EUR DAS KRAMER DISCUSSES RUSSIA, UKRAINE, MOLDOVA,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 000707 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/02/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL RS MD UP EUN USEU BRUSSELS SUBJECT: EUR DAS KRAMER DISCUSSES RUSSIA, UKRAINE, MOLDOVA, AND BELARUS WITH EU OFFICIALS Classified By: USEU POLCOUNS LEE LITZENBERGER; REASONS 1.4 (B,D) ¶1. (C) Summary: ON February 22, EUR DAS David Kramer held COEST Troika consultations with the EU ON Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus. ON Russia, the EU agrees that a combative Russia feels it is in an increasingly strengthened position. The European Commission viewed the "creeping reassertiveness" of Russia with concern but focused ON potential areas of cooperation such as deeper economic engagement - once WTO accession has taken place - and ON the four common spaces agreement the EU has with Russia. ON Belarus, the EU emphasized that Belarus is isolating itself with its revanchist behavior and, despite EU/US efforts to engage the Belarusian government, there is no reciprocal behavior from the authorities in Minsk. Asset freezes and travel bans, in addition to revoking General System of Preferences (GSP),were discussed as possible post-election censures that could be carried out in the event of problematic presidential elections March 19. ON Ukraine, the Austrians (EU presidency) said they have told Kiev that standards will be high for upcoming parliamentary elections and that a government should be formed quickly. There was broad disappointment at Ukraine's backsliding ON its purported agreements ON helping facilitate a settlement for Transnistria. ON Moldova, EU Special Representative (EUSR) for Moldova Adrian Jacobovits underlined that the Russian position ON Transnistria is making it significantly harder to move forward; Moscow is getting "cocky." The EC said it is looking at expanding the size of its Border Assistance Mission (BAM) in Moldova. End Summary. Russia -------------- ¶2. (C) In EUR/DAS Kramer's February 22 US-EU COEST Troika discussions with EU officials, there was broad consensus that dealing with Moscow is becoming increasingly difficult. In a separate consultation, Fokion Fotiadis, Deputy Director General for European Neighborhood Policy in the Commission, told DAS Kramer that the EC sees Russia as "trending in the wrong direction" and that they would like to send a tough message to Moscow ON energy security in the runup to the G-8 Summit without making it look as if they are declaring war ON Russia. Russia should "get the message" ON market-oriented policies - if Russia wants Europe to have market policies, then Russia will have to adapt to such principles ON Europe's terms as well. He expressed interest in sitting down with US officials to try to come to an agreement ON how this message should be conveyed. Expressing a broader concern with Moscow's political use of its energy companies, Fotiadis said that Russian energy companies operating in Europe will come under closer scrutiny by the European Commission competition commission. Fotiadis agreed with DAS Kramer that much more support for Russia's neighbors is needed, particularly Ukraine, because of Russian behavior. ¶3. (C) EU Council officials shared the belief that a Russian Presidency of the G-8 is a challenge for everybody as we see that Russia does not share our view of what its G-8 presidency should look like. It looks as if the Russians see their G-8 presidency as a "window of opportunity" to assert more power and be more forceful, according to EU Council Russia policy official Carl Hallergard. In response to a question ON whether the Kremlin cares what the EU and US think anymore, Hallergard stated that, "to the extent that the Russians care, they think they can handle it - but it looks like they simply don't care anymore." He went ON to say that Foreign Minster Lavrov's recent message to the EU is that EU/Russia consultations only occur when there is a crisis and that the EU should consult with Russia earlier and more frequently. ¶4. (C) While acknowledging the challenges that face the EU in dealing with Russia, EU officials also looked at areas of engagement that will be possible over the coming months. Petteri Vuoromaki of Finland, representing the incoming Finnish Presidency of the EU, said that Russia would be a priority of the Finnish tenure. He stated that Finland would focus ON discussing contractual obligations between the EU and Russia, reinvigorating the energy dialogue, stressing the importance of regional cooperation across external borders, developing the EU-Russia "four-spaces" agreement, and discussing the importance of human rights in Russia. ON human rights consultations, Vuoromaki and the Austrian Presidency said that they were not optimistic - but realistic - and nevertheless intended to bring up human rights during EU/Russia consultations the week of February 27. The EC stressed that its willingness to engage Russia ON stabilization of the North Caucasus remains but Russian obstinance is precluding fruitful consultations in this area. The Commission also said its assistance budget for Russia is going down. ¶5. (C) The EU took ON board DAS Kramer's message that the US is becoming increasingly pragmatic when it comes to Russia. However, Kramer noted that Russia is much more cooperative ON Iran than it was a few years ago - "we are now reading from the same book...perhaps even the same chapter...but we are not yet ON the same page." The Austrian Presidency responded favorably to this encouraging development. Belarus -------------- ¶6. (C) In wide ranging discussions ON Belarus, EU officials presented a united front ON encouraging a democratic outcome for Belarus in upcoming presidential elections but differed ON possible post-election measures in the event of a problematic March 19 vote. The Austrians recognize that the Belarusian government is isolating itself - it is not the US or the EU that is isolating Belarus. However, when it came to using targeted asset freezes and travel restrictions ON Lukashenko and his regime after a possible flawed election, the Austrians were hesitant to make such a commitment. DAS Kramer conveyed that it would not necessarily be a bad thing if word got out to Lukashenko that the EU and US were considering such steps because it would get Lukashenko, and those around him, thinking. The Commission reported that the EU may withdraw GSP from Belarus later in March (as a result of ILO proceedings that are not linked to the elections). The action would have an economic impact ON Belarus (e.g. textile producers),and the GOB had already approached the EU ON this issue. ¶7. (C) A Belarus Policy Dinner hosted by the Lithuanian Mission sharpened the discussion ON strategies for Belarus. DAS Kramer stressed that we need to START acting now ON what kind of messages we want to send to Minsk. We want to get Lukashenko thinking - in this connection, the EU's possible withdrawal of GSP seems to have gotten the attention of Lukashenko - and turn the heat up ON the Belarusian regime. A united EU and US policy would be more effective in forcing those around Lukashenko to decide ON which side of a tightening "noose" they want to be. The Lithuanian PSC Ambassador broached the idea of a longer-term strategy of reaching out to mid-level Belarusian officials after the election to send the message that certain Belarusians could still be welcomed in Europe. DAS Kramer urged restraint in the initial post-election period, responding that we want mid-level officials to think they may be ON a possible visa ban list which would make them think twice about continuing to support Lukashenko. ¶8. (C) Comment. Follow-up discussions with EU officials and the Hungarian and Polish PSC Ambassadors yielded some reassuring comments that EU member states are likely to support a targeted expansion of the visa ban following the elections. It will probably take about two weeks for the EU decision process to work its way through so we should not expect an ability to coordinate a response in days. The Poles, in particular, will "insist" ON expanding the visa ban. The Polish PSC Ambassador told USEU ON February 24 that he fully expects Lukashenko to really crack down as the election date gets closer and he is confident member states will not need much persuading to support action beyond a statement. ¶9. (C) Comment continued. Gaining EU consensus to go beyond a limited visa ban extension could be somewhat more problematic and would depend ON continued deterioration, if not use of violence, by Belarusian forces. There appears to be strong EU consensus, however, to coordinate statements and actions on: 1) A possible pre-election statement urging restraint and cautioning against violence; 2) Coordinating immediate post-election statements; 3) Taking steps such as extending the visa ban. The Polish Ambassador noted that EU heads-of-state will be meeting March 23 in Brussels. If there is significant violence or other developments warranting discussion at this level, they will have a perfectly timed public opportunity to comment ON the elections. Ukraine -------------- ¶10. (C) In a limited discussion ON Ukraine, all parties agreed that standards for the upcoming parliamentary elections will be high but that we expect the elections to go smoothly. There is the hope and expectation from the EU that Ukraine will form a government quickly after the elections. Fokion Fotiadis agreed that support for Ukraine is essential in the face of Russian pressure but that the EU's two most promising areas of engagement - visa facilitation and closer EU economic integration - are not workable at this time. The EU took ON board the message that we should support Ukraine in the event it decides to revisit the January 4 gas deal with Russia, specifically the disturbing role of middleman company RosUkrEnergo. ¶11. (C) There was broader disappointment at Ukraine's handling of the Transnistrian conflict. After early signals that it wanted to play a constructive regional mediation role, Ukraine has not followed through ON its commitment to begin enforcing the use of Moldovan customs seals ON cargo coming from or transiting Transnistria. Moldova -------------- ¶12. (C) Focusing ON resolution of the Transnistrian conflict, EUSR Jacobovits said that Russia's position ON Transnistria is making it harder all the time to move forward; he commented that Russia was getting "cocky." He outlined four points: 1) Insist ON Ukrainian implementation of the customs declaration; 2) Democratization of Transnistria; 3) Change the peace stabilization force into a multinational force; 4) Insist ON Russian withdrawal from ammunition bases. DAS Kramer conveyed that we need to let the parties involved in settlement talks know that the status quo is unacceptable. He noted that the Russian side has played an unhelpful role in this conflict, while the Transnistrians have demonstrated no seriousness toward the negotiations. ¶13. (C) Commenting again ON Transnistria, Carl Hallergard noted that Moldovan President Voronin's intransigence was creating a lot of enemies in Brussels. Hallergard speculated that member states may soon run out of patience with Voronin and defer to Moscow's lead ON resolving the issue. ON the issue of a PKO, Hallergard mentioned that Russia interestingly continues to broach the idea of a joint EU/Russia PKO to EU officials. The EU would only be interested in a PKO as part of a settlement process. ¶14. (C) The European Commission said that its Border Assistance Monitoring (BAM) Mission ON the Moldovan-Ukrainian border is in its third month of implementation, but that it is increasingly difficult to solicit Ukrainian cooperation. The EU is looking at increasing the size of the mission from the 69 that are presently there. ¶15. (U) DAS Kramer has cleared this cable. McKinley .