blood of our people for
anyone's money."


9. (SBU) Tracking Embassy efforts, Mackey encouraged the MFA
to begin work with friendly nations toward a better Interpol
result the next time. Cappagli agreed, but said that
Argentina has to be realistic and cannot ignore the fact that
very few nations at Interpol thought Argentina's groundwork
was solid enough to maintain the red notices. Cappagli also
noted that taking action before new indictments are issued
could be construed as GOA interference with the domestic
justice system, which would give Iran the ability to argue
that the new indictments were politically motivated. The DCM
said the red notices incident at Interpol was a sad example
of governments not fully understanding the case and confusing
its international aspects with the internal. He stressed the
Embassy's long-term commitment to assist in the case, and
told Cappagli that the U.S. would use its diplomatic and
political muscle in another push to support Argentina if/when
new indictments are issued.

10. (SBU) The Staffdel questioned why Argentina has failed to
take a harder public line against Hizbollah, such as by
arguing for its inclusion on the UNSCR 1373 terrorist list.
Villagra answered that "Argentina knows all about Hizbollah,"
but cannot make any changes to its policy until an Argentine
judge rules that Hizbollah was involved in AMIA. Argentina
has not acted against Hizbollah to date because of concerns
about the stability of Lebanon, where Hizbollah has a strong
parliamentary representation, according to Villagra.


11. (SBU) The Staffdel also asked Cappagli about Venezuela
and Bolivia, with Oostburg Sanz noting Congress' particular
concern about the deterioration of democracy in Venezuela,
especially as it relates to the rule of law and the
concentration of power in the executive branch. Cappagli
said that presidents Chavez and Morales are best dealt with
through constructive engagement and not by "isolating these
countries." Oostburg Sanz emphasized that Congressional
leaders do not seek to isolate Chavez, but that he makes
alternative courses of action almost inevitable, as evidenced
by the rebuke of Codel Hyde in November 2005. Oostburg Sanz
also said that it is a pity that Argentina, a leader for so
many decades in the region, is beginning to be seen by
Members of Congress as a follower of Venezuela and Chavez
because of its failure to pressure Venezuela on key democracy
and rule of law issues.

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The Jewish Community
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12. (SBU) Much of the Staffdel's time in Argentina was
dedicated to meetings with Jewish community organizations.
Those meetings allowed the Staffdel to hear a range of views
about the progress of the investigation and the role and
comfort level of the Jewish community in Argentina. The
Staffdel's schedule included meetings with the AMIA
leadership; the directors of AMIA sister organization DAIA;
Argentina's branch of the Simon Weisenthal center, local
religious leaders; and victims' associations and their legal
representation. There is overwhelming consensus in the
Jewish community on the importance of pressing forward
vigorously with the investigation and seeking new
indictments. Jewish leaders of AMIA and DAIA vowed to
continue to lobby the GOA to make the AMIA case a top foreign
policy priority.

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Comment
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13. (SBU) Staffdel Mackey's visit was a real boost to the
Embassy's longstanding commitment to see justice done in this
case. It was important for the relevant Argentine officials
and organizations to see that the U.S. Congress and Executive
continue to speak with one voice on this issue, that both
branches are still watching developments closely, and that
the U.S. remains fully involved and willing to assist in any
way possible.

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Action Request
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14. (SBU) The Staffdel recommended that the USG be fully
coordinated and ready to act when new indictments are issued
and international arrest warrants are forwarded to Interpol.
Specifically, the staffers suggested that State (S/CT, L,
WHA) should coordinate a USG position with DOJ, with one
office from State or DOJ assuming responsibility (and
accountability) for overall management of the USG effort in
support of Argentina's position at Interpol. The staff of
the HIRC plans to follow up with State and DOJ to ensure USG
preparedness.
GUTIERREZ