SLOVAKIA: RULING COALITION DISSOLVING, PM AGREES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRATISLAVA 000099 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR EUR/NCE AND S/ES-O NSC FOR DAMON WILSON E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/07/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM PHUM SOCI LO SUBJECT: SLOVAKIA: RULING COALITION DISSOLVING, PM AGREES TO EARLY ELECTIONS REF: A. 05 BRATISLAVA 663 ¶B. HEVIA-OPS CENTER TELCON 7 FEBRUARY 2006 Classified By: Ambassador Rodolphe M. Vallee for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D ). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY AND COMMENT: Speaker of parliament Pavol Hrusovsky and Ministers of the coalition party KDH (Christian Democrat Movement) submitted their resignations to President Ivan Gasparovic on February 7 after Prime Minister Dzurinda's SDKU refused to advance a "conscientious objector" treaty with the Vatican -- signed by KDH Justice Minister Daniel Lipsic -- to the cabinet for approval. Gasparovic announced he will decide on the resignation after consulting with political party leaders February 8; if accepted, the Slovak Republic will be without a Chairman of Parliament, Minister of Education, Minister of Interior, and Minister or Deputy Minister of Justice. In the meantime, Prime Minister Mikulas Dzurinda held a press conference at which he called for the coalition and opposition to begin making arrangements for early elections, which -- pursuant to the Constitution -- could be held in June at the earliest (vice the September timeframe for regular elections). Sources close to the PM tell us that Dzurinda is hoping for an "orderly process" and that most of the now-vacant Ministerial positions will be filled by State Secretaries (Deputy Ministers) in the interim. The consensus -- even from our KDH contacts -- is that a no-confidence vote in the PM would not succeed and a Dzurinda-led government will remain in power until the elections. While the dissolution of the government over a treaty with the Vatican has all the makings of high drama, KDH's decision to politicize the issues (which the spokesman of the Council of Catholic Bishops told us he deeply regretted) had more to do with political positioning than moral rhetoric. When the dust clears, the crisis may benefit SDKU more than KDH, but it will probably increase the already high apolitical cynicism among voters. END SUMMARY AND COMMENT. KDH: TAKING THEIR BALL AND GOING HOME -------------- ¶2. (SBU) KDH, as a self-styled morality "law and order" party with a religiously conservative social agenda, made advancing a "conscientious objector" treaty it signed with the Vatican its top priority. The decision was likely made due to the calculation that, if KDH did not pass the treaty now, it would not have the opportunity to do so after September elections. The treaty would provide that Slovaks would not have to perform work or services that were against their religious beliefs, e.g. pharmacists not dispensing birth control items, doctors not performing abortions, teachers not teaching about evolution. While many of these protections already exist in various Slovak laws, KDH wanted to institutionalize this relationship with the Holy See by implementing the treaty. Many Slovaks told us that they were concerned with the treaty, which could, it was noted, go beyond the "doctors refusing to perform abortions" example and have more quotidian effects (such as allowing the clerks at supermarkets to refuse to work on Sundays). ¶3. (SBU) To approve the treaty, KDH needed to put it before the cabinet for a vote (a vote which, Minister of Justice Daniel Lipsic told the Ambassador February 6, he was assured would pass). However, before the treaty could advance to the cabinet, it needed the approval of SDKU Minister of Foreign Affairs Eduard Kukan. Kukan refused to sign off, and KDH issued an ultimatum: either hold a vote on the treaty in the cabinet, or KDH would withdraw from the coalition (a tactic that it used successfully to oust former Minister of the Economy Pavol Rusko last year (Reftel)). CALLING THEIR BLUFF -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Dzurinda called the bluff, refusing to take the treaty to the cabinet and standing by as KDH leaders submitted their resignations to the President on February 7. Dzurinda then held a press conference at which he announced he would agree to an early election, and invited local leaders of all political parties in parliament to meet February 8 to discuss possible June dates. Soon-to-be-former Chairman of Parliament Pavol Hrusovsky called Dzurinda a "perfidious" man who "is taking over responsibility for developments in the country." Opposition Smer party has already begun collecting signatures to take the situation to an even further extreme: recalling PM Dzurinda. BRATISLAVA 00000099 002 OF 003 COALITION, OPPOSITION TO START TALKING DATES -------------- ¶5. (C) Milan Jezovica (protect),Foreign Affairs advisor to the PM, called DCM in advance of Dzurinda's press conference to inform us that the coalition would be meeting with the opposition parties February 8 to discuss possible dates for the early election in June. Jezovica said they are cognizant of the scheduled June 2 Czech elections and the EU Council meeting June 15-16, but hope to work the elections into the schedule (perhaps between the two). Jezovica stressed that Dzurinda wants an "orderly process." ¶6. (C) Jezovica said that the formerly KDH-controlled Ministries of Interior and Education are "covered" by State Secretaries (Deputy Ministers) from remaining coalition SIPDIS parties SDKU or SMK; however, the PM "cannot figure out" what to do with the Ministry of Justice, which is now left with neither a Minister or Deputy Minister. REACTION FROM CONTACTS -------------- ¶7. (C) Spokesman for the Council of Catholic Bishops Marian Gavenda told us he regrets that the issue has been politicized. It was not the Church's intent that the GOS would fall over this issue. Meanwhile, SDKU deputy chairman Roman Vavrik tells us that SDKU has no problem with early elections. Noting that it requires 90 votes to actually implement early elections, Vavrik said that it was likely that Communist Party KSS and independent MPs would vote against and that the decision "rests with Meciar." Discussing Smer's efforts to recall Dzurinda, Vavrik again said it was up to Meciar, noting that if Meciar backs SDKU's call for early elections and refuses to participate in the recall effort, rumors about his continued support for Dzurinda will be raised. If he supports the recall effort, he is seen cooperating with Smer and its chairman Robert Fico, one of Meciar's sworn enemies. ¶8. (C) Kukan chef de cabinet and SDKU foot soldier Peter Kmec (protect) told us that SDKU and KDH needed "fighting space" in the center-right political arena moving in to the election and that this issue afforded each party to show it was different from the other. Kmec cited polls showing that most Slovaks are against the treaty; in an election year, SDKU decided to side with the majority. KDH WILL SUPPORT DZURINDA RECALL -------------- ¶9. (C) KDH MP Jozef Miklusicak told us that he is 99.9 percent sure that KDH would support Fico's recall efforts, and that, contrary to SDKU observers, he believes HZDS will do so too. After being recalled, Dzurinda would then be reappointed as "caretaker PM" by the President, but would have to move in to the election cycle bearing the shame of this public punishment. Miklusicak noted, however, that Dzurinda may even be able to avoid the recall fiasco altogether by resigning, then being appointed caretaker by Gasparovic until the elections, a deft move that would help him avoid the recall stigma altogether. COMMENT: On the other hand, Gasparovic could name technocrats -- or his own political appointees -- to a caretaker government until the June elections. Gasparovic has often expressed opposition to the Dzurinda government, but such a drastic, destabilizing step would be unlikely. END COMMENT. COMMENT: DZURINDA'S MARATHON LEADERSHIP -------------- ¶10. (C) When the dust clears, KDH's decision to politicize the issue could be more beneficial to SDKU. KDH moved in to the debate with a threat to implement the treaty "or else;" they will now find themselves heading into an election with neither treaty nor coalition. KDH will likely seek to use this to its advantage, distancing itself from unpopular reforms implemented by the coalition and placing the "blame" for them squarely on the shoulders of SDKU. ¶11. (C) Dzurinda, on the other hand, has handled the situation with aplomb, appearing in control and statesmanlike in his press conferences and taking the high road to present constructive next steps. In addition, "leading" the dissolution with a steady and experienced hand will balance the criticisms of corruption and unpopular reforms that SDKU must overcome. When the pressure is on, Dzurinda -- who likes to remind us that he is a "marathoner" -- rises to the BRATISLAVA 00000099 003 OF 003 occasion. However, there is a stigma attached to being expected to remain the head of a steady coalition for eight years, then losing control when the finish line is in sight. Moreover, Dzurinda and SDKU likely will be unable to launch one of their potentially effective campaign tactics: returning funds from an "unexpected" budget surplus to the voters. ¶12. (C) After June elections, the parties will need to assemble a new coalition. At the moment, emotions are high and tempers are hot, but no one has dismissed the possibility of SDKU and KDH governing together in the future -- or other, stranger bedfellows. VALLEE