EUROPEAN COMMISION AND U.S. WORK TOWARD PROGRESS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BRUSSELS 000508 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/13/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV EAID XA EUN USEU BRUSSELS SUBJECT: EUROPEAN COMMISION AND U.S. WORK TOWARD PROGRESS IN DRC, SUDAN, CHAD, HORN OF AFRICA Classified By: USEU POLMINCOUNS EARLE D. LITZENBERGER FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) ¶1. (U) SUMMARY: Assistant Secretary Jendayi Fraser met in Brussels on January 26 with European Commission (EC) Director General for DG Development Stefano Manservisi to discuss the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC),Sudan, Chad and the Horn of Africa. Mutual perspectives and targeted assistance were discussed with an eye toward moving the countries towards peace and stability. END SUMMARY. -------------- DRC: Elections and Security - Trouble Ahead? -------------- ¶1. (C) Manservisi emphasized the importance of upcoming elections in the DRC and noted that EC Commission Louis Michel was heavily engaged in working to support peaceful elections. Manservisi stated that the planned June 30 Presidential elections will be a "benchmark of credibility8 for the entire elections and the people of the DRC. He, nonetheless, predicted the electoral process would likely be delayed. A/S Frazer expressed concern about the delays, noting that elections could be flashpoints for violence and questioned the legality of delays and the fact that elections are routinely costly. She expressed a desire that elections should all be held at the same time to minimize the possibility for violence and presented Nigeria as a case where, even given its large size, had the ability to conduct three elections. When Liberia -- even though much smaller in size -- is considered it again proves that point, she asserted. ¶2. (C) Elections are important for state-building and failure during the electoral process will be &disastrous8 for the country, offered Manservisi. He said the elections would be difficult to manage, but believed them to be the only way toward progress. Manservisi highlighted the security situation in the DRC and mentioned that dismantlement of the military with its various factions prompted the creation of a truly national army. He added that he personally discussed the general security situation with General Juana, who indicated the need for 12 to 14 brigades as a type of &safety net8 for the elections. Manservisi cited the massive displacement towards eastern DRC due to the number of soldiers who would be demobilized and characterized that scenario as quite fragile. ¶3. (C) In response to Manservisi's question regarding a possible role for Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda (Tripartite Plus group minus DRC) in the security/stabilization process, A/S Frazer countered that an active role on their part is undesirable and that it would not be helpful to have the three countries remaining in DRC for any length of time. A/S Frazer offered that perhaps communication of a general message of restraint transmitted by the three throughout the region would be a more productive role for the group. ¶4. (C) USEU Charg d,Affaires Michael McKinley questioned whether DRC President Joseph Kabila had thought seriously about the implications of the international community,s approach to merging the elections. He cited the fact that the DRC December 2005 elections demonstrated to most that elections could be peaceful and completed on time. McKinley opined that fewer &balloting opportunities8 offered the best chance for a smooth, peaceful electoral process. Manservisi noted the EC would discuss the issue with President Kabila in the next week when the UN Security Council debated the issue. He added that he believed the DRC is entering a &trouble zone.8 He asserted that the EC believes the UN Mission in Congo (MONUC) is making a credible effort and that police sector reforms are a high priority for the EC. -------------- SUDAN: No Easy Road to Peace -------------- ¶5. (C) A/S Frazer, who had just arrived from Sudan, noted that the security environment in Sudan is breaking down. She stated that while she was visiting, attacks were occurring in Darfur. The fluidity of military and political alliances, as well as recent attacks on humanitarian workers, were cause for grave concern. She noted the situation in Sudan as quite dangerous. ¶6. (C) A/S Frazer stated that the Sudanese peace process must be moved along quickly and that security arrangements were an issue. There is a need to energize the Abuja Peace Talks and push for cohesion, she added. The security situation must be improved as the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) forces were &stretched thin,8 and required additional training, financing and capacity-building. ¶7. (C) Discussion on AMIS,s role and possible transition to a UN (&blue hat8) force ensued with A/S Frazer pointing out that there was no debate at the recent Sudan-hosted African Union (AU) Summit on this issue given the presence of the Sudanese delegation. Consideration of keeping AU forces as the core of the peace-keeping mission and ensuring the force commander or deputy force commander was an African national could serve to enhance the peace-enforcement environment and result in minimal resistance to this transition, offered Frazer. Determining how the U.S. and the European Union (EU) could support AMIS and a UN &blue hat8 force during the transition (AMIS to UN) period was critical, she noted. Frazer suggested that perhaps a NATO role consisting of 15 planners from NATO Headquarters could be an option, although a financing mechanism would be required. ¶8. (C) A/S Frazer indicated that some observed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA),signed in January 2005, was overshadowed by the conflict in Darfur and that the leadership of the Sudan People,s Liberation Movement (SPLM) was thin. She personally observed, however, that the SPLM and the Government of Sudan (GOS) are interested in joint, integrated military units. Manservisi interjected that the death of John Garang impacted the spirit of the SPLM and that he had the impression that First Vice President Salva Kir was more interested in building the south of the country, not a North/South unified Government. A/S Frazer pointed out the distinction in style between Kir and the late Garang in that Kir has a more consultative, consensus-making decision style. She added that attempts to divide the parties slow down implementation of the CPA, but did not believe there existed a lack of commitment to implement the CPA. -------------- Chad: Fragile, too -------------- ¶9. (C) Manservisi characterized the situation in Chad as fragile and noted that Chadian President Idriss Deby visited Brussels in December -- prompted by the World Bank,s decision to suspend funding of the Chad-Cameroon pipeline -- and asked A/S Frazer her assessment of the growing problems in Chad. A/S Frazer responded that the U.S. was assessing Chad and noted that its fragility stems, in part, from problems within Deby,s own government. For example, the change in the Chadian constitution to permit a third presidential term created problems. In consultations with several countries, including Libya, there was consensus that if Deby,s government collapses, it &would be a mess.8 A/S Frazer recommended a need to look at a transition strategy. She cautioned against a strategy focused on &protecting Deby8 to the detriment of pro-democracy efforts and questioned whether France could increase its patrols. Frazer also cited a need for an international force to patrol the border between Chad and Sudan. ¶10. (C) Manservisi observed that political opposition to Deby is very divided which makes for a high risk environment. Manservisi said the EU did not exclude the possibility of a mediation role and was considering a joint assessment, an EU Joint Action and a political dialogue. He clearly distinguished the potential EU role from that of the World Bank's. Manservisi and Frazer agreed that the sooner Chad was addressed, the better. Referring back to Sudan, Manservisi added that time was a key factor and financing was an issue. The EC, he noted, had taken funds from the overall Africa, Caribbean, Pacific (ACP) account and is looking to find funds quickly near the end of summer 2006. He estimated that 50 million Euros could potentially be made available and that the EC has already begun discussions on assistance to Sudan with EU High Representative Solana and Special Envoy to Sudan Pekka Haavisto, as well as EU member states. -------------- -------------- Horn of Africa: Need to Move Quickly on Border Demarcation -------------- -------------- ¶11. (C) A/S Frazer advised a need to look clearly at the options set out in UNSCR 1640 for the UN Mission to Eritrea and Ethiopia (UNMEE). She concluded that UNMEE soldiers desire to complete their mission, but were very concerned about the problem of medical evacuations due to the lack of air mobility. Even minor injuries were left untreated for long periods of time due to the absence of efficient means of evacuation. ¶12. (C) A/S Frazer questioned whether UNMEE could "draw down" to an observer mission/role so that demarcation could go forward. Frazer noted that during her recent visit to the border area, she observed consensus that UNMEE could serve as an aid to demarcation and was, in reality, not a real inhibitor to recommencement of war. ¶13. (C) A/S Frazer noted that during her recent visit with Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles, he offered that the Eritrea Ethiopian Boundary Commission (EEBC) made mistakes in its decision and distinguished between &delimitation8 and &demarcation.8 Frazer suggested next steps, including: convening the Algiers Witnesses with an aim to inform both countries they are in violation of the EEBC decision; convening the EEBC; and pushing President Meles to send a credible representative to begin the process of demarcation. Frazer concluded that sanctions would not be immediately helpful and that UNMEE could draw down to an observer mission so that demarcation of the border could be completed. ¶14. (C) Manservisi emphasized that in addition to the border conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia, the EU and Member States face the added problem of Ethiopia,s deteriorating domestic problems, particularly the imprisonment of opposition members. Manservisi added that the EU has attempted on many occasions to communicate directly to Prime Minister Meles that unless the latter made more progress (release of political prisoners, allowing free press, permitting visitation of prisoners),Ethiopia would likely face a withdrawal of European assistance. He further noted the EU had begun a political dialogue with Meles on these issues and believed that if Meles could make progress in these areas, it would strengthen his domestic situation vis--vis Eritrean President Isaias. ¶15. (C) A/S Frazer questioned how the EU characterizes Eritrea,s domestic situation in the area of human and political rights and urged a balanced view of both countries given that Eritrea is a totalitarian state. Differences in how we address these issues for both, she stated, are problematic. Frazer distinguished between the domestic situation in Ethiopia and demarcation of the border. In her meeting with Prime Minister Meles, Frazer stated that Meles saw his internal problems (in descending order of priority)as caused by: insurgents, whom he could handle; foot soldiers, primarily unemployed youth, who were motivated by the insurgents; and lastly, and most problematic, protest voters. A/S Frazer insisted that international parties maintain neutrality and balance on the border issue, it was critical for the U.S. and the EU to communicate parallel messages, and imperative to begin border demarcation. Manservisi agreed that different signals from the EU and U.S. should be avoided. -------------- Somalia -------------- ¶16. (C) A/S Frazer stated the U.S. was attempting to work with all sides in Somalia and did not want it to become a terrorist haven. She added that a joint task force had been recommended, which would call a conference on Somalia in order to discuss pertinent and problematic issues. She noted that Nigerian President Obasanjo had called for an African Union Peacekeeping Mission for Somalia. ¶17. (C) Manservisi indicated the EC was interested in a mix of security and police support -- not a strict peacekeeping force. He added that the U.S. needs to be seen as &on-board8 in support to Somalia because the process is very fragile. ¶18. (U) Participants: United States -------------- Jendayi Frazer, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Kendra Gaither, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary Michael McKinley, Charg Affaires, U.S. Mission to the EU Patricia Lerner, USAID Development Counselor, U.S. Mission to the EU Margaret B. Diop, USEU Political Officer European Commission -------------- Stefano Manservisi, European Commission Director General for DG Development Sipke Brouwer, European Commission Director for West and Central Africa and Caribbean Roger Moore, European Commission Head of Division Horn of Africa, Eastern Africa and Indian Ocean ¶19. (U) Assistant Secretary Jendayi Frazer has cleared on this cable. GRAY .