AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT BASESCU

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BUCHAREST 001886

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/FO FOR DAS PEKALA, BRYZA
EUR/NCE FOR JENSEN AND KOSTELANCIK

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/20/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV RO
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT BASESCU

REF: BUCHAREST 1885

Classified By: Ambassador Nicholas F. Taubman for
Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: President Traian Basescu provided
assurances at a December 20 meeting with the Ambassador that
Romania would maintain current force levels in Iraq and
Afghanistan and would continue to upgrade the quality of its
forces to NATO standards. Basescu also confirmed Romanian
interest in organizing a mid-2007 follow-up to the Black Sea
Forum. He said that Azerbaijan supported the concept and was
interested in pursuing the Nabucco pipeline project as well.
Basescu also said that a Qatari delegation had recently
expressed strong interest in a planned LNG terminal in
Constanta, and that the Emir of Qatar had provided assurances
that he would "make the arrangements" with Turkey. Basescu
acknowledged that Romania was having a "difficult" time in
relations with Moldova, but said that Romanian strategy was
to back off and "not interfere" for the next six months
"unless the Moldovans ask us." At the same time, he
expressed concern about Moldova's long-term viability as an
independent state, noting that Moldovan weakness could create
an opening for Russia to expand its influence again to the
Romanian border. On bilateral defense cooperation matters,
Ambassador requested Basescu's cooperation in changing
Romanian customs regulations so that U.S. spare parts for
Romania's C-130 fleet could be brought into the country
rapidly rather than the current 55 days waiting time. On
future fighter aircraft procurements, Basescu said Romania
would eschew a "European solution" for F-16s, but needed the
political cover of a "competitive" price in order to counter
critics who would fault Romania for opting for a higher-cost
US plane. On Kosovo, Basescu asked that the international
community not introduce a Kosovo independence proposal to the
parties until after a new government was in place in
Belgrade. While Romania would stick to its previous public
position regarding Kosovo, once a decision is taken on
status, Romania would support it. End Summary.


2. (C) Ambassador accompanied by DCM and Polcouns met
December 20 with President Basescu. Basescu prefaced the
meeting with a reference to the December 18 special
parliamentary session that issued a formal condemnation of
communist rule in Romania (septel). Basescu agreed with the
Ambassador's characterization of the disruptive tactics of
some legislators--including Greater Romania Party leader
Corneliu Vadim Tudor--as "Soviet style," adding that it was
proof that Romania still had a long way to go to remove all
residues of communist rule from politics, business, and the
media. Basescu accepted the Ambassador's congratulations
for Romania's EU entry by noting that Romania finally was on
the "safe side" both from the perspective of economic and
political links to the West.


3. (C) Basescu told the Ambassador that the Supreme Council
on National Defense (CSAT) had just taken a decision to
maintain current force levels in Iraq and Afghanistan for the
next 12 months, and to maintain a strategic reserve as well.
Basescu added that Romania would continue to upgrade its
forces to NATO standards, noting that another two brigades
would be "NATO-certified" in the coming year. While
underscoring that Romania was a "small country" militarily,
Basescu said that America could continue to depend on
Romanian forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, and for peacekeeping
missions in Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Darfour, and
Haiti as well. Basescu explained Romania's reluctance to
participate in the French-led EU mission in Lebanon by noting
that the decision was not because of lack of resources, but
due to concerns about the risks of undertaking such a
mission, Romania's historic "neutrality" in Middle East
issues, and sensitivity to the potential reaction of the
large Arab population residing in Romania. He added that the
economic welfare of some half a million Romanians--many of
them overseas workers and their families--depended directly
or indirectly on stability in Israel and the region.


4. (C) On Black Sea and energy security matters, President
Basescu confirmed Romanian interest in organizing a follow-on
event to the Black Sea Forum in the June 2007 timeframe. He
said that he had raised the issue with the Azeri President
during a recent visit, and that the Azeris were behind the
concept. He also confirmed that the Nabucco pipleline and
other energy issues had been discussed with the Azeris,
remarking that "you can trust them to finalize the deal, not
like Yushchenko." Basescu said that a Qatari delegation
had recently visited Romania and had expressed strong
interest in a planned LNG terminal in Constanta. When
queried by Ambassador about the Turkish attitude to this

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plan, including the question of allowing LNG shipments
through the Bosphorus, Basescu responded that the Emir of
Qatar had promised him that "I will make the arrangements
with Turkey." Basescu reported that the Turks were still
blocking the Nabucco project, but evinced the hope that
Turkey could be turned around "step by step." He said the
Turks were also suspicious about whether other countries
sought to revisit the Montreux convention. In closing, he
noted that Romania had "additional leverage" on the Turks
because of their need to show "flexibility" in order to join
the EU. Basescu added "we won't use that leverage, of
course."


5. (C) Basescu confirmed that Romania was having a
"difficult" time in relations with Moldova, but evinced a
more relaxed view than Foreign Minister Ungureanu (reftel),
remarking that Romania's strategy would be to back off and
"not interfere" for the next six months "unless the Moldovans
ask us." Basescu said that Voronin's position had changed
since the election in Ukraine, and suggested there was a
behind-the-scenes Moscow-Chisinau "deal" that traded cheap
Russian natural gas and access to the Russian market for
better relations with Moscow and a commitment to ratchet up
the hostility towards Romania. Basescu admitted concern
about Moldova's long-term viability as an independent state,
noting that Moldovan weakness provided a possible opening for
Russia to expand its influence to the Romanian border in the
future. Asked by Ambassador what the USG might do to improve
the climate between Chisinau and Bucharest, Basescu
responded, "don't play into their game of creating the
impression that the problem is with us," adding that "we
should let them prove that they are sincere."


6. (C) On bilateral defense cooperation matters, Ambassador
underscored the importance of keeping Romania's C-130 fleet
airworthy, noting that at present only one (of four) C-130s
was flyable. USG ability to help Romania keep its C-130s
flying was hampered by delays in customs clearance. "We can
ship a spare part within 24 hours," the Ambassador explained,
"but Romanian customs requirements add an additional 55
days." Basescu said he would take up the matter with the
Defense Minister. He said that he had inquired previously
about why more Romanian C-130s were not flyable, and had
received the answer from the MOD that the fault lay with on
the American side, including the delayed delivery of a
refurbished C-130 from Lockheed-Martin.


7. (C) On future fighter aircraft procurements, Basescu
said that there was no feasible "European solution" or
"British solution" for Romania's fighter aircraft needs,
given that Romanian forces would be fighting side-by-side
with US forces for the forseeable future. He said that a
decision has been taken to procure F-16s, and at a later
point the F-35, for a total of 48 aircraft. Basescu
indicated that he needed political cover to counter the
expected criticism from EU quarters for not choosing a
"European" solution, underscoring that the price of new F-16s
had to be "competitive" with that of a new Eurofighter.
Basescu also responded enthusiastically to the Ambassador's
informal offer to explore the idea of a combined training
deployment of Romanian pilots and maintenance crews to an Air
National Guard unit in the United States as a way to
guarantee that the "F-16 culture" is properly embedded in the
Romanian Air Force.


8. (C) On Kosovo, Basescu asked that the United States and
the international community hold off on a final status
proposal until after a new Serbian government is in place
after the January elections, given the potential of a Kosovo
independence announcement for destabilizing the Serbian
political scene. He cited recent polling showing a drop in
support for the Radical Party and continuing support for
Tadic and Kostunica. He reported that he was urging the two
Serb leaders to move quickly to form a new government, in a
timeframe he suggested could be as little as seven to ten
days. He added that Romania wanted stability in Serbia given
the risk of any resurgence in Balkan conflicts could have a
spill-over effect on investment in the region. In closing,
Basescu assured the Ambassador that while Romania would
continue to hew to its public position regarding Kosovo,
Romania would fall into line eventually with the majority
approach. "When the decision is taken, we'll be behind the
decision," he stressed.
TAUBMAN