EU RESPONSE: SUDAN - ACCELERATING UNSC ACTION ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L BRUSSELS 000942

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/17/2016
TAGS: PREL SOCI KPKO SU EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: EU RESPONSE: SUDAN - ACCELERATING UNSC ACTION ON
RE-HATTING AMIS

REF: STATE 42555

Classified By: PRMOFF MARC J. MEZNAR. REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (C) Summary. The EU agrees with the U.S. interpretation
that the three components of the AU decision of March 10
regarding the transition of AMIS are not interlinked.
However, the EU is concerned that UN Assistant Secretary
Annabi may perceive a linkage. EU Special Representative
Pekka Haavisto will stress the need for African countries to
press for a UNSC resolution during his upcoming trip to
Abuja. End Summary.


2. (C) Per reftel, PRMOff conveyed U.S. concerns about
diverging views of the March 10 AU decision to transition the
AMIS peacekeeping operation in Darfur to UN forces and urged
the EU to make similar demarches to key African states. EU
Council policy advisor on Sudan, Christian Manahl, expressed
total support for the U.S. interpretation of the AU decision.
He credited this positive outcome to the joint U.S.-EU
efforts to influence Konare and said that the statement
regarding transitioning was more positive than the EU had
expected. Manahl agreed that the three components were
separate and that a rehatting was not conditioned on a peace
agreement in Abuja.


3. (C) Manahl expressed concern, however, with statements
from UN officials concerning links between the three
components. He noted that on March 13, Assistant Secretary
General Annabi himself had made a link between the Abuja
talks and rehatting, saying that if there were no peace
agreement the UN would not accept taking the peace mission
over from AMIS. Manahl noted that Annabi had made a similar
point during the March 8 meeting with the DepSec and High
Representative Solana in Brussels. Manahl worried that
should the UN continue to perceive a link, the international
community could find AMIS winding up with no UN successor in
place.


4. (C) Regarding the amount of time necessary to make an
effective transition, Manahl noted that Annabi called for six
to nine months, and at this point the UN has six months to
develop and implement a plan. He said that the UN should be
able to establish at least a modest presence by October 1 and
gradually build up its size (similar to the gradual build up
of AMIS). He added that he hoped the AU,s extension of the
AMIS mandate to September 30 was the last (although a brief
extension at a later date might be acceptable if the UN were
unable to establish a competent presence by October 1).


5. (C) Manahl was not aware that some countries were pushing
different views of the March 10 AU statement in New York.
Regarding Russia, Manahl said that EU Special Representative
for Sudan Pekka Haavisto had positive meetings in Moscow two
and a half weeks ago and that they had supported the
rehatting initiative.


6. (C) On outreach to key African countries, Manahl said that
Haavisto had been in Abuja and would return there shortly
where he would continue advocating along the lines described
in reftel. However, he said that logistically, it would be
very difficult for the EU to agree to a unified demarche
before the end of the month. That said, key EU Member States
were likely to launch their own diplomatic initiatives
similar to that being undertaken by the U.S.

GRAY
.