CLARITY OF PURPOSE ACHIEVED ON CWC REGIONAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L BRIDGETOWN 000744 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/CAR, S/CT DEPARTMENT PASS TO DHS FOR CHARLES STALLWORTH, BYLLE PATTERSON, AND MIKE LOONEY CARACAS FOR DAO E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/17/2016 TAGS: PREL PINR PTER ASEC CPAS XL SUBJECT: CLARITY OF PURPOSE ACHIEVED ON CWC REGIONAL ENTRY-EXIT SYSTEM REF: BRIDGETOWN 505 Classified By: Ambassador Kramer for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Barbados Deputy Prime Minister Mottley hosted a meeting between Embassy officials and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Director of Foreign Operations in Customs and Border Protection (CBP),Charles Stallworth, April 18, 2006. The meeting proved to be beneficial as it defined the entry-exit immigration project and clarified roles and responsibilities. If DHS funds the project, it will serve as a pilot program for the larger Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI) and allow the U.S. to track visitors coming to the region for Cricket World Cup (CWC) in 2007. CWC is expected to attract a large number of visitors from south Asia, where the largest concentration of cricket fans resides. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (SBU) Participants: Barbados Deputy Prime Minister Mia Mottley, Barbados Permanent Secretary for Special Assignments related to Cricket World Cup Juanita Thorington-Powlett, and former Barbados Senator Phillip Goddard, now serving as Science and Technology Advisor to the Prime Minister. U.S. Participants: Ambassador Mary Kramer, Deputy Chief of Mission Mary Ellen Gilroy, DHS Director of Foreign Operations Charles Stallworth, and NAO Patricia Aguilera (notetaker). ¶3. (C) During an April 18 meeting with Deputy Prime Minister (DPM) Mottley, Charles Stallworth addressed concerns that lingered after an initial meeting on April 10 between DHS contractors and officials from Barbados and CARICOM. Mr. Stallworth prepared a white paper that assisted in his presentation to DPM Mottley. He outlined the hurdles the USG had to overcome before committing to the regional entry-exit smart card project. Mr. Stallworth made it clear that there was no secured USG funding as of yet, and that the time frame needed to implement a project of this magnitude would be challenging. LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR SHARING INFORMATION ¶4. (SBU) Ambassador Kramer raised concerns over the legal framework necessary to share information with the USG. DPM Mottley replied that a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the U.S. and CARICOM would suffice, obviating the need to negotiate bilateral agreements with individual countries. Asked by Ambassador Kramer if CARICOM could sign on behalf of its member states, DPM Mottley explained that member states had ceded signing authority to CARICOM. All member states had enacted domestic legislation that made any agreements entered into by CARICOM legally binding. She reminded Ambassador Kramer that there were several existing agreements to share information with the U.S. and that this project would be no different. SMART CARDS ¶5. (C) Mr. Stallworth and DPM Mottley discussed general technical issues that remained undetermined. Mr. Stallworth explained that the cost of the proposed smart card would vary greatly depending on the amount of information held in the card. The USG would want all ten fingerprints, a digital photo, and biographic data to be stored in the card. If CARICOM had an interest in using the smart card as an e-purse as well, then CARICOM would have to negotiate the applicable contract terms with the chosen financial institution. The costs of the smart card, however, would be divided between the financial institution and the USG. DPM Mottley offered that Visa International was one of the official sponsors of the International Cricket Council (ICC) and there had been talks on the possibility of them signing on to the project. Mr. Stallworth advised he could not favor one vendor over another due to federal contracting regulations. The USG would deal with Visa International, or any other financial institution, as an ordinary contractor. If Visa International decided it did not want to participate in the project, then the USG would pay for the smart cards for a pre-determined time frame. Ambassador Kramer added that DHS and the Department of State's office of legal affairs and ethics would need to decide the proper mechanism to deal with this issue. DPM Mottley said she understood and would urge the ICC to continue talks with Visa International. ¶6. (C) DPM Mottley thought it practical if only visitors attending CWC receive smart cards. As they arrived, she said, they would be processed in a separate area. All other visitors would go through the normal immigration line, but would have a fingerprint and digital photo taken. When Mr. Stallworth asked about using the smart cards to enter into the CWC venue sites, DPM Mottley warned that CARICOM had not agreed to the smart card being used for this purpose, and thus it was best to focus on what CARICOM had passed as policy. Mr. Stallworth agreed that the focus should be on the tracking of passengers at the points of entry. DEADLINES AND OTHER CONCERNS ¶7. (C) Once the parameters of the smart card were decided, DPM Mottley said the system should be up and running by December 2006 and no later than January 2007. She cautioned that the run-up to the Guyana elections could potentially be problematic for the installation of the project and strongly urged DHS to first install the system in Guyana. Furthermore, the entry-exit project would also need to be installed in Suriname and Dominica. CWC spectators would likely use either country as a jumping-off point since accommodations were limited in neighboring countries. DPM Mottley added that Suriname, because of its history and population, had strong links to Indonesia. Visitors coming from that part of the world could avoid transiting through North America or Europe and enter the region through Suriname instead. WHAT ABOUT HAITI? ¶8. (C) DCM Gilroy asked if CARICOM would request the USG to install a system in Haiti, Belize or the Bahamas. DPM Mottley replied that she believed Haiti was too chaotic at the moment to include in the initial project. As for Belize and the Bahamas, visitors would have to transit through the U.S. before getting to one of the CWC hosting countries, and thus it was not urgent to include either country in the initial phase. NEXT STEPS ¶9. (C) DPM Mottley said each participating country would need to start its own public campaign to sell the project, and posited the following scenario: First, Ambassador Kramer should make public remarks about the biometric entry requirements visitors would need to have in their travel documents to enter the U.S. and possibly Europe in the near future. DPM Mottley, in turn, would comment on Ambassador Kramer's statement, using the occasion to introduce the entry-exit initiative. DPM Mottley reasoned that the average citizen would be more likely to buy in to the project if they believed it would expedite their future travel to the U.S. or Europe. ¶10. (C) COMMENT: The initial euphoria Post experienced when DHS moved expeditiously to contract a site survey of CWC hosting countries quickly dissipated when it became obvious that the region had contradictory expectations for the entry-exit system. Charles Stallworth's visit to Barbados was an important step in managing expectations by clearly defining the realistic scope of the project as envisioned by DHS when it agreed to consider funding it. That clarity, along with the frankness of the meeting and the open sharing of ideas, resulted in DHS and CARICOM expressing unanimity of purpose. END COMMENT. KRAMER