Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BRATISLAVA41
2006-01-18 15:36:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bratislava
Cable title:  

EU "FACILITATOR" LAJCAK UPDATES ON MONTENEGRO

Tags:  PGOV PREL MW SR LO 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L BRATISLAVA 000041 

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/18/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL MW SR LO
SUBJECT: EU "FACILITATOR" LAJCAK UPDATES ON MONTENEGRO
REFERENDUM

REF: BELGRADE 00054

Classified By: Classified by Ambassador Rodolphe M. Vallee, for reasons
1.4 (B)(D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L BRATISLAVA 000041

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/18/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL MW SR LO
SUBJECT: EU "FACILITATOR" LAJCAK UPDATES ON MONTENEGRO
REFERENDUM

REF: BELGRADE 00054

Classified By: Classified by Ambassador Rodolphe M. Vallee, for reasons
1.4 (B)(D).


1. (C) Ambassador and DCM took advantage of a January 18
meeting on other subjects to get an update from PolDir Miro
Lajcak on his efforts as EU "facilitator" for Montenegro.
Fresh from his Jan.17 briefing of EU experts in Brussels,
Lajcak told us that his idea of posing two positive questions
-- pro-independence and pro-continuation of union -- on the
referendum ballot ran into considerable EU opposition, and
likely would not survive. These EU members would accept only
a qualified majority system, which the two-question format
does not provide. He termed the Montenegrin government's
position of 40 percent turnout of registered voters "too
low," and reiterated that the Belgrade- and
opposition-supported requirement of a "yes" vote by 50
percent of registered voters was a guarantee that the
referendum would fail, and thus unacceptable. Responding to
the Ambassador's question, Lajcak thought the talks would
have to find a qualified majority alternative, perhaps
requiring 50 percent turnout plus a 55 percent "yes" vote.
In any event, he would present a formula first to the EU and
U.S. for consensus before putting anything in front of the
parties. He believes the parties are looking beyond his
official status as an EU "observer' and seek concrete
guidance on an "acceptable" solution.


2. (C) Lajcak stressed the need for the EU and U.S. to speak
with one voice. U.S. statements supporting the EU efforts
are welcome and necessary. Lajcak emphasized that he
expected an "unhelpful" Belgrade to interfere with the
referendum campaign through the media and Orthodox Church.
He asked that the USG urge Belgrade to be "restrained,
neutral, and not destructive," even as the EU and we
continued to engage an opposition (at least the three of the
four opposition parties willing to participate in the
referendum talks) that wanted to prolong the process beyond
April 30. Engagement with the opposition meant EU
acknowledgement that it did not consider opposition to the
referendum as opposition to Europe -- just to the Montenegrin
government. As for timing, Lajcak sees no reason for an
extension beyond April, and the international community
should make that clear. He reiterated that when the talks
begin January 23, he wanted all the parties to communicate
ideas and reaction through him, not directly to each other.


3. (C) Lajcak concluded with a plea to urge Belgrade and the
Montenegrin parties to begin planning for the "day after" the
referendum, regardless of outcome, something Belgrade has
been unwilling to do. If the vote was for independence there
would be thousands of issues to work out, and Belgrade would
not be helpful in finding solutions. If negative, the
parties would still face tough issues affecting
Serbia-Montenegro relations.
VALLEE


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