PRESIDENT BASESCU ADVOCATES SERB LINE ON KOSOVO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BUCHAREST 001203

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE DEPT FOR EUR/NCE - WILLIAM SILKWORTH
STATE DEPT FOR EUR/SCE - STEPHEN GEE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/28/2016
TAGS: PREL SR RO
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT BASESCU ADVOCATES SERB LINE ON KOSOVO
AFTER TALKS WITH PRESIDENT TADIC

Classified By: CDA Rodger Garner for Reasons 1.4 B and D


1. (C) Summary: Romanian President Basescu promised to
advocate for Serbian President Tadic with the leaders of the
Contact Group, beginning in Washington, according to the MFA.
Following July 25 bilateral talks in Bucharest, Basescu and
Tadic had no discernable difference on Kosovo Final Status
Talks, per Romanian MFA officials who provided a readout of
the Tadic visit to Contact Group embassies. The MFA reported
that Basescu advocates a negotiated settlement ending in
autonomy for Kosovo, not an imposed solution of independence,
to avoid setting a precedent for other frozen conflicts and
harming overall stability. Basescu's public statements
appeared to contradict his earlier private commitments to
U.S. and U.K. diplomats to help Serbia face up to the reality
of finalizing Kosovo's status this year. End summary.


2. (C) President Traian Basescu hosted Serbian President
Boris Tadic in Bucharest on July 25 for a one-day visit. The
following day, just prior to leaving Bucharest for an
official visit to Washingtion, Basescu commented to the press
regarding his meeting with President Bush, "Another item on
the agenda is related to the Western Balkans, where, you
probably already know, Romania has a slightly different
position than the one adopted by the Contact Group of the
U.S., Great Britain, France, and Russia, regarding the
solution for Kosovo. We plead for the acknowledgment of the
state borders and for finding solutions of autonomy inside
the borders of the Serbian state."


3. (C) MFA's Director General for Eastern Europe Razvan Rusu
and Director for the Western Balkans Irina Zidaru offered a
readout of the Tadic visit to embassies representing Contact
Group member states on July 27. Representatives of Germany,
France, Britain, Russia, and the U.S. were present. Rusu
claimed that "Romania's position on Kosovo was unchanged" --
that there "should not be an imposed solution, as that would
harm overall stability," that the final status should respect
the "principles of international law -- specifically meaning
in this case the inviolability of borders in the region," and
that minority rights should be protected. Rusu said President
Basescu "intends to convey the rightness of this view" to
each leader of the Contact Group, starting the same day in
Washington during his meeting with President Bush.


4. (C) Rusu said Basescu is concerned, due to the relevance
of Serbia to the region, that Kosovo should be settled only
by direct dialogue and a middle ground should be found on
Kosovos' autonomy. Rusu said, in front of the Russian
Embassy's Minister Counselor Vladimir Lapshin, that a
solution to Kosovo's final status "should avoid any possible
precedent by derailing from the principles of international
law." Rusu then relayed President Basescu's private comments
to President Tadic, stressing full compliance with ICTY and
delivering General Mladic in order to improve relations with
the EU, NATO, and attract foreign investors.


5. (C) According to Rusu, Tadic told Basescu that 2006 is a
difficult year for Serbia that brings challenges and profound
changes. Tadic said he appreciated Romania's position on a
Kosovo compromise and said that Serbia does not want to take
over leadership in Kosovo, but will defend the rights of the
minorities and defend Serbia's borders. Tadic commented to
Basescu that Serbia is a democratic state whose goodwill was
demonstrated by granting Montenegro independence. He argued
that Serbia is open to making a deal on Kosovo and favors a
great degree of autonomy, but would not accept a Kosovo Army
or separation. Tadic said he was happy to continue talking
through divergent views and was pleased Basescu was willing
to advocate this position with the Contact Group. In response
to a U.K. diplomat's question, Rusu said there was no
distinguishable difference between Basescu's and Tadic's
positions on Kosovo.


6. (C) On bilateral issues, Basescu stressed the need for
action to ensure the rights of the Romanian minority in
Serbia, to reciprocally recognize the Romanian Orthodox
Church, to support the opening of a General Consulate in
Zajecar, and to improve the visa regime between the two
countries. Tadic granted those as justifiable requests, per
Rusu, and supported opening the consulate and said the
Romanian Orthodox Church should have the same rights as the
Serbian Orthodox Church has in Romania. Tadic stressed the
need to work on economic projects such as ensuring Serbian
access to the port of Constanta through the Danube,
constructing the Constanta-Trieste oil pipeline, and
constructing European Corridor 7 along the Danube as Serbia's
main route of access. Basescu answered that Corridor 7 could

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not be put into practice until Serbia has a clear
relationship with the EU -- and that via complying with ICTY.


7. (C) Rusu and Zidaru offered a separate follow-on
conversation to the U.K. and U.S. diplomats. Both POLOFF and
the U.K. diplomat expressed disappointment in the divergence
of Basescu's public positions from prior commitments and
asked whether his private messages differed from his public
comments, which only appeared to reinforce Russian linkage of
Kosovo to Transnistria and other frozen conflicts and did not
help Tadic face up to the reality of dealing with Kosovo this
year. Zidaru answered, "Do not expect our public position to
change too radically overnight." She said Basescu appealed to
the Serbs to be more open and forcefully told Tadic to
"deliver something on ICTY" and the "gates will open for
you." Basescu insisted on Mladic being delivered and linked
ICTY to EU membership. Zidaru, who accompanied Basescu on his
trip to Belgrade in June - the first visit of a head of state
to Serbia post Montenegro - said she was highly confident
Basescu delivered at that time the message President Tadic
needed to hear. She said Basescu then heard about Kosovo from
the Serbian side. Neither she nor Rusu could comment as to
whether Basescu might be playing a game with Tadic by
advocating for him on Kosovo to eventually bring him around
to a conclusion of independence for Kosovo as the only
possible final status.


8. (C) During Tadic's visit, Rusu talked at length with
Serbian Senior Presidential Advisor Vak Jeremic, who
basically admitted that Serbia "clearly won't be able to
deliver Mladic" and that Tadic plans to wait till elections,
which he intends for this fall, before delivering anything.
According to Rusu, the 45 days it takes to arrange elections
would buy Tadic more time from the international community on
Kosovo.


9. (U) Amembassy Bucharest's reporting telegrams are
available on the SIPRNet website:
www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/bucharest
GARNER