WHAT ROMANIA CAN DO TO PROMOTE STABILITY, SECURITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BUCHAREST 000519

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE DEPT FOR EUR/NCE - WILLIAM SILKWORTH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/23/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM SOCI ECON ENRG ASEC PTER KCRM
MARR, MOPS, ETRD, EINV, RO
SUBJECT: WHAT ROMANIA CAN DO TO PROMOTE STABILITY, SECURITY
AND DEMOCRACY IN THE BLACK SEA REGION

REF: A. BUCHAREST 411


B. BUCHAREST 447

C. BUCHAREST 278

D. 05 USNATO 759

E. 05 BUCHAREST 2354

Classified By: CDA Mark Taplin for Reasons 1.4 (a),(b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary. Romania's desire to play an active role in
the Black Sea region could, if properly channeled and
supported by the U.S., the U.K. and like-minded partners,
further our goals for the region and beyond. Bucharest could
play a positive role in promoting regional efforts to
strengthen democratic institutions, diversify energy sources,
and combat asymmetric transnational threats such as TIP and
narcotics trafficking. Existing organizations like the
Bucharest-based Southeast European Cooperative Initiative
(SECI) Regional Center can help further these goals, but more
support from Washington and European capitals is needed to
persuade skeptical neighbors along the Black Sea rim to begin
to cooperate seriously on a regional basis. The June 5 Black
Sea forum in Bucharest provides an opportunity to jumpstart
this process, but we need to provide counsel to the Romanians
on how to best focus their efforts, as well as lend
encouragement to Bulgaria and NATO-aspirants Ukraine and
Georgia to work together more closely on a regional basis.
It also provides an opportunity to send a clear message to a
reluctant Ankara in particular that more regional dialogue
rather than less is the best way for it to maintain its
leading role on the Black Sea and to collaborate with NATO
and EU members in addressing "soft security" questions that
have growing implications for Europe and beyond. End Summary.


2. (C) On March 20, the Ambassador assembled Country Team
members for a wide-ranging offsite discussion of Black Sea
issues. Embassy Bucharest offers these thoughts as our
contribution to the ongoing USG assessment of a strategy
towards the Black Sea region. If all politics are local, it
may be true that all global strategies are too. The
standing-up of an East European Task Force in Romania and
Bulgaria may be, when viewed from Washington, mostly about
cutting-edge military training and operations far beyond the
Black Sea rim. However, for the countries in the region
itself, our new presence on the Black Sea has meant strategic
recalibrations -- some more enthusiastic than others -- as
well as no small measure of heartburn. For this reason,
among others, it is imperative that we set a clear policy
direction, on a government-wide basis, so that regional
capitals will better understand our objectives -- and
correspondingly will be less likely to make miscalculations
about a neighborhood which shows every sign of becoming more
critical for U.S. interests.

The Black Sea "Security Paradox"
--------------

3. (C) Country Team members immediately identified the Black
Sea "security paradox": despite the presence of three NATO
members on the Black Sea littoral, and the planned accession
of both Romania and Bulgaria to the EU in January, 2007, the
Black Sea region and its neighborhood remain very much on the
"frontier" of a prosperous and democratic Europe. The Black
Sea region itself is home to at least three frozen conflicts
and abuts the still-unstable Western Balkans. The area's
nascent democracies face major challenges, including
entrenched endemic corruption within their borders and the
threats posed by transnational crime syndicates, which
transcend national boundaries.


4. (C) The region is Europe's "gateway" to the Caucasus and
the Middle East, as well as an increasingly major point of
entry into Europe for oil and natural gas from those areas.
Indeed, much of the Romanian focus on the Black Sea region
reflects its growing dependence on foreign sources of energy,
including Russian gas imports. (Ref A) Although the region is
a crossroads for legitimate commerce, having reemerged in the
post Cold War era as the pathway from the Middle East to
Europe, law enforcement experts note that the Black Sea
region is also increasingly becoming a crucible for illegal
trade -- from smuggling of cigarettes, stolen cars and oil to
trafficking in drugs, persons, small arms and, possibly,
weapons of mass destruction (WMD). While hard statistics are
difficult to come by due to an extraordinarily low rate of
interdiction, illegal trafficking via the Black Sea region
probably accounts for most of the trafficking in persons from
Eastern Europe, much of the Middle Eastern migrant smuggling
into Western Europe, a large percentage of the heroin

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smuggled from Afghanistan and a significant proportion of
small arms and light weapons smuggled out of Transnistria.


5. (C) Since 2004, senior GOR officials have regularly
consulted Embassy Bucharest on Black Sea issues, seeking our
guidance and feedback on Romania's ongoing formulation of a
Black Sea regional strategy. GOR policy makers have
consistently told us that Romania's overarching goal is to
"anchor the region to the strategic mainstream" (Ref B) by
linking the region to Euro-Atlantic structures, notably NATO
and the EU. They view this linkage as the only way to
successfully confront asymmetrical, trans-border threats and
regional instability. Romania remains eager to play a
constructive and supportive role in the Black Sea region, but
seeks U.S. leadership in bringing the region closer to the
West, a point that President Traian Basescu has repeatedly
stressed, both in meetings with U.S. interlocutors and in
public remarks. Initially, the Romanian approach to regional
issues focused on "hard security" concerns but since last
year, and at U.S. urging, the GOR has increasingly turned its
attention to efforts to encourage regional cooperation with a
"soft security" focus. The GOR devised its June 5 "Black Sea
Forum for Dialogue and Partnership Summit" with this in mind
and views active U.S. support for the forum as pivotal to its
success. The GOR frets that absent U.S. urging, Russia,
Turkey (and others) will send low level representatives to
attend the forum. (Ref C)

A Robust, if Untraditional, Role for NATO
--------------

6. (C) In Embassy's view, NATO has an important role to play
in the region, but that role should not just include
traditional defense issues. Far more than a military
alliance, NATO serves as a steppingstone for EU membership
and a partner in democracy development. As USNATO has noted,
NATO can serve as both a "mentor and magnet for fragile
democracies." (Ref D) In light of declining assistance
budgets regionally, NATO may be one of the best tools
available for the promotion of democratic institutions and
regional cooperation. Although the Partnership for Peace
(PfP) program is valuable for regional states with declared
Euro-Atlantic aspirations (Ukraine, Georgia),countries in
the region that do not belong to the PfP can benefit from
targeted security cooperation programs, including programs
aimed at defense reform, a key aspect of which is civilian
control of the military and the development of durable
democratic institutions. Romania, with its recent experience
as a post-communist state, fledgling democracy and NATO
aspirant, has a great deal to offer to countries in the
region exploring closer Euro-Atlantic ties. Next week, for
example, Romania is hosting a group of senior Georgian
parliamentarians under the auspices of a USG-funded NATO
tour. Romania could also serve as a host/key participant in
NATO programs without a specific military focus, such as
NATO-led environmental projects.

A "Harmonious" Model for Both Romania and Turkey?
-------------- --------------

7. (C) Romania's reticence about an expanded BLACKSEAFOR
under Turkish and Russian leadership reflects bona fide
concerns about Moscow and Ankara's efforts to, in effect,
exclude NATO from the Black Sea region (Ref E). On the other
hand, senior GOR officials have told us that Romania is open
to the possibility of an expanded Operation Black Sea Harmony
(OBSH),provided it would not be dominated by Turkey. Under
Bucharest's vision, OBSH would have rotating leadership and
would be open to participation by NATO assets (ships and
aircraft) from the Mediterranean, including from NATO's
Mediterranean-based Operation Active Endeavor (OAE). Romania
adamantly opposes Turkish control over information flow to
NATO from OBSH, with one senior Romanian naval officer
characterizing the current Turkish attitude on intelligence
sharing with NATO as "Turkey would pass to NATO what it needs
to know." If these concerns could be surmounted, Romania
would be an important, even eager, participant in an expanded
OBSH -- but it will not participate in an OBSH that is
"morphed" into BLACKSEAFOR or dominated by players who are
antagonistic to a broader role in the region for the
Euro-Atlantic community.

SECI: Cooperating at the Crossroads
--------------

8. (C) The Black Sea could use more regional institutions
like the Bucharest-based Southeast European Cooperative
Initiative (SECI) Regional Center for Combating Transborder
Crime. Its emphasis on issues like TIP, narco-trafficking

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and conventional smuggling is the right fit for the Black Sea
and Balkans space. SECI conducted 21 regional operations
between 2002-2005 targeting a gamut of criminal enterprises.
One prominent example of SECI's value to the region: the
anti-TIP Operation Mirage has netted, to date, 809
traffickers. Given that 300,000 containers transit the port
of Constanta each year, and an ambitious port expansion is
planned, SECI's recently launched Container Security
Initiative exemplifies the organization's cutting edge
approach to regional law enforcement issues. Romanian policy
makers strongly support SECI but insist SECI will not work
without continued U.S. backing, expressing concerns of late
that USG support for SECI could be lagging. (Ref B) Despite
its success so far, and the rising interest in operating out
of SECI demonstrated by law enforcement agencies like FBI and
DEA, the Center still needs a "hands-on" U.S. presence to
facilitate, coordinate and -- on occasion -- to cajole. This
will remain the case until at least 2009, the first year that
substantial EU resources might be available to sustain SECI's
operations and activities.

Adopting a Joint Task Force Model
--------------

9. (C) Another practical way to promote Black Sea security
would be to encourage each of the region's governments to
develop internal inter-agency coordination modeled on the
U.S. Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF). Issues such as
TIP and narcotics smuggling tend to fall between the cracks
of those agencies which have the capacities to track
traffickers (including the military and intelligence
services) but lack law enforcement jurisdiction and law
enforcement agencies which have the jurisdiction but lack
intelligence gathering capacities. One possible U.S.
contribution to the June 5 Bucharest "Black Sea Forum" could
be to urge Black Sea states to promote a "task force model"
of inter-agency cooperation at the national level.

Energy Diversification: New Route(s) to Regional Cooperation?
-------------- --------------

10. (C) Long skeptical of Russia, the Romanians received one
more reason to mistrust their giant neighbor to the east this
winter, when the temporary lowering of gas pressure from
Russia made the entire region shudder in the cold. Energy
diversification is now a renewed Romanian priority, as it has
become for many of its neighbors. An issue that had barely
registered on the Bucharest policy seismograph before has
caught the attention of President Basescu, who during a
recent Gulf trip announced a project to build an LNG terminal
in Constanta for Qatari gas, and Prime Minister Tariceanu,
who has touted the merits of the Nabucco project repeatedly
since a winter visit to Ankara.


11. (C) Romania, along with fellow NATO members Bulgaria and
Turkey, seem to be well-positioned to advocate for, and
participate in, a range of "southern corridor" energy
options. If we help our partners articulate a long-term
vision for a network of pipelines and upgraded ports in the
Black Sea region, a powerful new cooperative dynamic could
take hold where little in the way of shared economic
interests has been evident before. Without strategic vision,
international cooperation and large investments, however,
this opportunity could be lost. We should also strongly
encourage closer regional integration through free trade
arrangements, eased border and customs processes, harmonized
transportation networks (e.g. there is no single rail-gauge
standard in the region),harmonized energy and hydrocarbon
regulations and infrastructure and greater reliance on market
pricing. Partners like the World Bank and EBRD could be
brought to the table to provide real-world resources and
strategic leverage.

Civil Society on the Black Sea Frontier
--------------

12. (C) Although we have saved this category for last, the
objective of promoting civil society and democratic
governance is probably the most important work we could take
on in the broader Black Sea region. Even outside the NATO
context, the success of Ukraine, Georgia and potentially
Moldova in carrying out full-fledged democratic
transformations over the next decade and a half would make an
enormous difference in terms of promoting security and
stability in this sensitive zone. Fifteen years ago, the
prospect of Romania carrying out the necessary reforms to
join both NATO and the European Union would have seemed, to
put it charitably, highly implausible. Even if our USG
assistance resources are dwindling, we still need to find

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ways to invest in building bridges among NGOs in the Black
Sea region, in promoting anti-corruption efforts, and in
helping our Central and East European partners in sharing
their experience of democratic transformation with the
fledgling democracies further east. To this end, we support
ideas like the German Marshall Fund's "Black Sea Fund"
proposal along with other approaches for putting small grants
with USG cost-sharing into the hands of grassroots civil
society builders so that they can undertake projects and
build networks further into the Black Sea region. However
stretched we are today for resources, this type of relatively
small investment could, in time, pay off a hundred times over
in a future Black Sea space that is about more than frozen
conflicts and simmering suspicions.


13. (U) AmEmbassy Bucharest's reporting telegrams are
available on the Bucharest SIPRNet website:
www.state.sgov.gov/eur/Bucharest
TAPLIN