SLOVAK DEFMIN PRESENTS PLAN FOR WITHDRAWAL OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRATISLAVA 000842 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/16/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS IZ AF LO SUBJECT: SLOVAK DEFMIN PRESENTS PLAN FOR WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS FROM IRAQ REF: BRATISLAVA 802 Classified By: Ambassador Rodolphe M. Vallee for reasons 1.4(b) and (d) . ¶1. (C) Summary: In an October 16 meeting with the Ambassador, Defense Minister Kasicky briefed plans for the withdrawal of Slovak troops from Iraq. Kasicky left the door open to future training on classic demining operations by a small number of troops, as well as officers remaining in NTM-I and MNF-I headquarters. However, there is currently no firm follow-on training plan for military or police trainers. Kasicky said his proposal would be presented for cabinet approval on October 18. Foreign Minister Kubis late on October 16 told the Ambassador that he would share U.S.-provided points on Iraq with Prime Minister Fico before the cabinet meeting. It may be too late to shape Slovakia's follow-on presence in Iraq, but we will try. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Defense Minister Frantisek Kasicky, with CHOD Bulik at his side, briefed Ambassador, Defense Attache, Pol-Ec Chief, and visiting Slovakia desk officer October 16 on plans for Slovakia's troop withdrawal from Iraq. Knowing that the MOD was working on the plan for troop withdrawal, the Ambassador had requested an informational meeting to learn about Slovakia's thinking and the timeline for a decision to be finalized. Thus, we were surprised to be presented with the decision as a fait accompli. Kasicky, in a business-like manner, without cracking a smile or making eye contact, reminded Ambassador that the GOS government program called for a withdrawal of troops in consultation with partners and the government of Iraq, that PM Robert Fico had visited Iraq, the Iraqi Foreign Minister had visited Slovakia, the Secretary and Slovak FM Kubis had discussed Iraq in New York, SIPDIS and coalition partners had consulted in the Warsaw conference the week of October 2. In all that time, the U.S. had not submitted a detailed plan for a Slovakia follow-on mission, and so Kasicky was hereby informing the U.S. of Slovakia's plan without U.S. input. The plan included five elements: a) Finish the current troop rotation in February and withdraw all troops. b) Be prepared to train Iraqi security forces to operate Bozena demining equipment. However, these would not be troops that "stay behind." It would be a separate group that would only travel to Iraq at the request of the Iraqi government. At present there is no plan for this mission. Kasicky estimated the number of trainers would be nine. c) Leave six officers in MNF-I. Leave five staff officers in the NTM-I. d) Donate the four Bozena mine-clearing devices after negotiation with the Iraqis. e) Provide additional military aid and/or equipment, based on needs of Iraq and availability in Slovakia. ¶3. (C) Kasicky said he would present this plan at Wednesday morning's cabinet meeting for approval by the government ministers. He said this plan allowed the government to fulfill its program plan, respected the Secretary's request that troops not be withdrawn before February 2007, kept the Slovak flag in Iraq both in the coalition operation and the NATO mission, offered help with classic demining training, and provided materiel aid. Kasicky said the plan created conditions for further consultations on what demining training would be appropriate, and that further consultations would also be needed regarding the donation of the Bozena equipment and other military assistance. ¶4. (C) The Ambassador commented that Kasicky's presentation was more one of "informing" than "consulting." With this briefing Monday evening, and the cabinet meeting scheduled Wednesday morning, there was little if no time for the U.S. government to respond with our evaluations and make additional suggestions. Counter-IED Training -------------- ¶5. (C) The Ambassador raised the possibility of Slovak troops training Iraqis on improvised explosive device (IED) removal. Kasicky said that although this idea had been mentioned in BRATISLAVA 00000842 002 OF 002 several bilateral meetings, the MOD had not received a sufficiently detailed proposal for how it would work. MOD and military staff discussed the idea and reached the conclusion that the Slovak armed forces do not have the capacity or technology to do such work. Their engineers are specialized in classic demining only. In addition, the IED mission would require many more troops than Slovakia was willing to contribute, which in turn would require additional troops to provide security. The Ambassador asked if Kasicky's proposal would allow sufficient flexibility to convert demining trainers to counter-IED trainers, and Kasicky firmly said "no." Police Trainers -------------- ¶6. (C) The Ambassador asked about the potential for police trainers. Kasicky said that his ministry had not discussed the issue with the Ministry of Interior and that the MOI had not prepared any points for the cabinet to consider. Foreign Minister Kubis later told the Ambassador that, during his September consultations in Washington, he had been told that Carabinieri were needed, and that no other type of training would be useful. Therefore, he had shut off inquiries to MinInt Kalinak. ¶7. (C) Kasicky said we should consider his draft plan final, because it reflected both the professional military and political points of view. Afghanistan -------------- ¶8. (C) The Ambassador and Kasicky briefly discussed Afghanistan. Kasicky said that there have been intensive discussions about possible Slovak participation in a Hungarian-led provincial reconstruction team. The Ambassador particularly inquired about the ISAF request for Slovak troops to relocate to Khandahar. Kasicky was vague on the timing of the decisions, and body language seemed to indicate a negative tendency on the move to Khandahar. He made it clear that his primary concern was security, as this would be an unfamiliar mission in unfamiliar territory. Urgent Follow-Up Needed -------------- ¶9. (C) The Ambassador phoned FM Kubis the evening of October ¶16. Kubis's staff had called the embassy prior to the Kasicky meeting to request a copy of the U.S. non-paper before the October 18 cabinet meeting. Kubis and the Ambassador agreed to meet early the morning of October 18, and Kubis said he would speak privately with Fico before the meeting began. He emphasized the need for as many details as possible attached to any requests the U.S. would make. ¶10. (C) Comment: It is likely too late to turn back Kasicky's plan, although we will make our best effort with talking points to be provided from Washington agencies. Fico was determined even before he won the elections to withdraw troops from Iraq. He announced at the Smer party congress on September 30 that an announcement on withdrawal would be made in two weeks (reftel). Kasicky made particular reference to claims by opposition parties upon the Fico government's 100th day in office, who said the GOS had not met its program goals including the withdrawal of troops. We believe that these comments from Mikulas Dzurinda and Bela Bugar irked Fico into moving full-speed ahead. End comment. VALLEE