SLOVAKIA'S JUNE 17 NATIONAL ELECTIONS: UNCERTAINTY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRATISLAVA 000476 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/18/2021 TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM PINR SOCI LO SUBJECT: SLOVAKIA'S JUNE 17 NATIONAL ELECTIONS: UNCERTAINTY IS A CERTAINTY REF: A. BRATISLAVA 471 ¶B. BRATISLAVA 455 Classified By: Ambassador Rodolphe M. Vallee for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D ). 6 TO 8 PARTIES IN PARLIAMENT: RECIPE FOR A GRAND COALITION? -------------- -------------- ¶1. (C) With 6 major political parties likely to pass the 5 percent parliamentary threshold (and two more within easy striking distance) in Slovakia's June 17 national elections -- and none of them positioned for such a decisive victory as to allow for a two-party coalition -- it will likely be a long, hot summer for Slovak politics. With parties working hard not to burn any bridges (PM Dzurinda even took the opportunity of a televised debate with Robert Fico a week before the elections to acknowledge the possibility of his party working with Fico's Smer),we are left with the possibility of a "grand coalition" made up of a handful of parties who will put their campaign trail vitriol aside to rule together. The two key factors, assuming that Fico gets a plurality, are whether Fico passes the 25 percent mark and whether the gap between Fico and Dzurinda is small enough to give the PM enough leverage to resurrect a center-right coalition. Otherwise, Fico can hire off Dzurinda's former partners to make a grand coalition of sorts. ¶2. (C) The unpredictability of the result stems also from the high proportion of undecided voters, in addition to the traditional disconnect between polling numbers and actual votes on election day (Smer usually gets fewer votes than polls indicate, while SDKU fares better). According to the Slovak Radio pollster, who was most accurate in the 2002 elections, 16 percent of Slovak voters decide who to vote for while standing in the voting booth. Keeping with the country's trend of decreasing voter turnout, pundits have looked at the "perfect storm" of predicted sunny weekend weather and scheduled World Cup games on election day and have predicted that, again, many Slovaks will decided they have "better things to do" than to cast a ballot. We predict a turnout in the lower end of the 50-60 percent region. ¶3. (C) Conventional wisdom holds, however, that low voter turnout favors incumbent SDKU, which is strong in Slovakia's economically thriving cities (Bratislava, Kosice) and weaker in the countryside, where Smer is capitalizing on the lack of economic prosperity among Slovakia's poor and pensioners. The Slovak Radio Pollster claims that SDKU's campaign has been "the most effective" at boosting its numbers. SMER WILL DO BEST AT THE POLLS... -------------- ¶4. (C) While the large number of parties likely to cross the parliamentary threshold means no coalition building can begin until final numbers -- and resulting seats in parliament -- are announced, there are a few things that are clear. Robert Fico's Smer party will again take the most votes during national elections, and is likely to receive anywhere between 20 and 30 percent of the vote. A sympathetic President Gasparovic reportedly has already pledged Fico the first crack at forming a new government. While the party is popular among youth, Smer has recently been focused on the older, impoverished Slovak voters who have traditionally -- and reliably -- turned out in droves for former Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar's HZDS party. Smer will consider a partnership with Hungarian coalition party SMK, which is almost guaranteed its usual 10 percent take in addition to votes from Slovaks who appreciate the "reliability" of the party and its stances. ¶5. (C) Depending on the exact distribution of seats on election day, Smer will likely be able to form a coalition with only two other partners. In the past weeks, a possible coalition between Smer, nationalist party SNS (which is polling at around 10 percent),and Meciar's HZDS has been widely discussed in the media; whether a trial balloon by Smer or a campaign tactic by Fico's enemies, SDKU's numbers have gone up in response to the possibility of this "worse case scenario." We do not think Fico would be so shortsighted to form a Smer-HZDS-SNS coalition that would immediately cause him embarrassment and international skepticism, and raise the chances he would not be able to serve a full term (as SNS boss Jan Slota noted, explaining why a HZDS coalition might not hold together "is like having to explain why acid dissolves things."). Professor (and former SDL party head) Peter Weiss told us that some consider a Smer-SDKU-SMK coalition to be "ideal" for Slovak voters. Smer and SDKU, they reason, can keep an eye on each other's "sticky fingers," and no one can accuse the government of BRATISLAVA 00000476 002 OF 003 ignoring minority rights. Weiss also noted that SMK is widely viewed as a "stable" coalition partner. ...BUT MAY LEAVE DZURINDA SOME ROOM TO MANEUVER -------------- -- ¶6. (C) Prime Minister Dzurinda's SDKU will likely come in second, taking 12 to 18 percent of the vote. Based upon predictions, SDKU would be forced to form a broad coalition with at least three other parties in order to control the government. An SDKU contact told us June 14 that while the PM wants to be a part of the government, he would have trouble doing so as an obvious junior partner, and is considering going into opposition even if Fico made an offer, in hopes that a Fico government will not last. It all depends upon the gap between Smer and SDKU on election day: a Smer take in the low 20s will be seen as a failure (for a party that has consistently polled over 30 for most of the past few years) and could be seen as an indication to Dzurinda that he has a real shot at forming a government; a 25-30 percent Smer take would be seen as a Fico victory. Unlikely as it is, a Smer take over 30 percent would put Fico in the driver's seat with respect to coalition forming and ministerial portfolios. ¶7. (C) If Dzurinda takes the initiative and tries to form a coalition, he will likely try to do so with SMK, KDH, and possibly HZDS, although Dzurinda would first have to reconcile KDH and HZDS, as KDH has vowed not to work with Meciar's party. Pundits also point out that SDKU has not ruled out cooperation with SNS, although a coalition with this party would be an obvious last resort. WHAT SMER CONTROL COULD MEAN FOR SLOVAKIA -------------- ¶8. (C) A strong Smer showing would likely give Fico reassurance that he has the political capital to undertake broader reforms; it could also have foreign policy ramifications (ref A). Moreover, a strong Smer government would have a more symbiotic relationship between the government and the President, something Slovakia has not experienced under Prime Minster Dzurinda and President Gasparovic. Gasparovic's own HZD party will not get enough votes to enter parliament on election day, making Gasparovic -- whose rhetoric has often mirrored Fico's -- particularly pliable for Smer. HOW THE REST WILL TEST -------------- ¶9. (C) One of the only certainties or near-certainties: Hungarian coalition party SMK and nationalist SNS (whose campaign motto has been "A Slovak Government for Slovaks!") will not serve in a coalition together. In addition, the Communist party KSS -- currently teetering on the threshold of parliamentary accession -- would be the proverbial last kid picked on the playground. ¶10. (C) SNS -- although not represented in the previous parliament -- is polling slightly above 10 percent and seems poised to take a significant number of seats on election day. The disappointing unwillingness of mainstream parties to rule out cooperation with the nationalists means that we may have to face dealing with Slota as a government minister, something that will be hard for us to do. On the other hand, most parties are aware that including the nationalists will bring discredit upon Slovakia in the international arena. ¶11. (C) Christian Democratic Movement (KDH) chairman Pavol Hrusovksy told Ambassador June 6 that KDH prefers a repeat of the center-right coalition of KDH-SMK-SDKU, but said that -- despite his lack of trust in Fico -- a SMK-KDH-Smer combination could be presented to Smer as an alternative to the "catastrophic" Smer-SNS-HZDS coalition that public commentary and polling suggests is a possibility, despite Slota's June 14 declaration that he could never work with HZDS boss Vladimir Meciar. We have heard that Hrusovsky has told the party faithful in recent days that KDH would accept an offer to join Smer and SMK. Center-right stepchild Free Forum (SF),once considered a shoe-in for parliament, will need to make up ground in the final days before the vote in order to cross the 5 percent threshold. SF's internal infighting also stands to hurt the PM. If SF fails to get in, its votes will be divided among those parties that do, enlarging any Smer majority. SDKU's hope is that the disillusioned SF voters, who came from SDKU anyway, would simply vote SDKU out of realism. MECIAR'S STAR MAY HAVE FALLEN -------------- BRATISLAVA 00000476 003 OF 003 ¶12. (C) Former Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar has been totally unimpressive as a candidate in this election cycle, even showing up at the last minute for the main debate with Dzurinda, Fico, and Hrusovsky. His campaign appears to suffer from a "has been" character that may result in a lower vote count on June 17, which could make him more unattractive as a coalition partner. Fico's active targeting of HZDS voters may mean that Smer, too, smells blood in the water and is attempting to capitalize on HZDS' lack of momentum. However, HZDS is still polling near 10 percent, and may find itself sitting in too many parliamentary seats to not get asked to the dance by Dzurinda. Another possibility is that Dzurinda or Fico could try to split off HZDS MPs if Meciar is seen as having failed the party. INVESTORS, ECONOMISTS WATCHING CLOSELY -------------- ¶13. (C) The final debate between Meciar, Fico, and Dzurinda will be held June 15, and many believe Fico will be well prepared for the showdown. ING Bank just released an eight page analysis of the Slovak elections titled "Too Close to Call?" which advises "investors to stay on the sidelines" due to the "significant inherent risk" and calculates an 80 percent chance that Smer is in the government. It estimates a 50 percent chance that Smer enters the government with at least "one reform-oriented party" (specifically mentioning KDH and SMK as real possibilities),and gives an "opposition-only" government victory a 30 percent chance. ING further evaluates Slovakia's 2009 Euro adoption timeline to have only a 55 percent probability after the elections. VALLEE