EUR DAS KRAMER DISCUSSES RUSSIA, UKRAINE, MOLDOVA,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 000707

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/02/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL RS MD UP EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: EUR DAS KRAMER DISCUSSES RUSSIA, UKRAINE, MOLDOVA,
AND BELARUS WITH EU OFFICIALS

Classified By: USEU POLCOUNS LEE LITZENBERGER; REASONS 1.4 (B,D)


1. (C) Summary: On February 22, EUR DAS David Kramer held
COEST Troika consultations with the EU on Russia, Ukraine,
Moldova, and Belarus. On Russia, the EU agrees that a
combative Russia feels it is in an increasingly strengthened
position. The European Commission viewed the "creeping
reassertiveness" of Russia with concern but focused on
potential areas of cooperation such as deeper economic
engagement - once WTO accession has taken place - and on the
four common spaces agreement the EU has with Russia. On
Belarus, the EU emphasized that Belarus is isolating itself
with its revanchist behavior and, despite
EU/US efforts to engage the Belarusian government, there is
no reciprocal behavior from the authorities in Minsk. Asset
freezes and travel bans, in addition to revoking General
System of Preferences (GSP),were discussed as possible
post-election censures that could be carried out in the event
of problematic presidential elections March 19. On Ukraine,
the Austrians (EU presidency) said they have told Kiev that
standards will be high for upcoming parliamentary elections
and that a government should be formed quickly. There was
broad disappointment at Ukraine's backsliding on its
purported agreements on helping facilitate a settlement for
Transnistria. On Moldova, EU Special Representative (EUSR)
for Moldova
Adrian Jacobovits underlined that the Russian position on
Transnistria is making it significantly harder to move
forward; Moscow is getting "cocky." The EC said it is
looking at expanding the size of its Border Assistance
Mission (BAM) in Moldova. End Summary.

Russia
--------------


2. (C) In EUR/DAS Kramer's February 22 US-EU COEST Troika
discussions with EU officials, there was broad consensus that
dealing with Moscow is becoming increasingly difficult. In a
separate consultation, Fokion Fotiadis, Deputy Director
General for European Neighborhood Policy in the Commission,
told DAS Kramer that the EC sees Russia as "trending in the
wrong direction" and that they would like to send a tough
message to Moscow on energy security in the runup to the G-8
Summit without making it look as if they are declaring war on
Russia. Russia should "get the message" on market-oriented
policies - if Russia wants Europe to have market policies,
then Russia will have to adapt to such principles on Europe's
terms as well. He expressed interest in sitting down with US
officials to try to come to an agreement on how this message
should be conveyed. Expressing a broader concern with
Moscow's
political use of its energy companies, Fotiadis said that
Russian energy companies operating in Europe will come under
closer scrutiny by the European Commission competition
commission. Fotiadis agreed with DAS Kramer that much more
support for Russia's neighbors is needed, particularly
Ukraine, because of Russian behavior.


3. (C) EU Council officials shared the belief that a Russian
Presidency of the G-8 is a challenge for everybody as we see
that Russia does not share our view of what its G-8
presidency should look like. It looks as if the Russians see
their G-8 presidency as a "window of opportunity" to assert
more power and be more forceful, according to EU Council
Russia policy official Carl Hallergard. In response to a
question on whether the Kremlin cares what the EU and US
think anymore, Hallergard stated that, "to the extent that
the Russians care, they think they can handle it - but it
looks like they simply
don't care anymore." He went on to say that Foreign Minster
Lavrov's recent message to the EU is that EU/Russia
consultations only occur when there is a crisis and that the
EU should consult with Russia earlier and more frequently.


4. (C) While acknowledging the challenges that face the EU in
dealing with Russia, EU officials also looked at areas of
engagement that will be possible over the coming months.
Petteri Vuoromaki of Finland, representing the incoming
Finnish Presidency of the EU, said that Russia would be a
priority of the Finnish tenure. He stated that Finland would
focus on discussing contractual obligations
between the EU and Russia, reinvigorating the energy
dialogue, stressing the importance of regional cooperation
across external borders, developing the EU-Russia
"four-spaces" agreement, and discussing the importance of
human rights in Russia. On human rights consultations,
Vuoromaki and the Austrian Presidency said that they were not
optimistic - but realistic - and nevertheless intended
to bring up human rights during EU/Russia consultations the
week of February 27. The EC stressed that its willingness to
engage Russia on stabilization of the North Caucasus remains
but Russian obstinance is precluding fruitful consultations
in this area. The Commission also said its assistance budget
for Russia is going down.


5. (C) The EU took on board DAS Kramer's message that the US
is becoming increasingly pragmatic when it comes to Russia.
However, Kramer noted that Russia is much more cooperative on
Iran than it was a few years ago - "we are now reading from
the same book...perhaps even the same chapter...but we are
not yet on the same page." The Austrian Presidency responded
favorably to this encouraging development.

Belarus
--------------


6. (C) In wide ranging discussions on Belarus, EU officials
presented a united front on encouraging a
democratic outcome for Belarus in upcoming presidential
elections but differed on possible post-election measures in
the event of a problematic March 19 vote. The Austrians
recognize that the Belarusian government is isolating itself
- it is not the US or the EU that is isolating Belarus.
However, when it came to using targeted asset freezes and
travel restrictions on Lukashenko and his regime after a
possible flawed election, the Austrians were hesitant to make
such a commitment. DAS Kramer conveyed
that it would not necessarily be a bad thing if word got out
to Lukashenko that the EU and US were considering such steps
because it would get Lukashenko, and those around him,
thinking. The Commission reported that the EU may withdraw
GSP from Belarus later in March (as a result of ILO
proceedings that are not linked to the elections). The
action would have an economic impact on Belarus (e.g. textile
producers),and the GOB had already approached the EU on this
issue.


7. (C) A Belarus Policy Dinner hosted by the Lithuanian
Mission sharpened the discussion on strategies for Belarus.
DAS Kramer stressed that we need to start acting now on what
kind of messages we want to send to Minsk. We want to get
Lukashenko thinking - in this connection, the EU's possible
withdrawal of GSP seems to have gotten the attention of
Lukashenko - and turn the heat up on the Belarusian regime.
A united EU and US policy would be more effective in forcing
those around Lukashenko to decide on
which side of a tightening "noose" they want to be. The
Lithuanian PSC Ambassador broached the idea of a longer-term
strategy of reaching out to mid-level Belarusian officials
after the election to send the message that certain
Belarusians could still be welcomed in Europe. DAS Kramer
urged restraint in the initial post-election period,
responding that we want mid-level officials to think they may
be on a possible visa ban list which would make them think
twice about continuing to support Lukashenko.


8. (C) Comment. Follow-up discussions with EU officials and
the Hungarian and Polish PSC Ambassadors yielded some
reassuring comments that EU member states are likely to
support a targeted expansion of the visa ban following the
elections. It will probably take about two weeks for the EU
decision process to work its way through so we should not
expect an ability to coordinate a response in days. The
Poles, in particular, will "insist" on expanding the visa
ban. The Polish PSC Ambassador told USEU on February
24 that he fully expects Lukashenko to really crack down as
the election date gets closer and he is confident member
states will not need much persuading to support action beyond
a statement.


9. (C) Comment continued. Gaining EU consensus to go beyond
a limited visa ban extension could be somewhat more
problematic and would depend on continued deterioration, if
not use of violence, by Belarusian forces. There appears to
be strong EU consensus, however, to coordinate
statements and actions on: 1) A possible pre-election
statement urging restraint and cautioning against violence;
2) Coordinating immediate post-election statements; 3) Taking
steps such as extending the visa ban. The Polish Ambassador
noted that EU heads-of-state will be meeting March 23 in
Brussels. If there is significant violence or other
developments warranting discussion at this level, they will
have a perfectly timed public opportunity to comment on the
elections.

Ukraine
--------------


10. (C) In a limited discussion on Ukraine, all parties
agreed that standards for the upcoming parliamentary
elections will be high but that we expect the elections to go
smoothly. There is the hope and expectation from the EU that
Ukraine will form a government quickly after the elections.
Fokion Fotiadis agreed that support for Ukraine is essential
in the face of Russian pressure but that the
EU's two most promising areas of engagement - visa
facilitation and closer EU economic integration - are not
workable at this time. The EU took on board the message that
we should support Ukraine in the event it decides to revisit
the January 4 gas deal with Russia, specifically the
disturbing role of middleman company RosUkrEnergo.


11. (C) There was broader disappointment at Ukraine's
handling of the Transnistrian conflict. After early signals
that it wanted to play a constructive regional mediation
role, Ukraine has not followed through on its commitment to
begin enforcing the use of Moldovan customs seals on cargo
coming from or transiting Transnistria.

Moldova
--------------


12. (C) Focusing on resolution of the Transnistrian
conflict, EUSR Jacobovits said that Russia's position on
Transnistria is making it harder all the time to move
forward; he commented that Russia was getting "cocky." He
outlined four points: 1) Insist on Ukrainian implementation
of the customs declaration; 2) Democratization of
Transnistria; 3) Change the peace stabilization force into a
multinational force; 4) Insist on Russian withdrawal from
ammunition bases. DAS Kramer conveyed that we need to let
the parties involved in settlement talks know that the status
quo is unacceptable. He noted that the Russian side has
played an unhelpful role in this conflict, while the
Transnistrians have demonstrated no seriousness toward the
negotiations.


13. (C) Commenting again on Transnistria, Carl Hallergard
noted that Moldovan President Voronin's intransigence was
creating a lot of enemies in Brussels. Hallergard speculated
that member states may soon run out of patience with Voronin
and defer to Moscow's lead on resolving the issue. On the
issue of a PKO, Hallergard mentioned that Russia
interestingly continues to broach the idea of a joint
EU/Russia PKO to EU officials. The EU would only be
interested in a PKO as part of a settlement process.


14. (C) The European Commission said that its Border
Assistance Monitoring (BAM) Mission on the Moldovan-Ukrainian
border is in its third month of implementation, but that it
is increasingly difficult to solicit Ukrainian cooperation.
The EU is looking at increasing the size of the mission from
the 69 that are presently there.


15. (U) DAS Kramer has cleared this cable.
McKinley
.