HSPD-6 TERRORIST SCREENING INFORMATION: BELGIUM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 003911

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

CA/P/IP: AFRELICK
DEPT FOR TERRORIST SCREEING CENTER: RKOPEL
EUR/UBI: EFALLS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/22/2016
TAGS: CVIS PTER PINR PGOV PREL KHLS BE
SUBJECT: HSPD-6 TERRORIST SCREENING INFORMATION: BELGIUM
WILL CONSIDER SHARING

REF: A. STATE 37450

B. BRUSSELS 3710

C. BRUSSELS 1292

Classified By: ECONCOUNS TERRI L. ROBL, REASONS 1.5 B/D


1. (C) SUMMARY: The Government of Belgium (GOB) will
consider an information sharing proposal with the U.S. within
the framework of Homeland Security Presidential Directive - 6
(HSPD-6). The U.S. delegation, during a November 10 meeting
in Brussels, proposed to give Belgium access to a portion of
the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB) containing about
30,000 entries, and to provide follow on support from the
Terrorist Screening Center's (TSC) 24/7 call center. In
exchange, the USG would obtain from Belgium the identities
(name, date of birth, nationality and passport number) of
persons the GOB considers to be "of interest" for terrorism.
Each country would contact the other in the event of an
encounter with a person on the other country,s watchlist to
confirm identity and request background information. USDEL
explained how privacy would be protected and how supporting
documentation would be handled. The briefing took place just
days ahead of a visit to Washington by Deputy Prime Minister
(and Minister of Justice) Laurette Onkelinx (ref B). GOB
interlocutors promised to consider a potential information
sharing agreement after the Onkelinx visit, including the
possibility of an eventual formal proposal to the Belgian
Council of Ministers and recommendation to implement such an
agreement under terms of HSPD-6. END SUMMARY

PRESENTATION FOCUSES ON MUTUAL BENEFITS, PRIVACY PROTECTION
-------------- --------------

2. (C) The Prime Minister,s counterterrorism advisor pulled
together an impressive group of Belgian officials active in
counterterrorism, including the heads of the Federal Police
and the Belgian Intelligence Services and high-ranking
representatives from the Federal Prosecutor's Office, Justice
and Interior Ministries. The group was very interested in
the program, particularly in USG interagency coordination at
the TSC. TSC's Acting Director Rick Kopel gave an overview
of the interagency reporting process at TSC and described how
"encounters" with people on the watchlist are handled at
various levels, e.g. overseas, at points of entry, and within
the U.S. (such as during traffic-related stops.) Kopel
differentiated between the watchlist and no-fly list,
discussed record purging, thresholds for placement on the
watchlist, appeals, and the specific fields of data
incorporated into the database. Kopel explained the role of
the TSC call center, highlighting that support is available
24/7.


3. (C) The U.S. delegation noted that it was inviting
Belgian access to a database of some 30,000 records of people
known or suspected by the U.S. of terrorism. All records
would have a full name and date of birth. The U.S. threshold
for the watchlist entries made available to Belgium are that
the persons are either (a) a threat to commercial aviation;
(b) operationally prepared to commit a terrorist act; or (c)
the subject of an outstanding U.S. warrant for terrorism.
The U.S. noted that we anticipate that information sharing
may be "asymmetrically reciprocal," i.e., the database shared
by the U.S. would be much larger than that shared by Belgium.
Belgium would be expected to explain their threshold
criteria for inclusion on its watchlist, but not provide
specific derogatory information on each name at the time of
watchlisting. In response to anticipated Belgian concerns
about privacy protection, Kopel stated that single-source
names provided by Belgium would not be placed on the No-Fly
List, would not be shared with other countries, and that
Belgium would not be identified as the source of the
information. CA/P/IP proposed that Belgium and the U.S.
consider jointly pursuing a modified type of agreement, which
would memorialize a policy decision for the sharing of
information on known or suspected terrorists (KST),and which
would provide the umbrella for more specific discussions of
operational, logistical, and legal issues. The U.S. proposal
could potentially alter the need for parliamentary approval
(such as might be required of a formal Memorandum of
Understanding) and might facilitate sharing of critically
important information on KST in a shorter timeframe. The
Belgian side said they would consider the proposal.

HOW WILL HSPD-6 AFFECT EXISTING CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION?
-------------- --------------

4. (C) Of particular interest to the Belgians was how the
HSPD-6 program could affect existing informal channels of
information exchange between various U.S. and Belgian

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agencies. The U.S. team stated that this program would
augment and not replace extant working relationships.
Several on both the Belgian and U.S. side also expressed
frustration about receiving, but not being able to use, USG
classified information about individuals or cases of interest
because the information could not be declassified. The
delegation acknowledged this is a complex issue, involving
protection of sources and methods, and often the agency that
"owns" the information will not declassify it for foreign
government sharing. Nonetheless the TSC reps said they have
well-established channels for requesting and receiving
declassified texts with the international partners currently
working with the U.S., which will expedite and facilitate
such requests.

OTHER CONCERNS AND NEXT STEPS
--------------

5. (C) The Belgians expressed interest in considering an
information sharing agreement, and promised to be back in
touch with the Embassy after the Justice Minister,s visit to
the U.S. The discussion revealed several important issues to
be clarified, including:

--which Belgian entity would serve as the point of contact
for accessing the watchlist database;

--addressing Belgian legal and operational issues, including
privacy protection;

--defining how to exchange and who would get access to
encounter information and to any subsequent classified
information exchanged in connect with encounters;

--preserving current channels of information sharing between
Belgian entities and USG counterparts;

--ground rules for how data is handled by various agencies,
and for how, and with whom information may be shared.


6. (C) The Belgians stated that the proposed exchange would
be discussed within the interministerial college on security
and intelligence following Onkelinx, return from Washington,
and promised feedback. Approval of an HSPD-6 agreement would
require the consent of the Belgian Council of Ministers (akin
to the President's Cabinet). Post will follow up with our
contacts about developing an agreement in the coming weeks.
IMBRIE
.