DINNER WITH FICO: SLOVAKIA'S OPPOSITION LEADER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRATISLAVA 000131 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR DAMON WILSON E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/17/2026 TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR KDEM ECON SOCI CVIS LO SUBJECT: DINNER WITH FICO: SLOVAKIA'S OPPOSITION LEADER LOOKS INTO HIS CRYSTAL BALL REF: A. 05 BRATISLAVA 991 ¶B. BRATISLAVA 101 Classified By: Ambassador Rodolphe M. Vallee for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D ). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Ambassador hosted Smer Chairman Robert Fico and Vice Chairman Pavol Paska (who also chairs parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee) at a February 15 dinner, during which Fico and Paska made their predictions about what post-June 17 election Slovakia would look like in terms of foreign and economic policy. Fico predicted that his party would win 22 to 25 percent of the vote, but that PM Mikulas Dzurinda's SDKU would do better (with around 15 percent) than it is doing in the polls now (8 percent). He did not rule out a possible Smer-SDKU coalition. While he does not expect foreign policy to play a role in the elections, Fico recently told a gathering of EU Ambassadors that a Smer-led Slovakia would have an EU, not Transatlantic, outlook. He expressed anti-privatization views in the energy and transportation sectors, especially related to the rail cargo sector and the privatization of Bratislava's airport. Fico also mentioned his desire for an official visit to Washington in late March. END SUMMARY. FICO: THIS CAMPAIGN IS ABOUT DOMESTIC POLICY -------------- ¶2. (C) During a February 15 dinner, Smer party Chairman Robert Fico told Ambassador and DCM that this will be the first election fought on the basis of domestic issues, not personalities or existential matters like EU entry. He reiterated that healthcare would be front and center. Fico castigated the government for allowing grave inequalities in pension structures that left many Slovaks to exist on stipends that do not allow them to pay rent, nor buy clothes and food or other services. Asked if there was a chance of any consequential legislation passing in the run-up to the election, he thought that all the parties would agree to reforms in this area before the election; Smer would press the issue. ¶3. (C) Otherwise, Smer will campaign on the need to establish the "social state" in Slovakia to even-out development across the country. This "social democratic" model would not include an extensive rollback of reforms, as some have tried to portray. He would not do away with the flat tax and would keep the corporate rate of 19 percent. He would lower non-corporate rates to create a more "progressive" tax system. He strongly advocated for a return to a tax on dividends, as well. The Slovak government was foregoing potential revenues that other states used to finance governmental programs. WHO WILL BE IN PARLIAMENT? -------------- ¶4. (C) According to Fico, in June 17 national elections Smer, KDH, SDKU, SMK, HZDS, the Communist part (KSS),Slovak Nationalist Party (SNS),and Freedom Forum (SF) will all reach the 5 percent threshold and will be included in the National Council (parliament). Fico said he would still like eventually to raise the threshold from five to seven percent to cut down the number of parties in parliament. He believes a governing coalition should have two, or at the most three, parties, but predicted that the next coalition would have four or five. HUNGARIANS MAKING "STUPID" MOVES -------------- ¶5. (C) Fico, who made public statements to the effect that no Hungarian would ever lead the Slovak parliament, is said by party insiders to have a close relationship with SMK and its Chairman, Bela Bugar, in particular. That said, Fico called ethnic Hungarian Deputy PM Pal Csaky "stupid" for pushing an initiative to allow Slovak towns named for historical Slovaks to use their traditional Hungarian names as well. Fico says this will only move votes towards Jan Slota's nationalist SNS party, and that it is these kinds of issues which make Fico believe that SNS will garner perhaps seven percent of the vote this summer. SMER'S COALITION PROSPECTS -------------- ¶6. (C) Smer will fare well in the upcoming elections, according to Fico and Paska, receiving between 22 and 25 percent of the vote (though Paska said he believes they may BRATISLAVA 00000131 002 OF 003 get more). Asked what he considered the most important qualification for becoming one of his party's 150 spots on the ballot nationwide, Fico responded with one word: loyalty. Clearly, he is not one to brook great policy differences in his caucus. Fico told us that 80 percent of Smer's party list this year would be identical to the party list in the last election. ¶7. (C) As for partners, Fico did not rule out a deal with SDKU, even with Dzurinda a member of the cabinet (Note: Other Smer operatives have told us that they believed the personality conflict between Fico and Dzurinda was too great to overcome. End Note). Fico said that "it was a mistake last time to rule out any potential partners," and speculated that SDKU would get 15 percent in the elections, as ANO and SF voters are likely to look there. Smer, he said, would not ally with KSS or SNS. Fico did not rule out cooperation with HZDS if Meciar were no longer in control, and if some members were willing to break with the party and join Smer or otherwise ally on issues. Paska doubted that Meciar would ever relinquish leadership of the party. ¶8. (C) Fico took the opportunity to criticize the rumored potential cooperation between SDKU and HZDS, stressing that as long as Meciar led the party, it was essential to keep it in the opposition, so as to continue the process of destroying Meciar's relevance. Paska noted that many members would break with Meciar if he was, once again, in the minority in parliament. ¶9. (C) Although critical of the Vatican treaty issue (ref B),Fico did not rule out cooperation with KDH, which he called "our Taliban." He thought KDH had made a bad mistake bringing down the coalition, but he was happy that KDH had accomplished what Smer had failed to do: force early elections. He did not really understand why KDH decided to move now, but if they did it to show the public they were different from SDKU, the move would not help, and meanwhile, KDH lost their positions and power within the government. Paska marveled at how, in a country that is 70 percent Catholic, KDH only gets 10 to 12 percent of the vote. PRIVATIZATION -------------- ¶10. (C) Fico differentiated between certain sectors in which he opposed privatization in principle (though not necessarily selling minority shares in publicly-controlled enterprises to private hands),and those which he opposed because he thought the processes were corrupt. He was opposed in principle to privatization in the energy, electrical, and rail sectors, as well as the ongoing sale of the airports. He categorically told the Ambassador that he would do all he could to stop the ongoing process -- including a vote of no-confidence in the PM, which he thinks KDH and HZDS would support -- to privatize rail cargo prior to the elections, and he thought he would succeed, given that "no paper had been signed." THE ECONOMISTS BEHIND THE MAN -------------- ¶11. (C) When it comes to economics, Fico said he looked to Peter Stanek of the Slovak Academy of Science for advice, implying that he would be economy minister in a Fico led government. On the financial side, Smer gets advice from the President of the Slovak Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Peter Mihok. (COMMENT: Our preliminary view of these advisors is that they represent economic "old think." END COMMENT) FICO FOREIGN POLICY: EU, NOT TRANSATLANTIC -------------- ¶12. (C) Fico said that foreign policy would not factor into the campaign cycle. We emphasized that none of the parties should try to bring the U.S. into the campaign as an issue, and that we were comfortably noncommittal on the outcome, willing to work with a new government selected by the Slovak people. (COMMENT: Although Fico did not mention "transatlantic relations" per se, we note that he told an invited gathering of EU Ambassadors recently that a Fico-led Slovakia would have an EU, not Transatlantic, outlook. END COMMENT.) Paska, though, mentioned that recent Embassy and Department discussions of a "partnership" with Europe were much welcomed in his party's foreign affairs leadership. ¶13. (C) Paska and Fico evinced a distinctly softer, friendlier approach to Russia. When we suggested that Fico BRATISLAVA 00000131 003 OF 003 take the opportunity of his upcoming March visit to Moscow to raise with the GOR's recent moves against NGOs and freedom of the press, Paska and Fico responded with only vague agreement to respect human rights and a greater appreciation that countries like Russia and China just need to develop in their own ways and at their own pace; "stability" was the more important consideration. ¶14. (C) We made a strong pitch for a continuing active Slovak role in promoting democracy, fighting terror, etc. Fico did not repeat his earlier protest to us that Slovakia was "too small" to have an active foreign policy (ref A),but he clearly looked disinterested in Slovak outreach abroad. Paska, however, agreed that Slovakia's activism had created a very positive image of the country in Europe and the U.S., and was valuable. Fico did respond affirmatively to our point that we would count on cooperation in the UNSC for the rest of Slovakia's term there, regardless of who won the election. DANISH CARTOONS ILLUSTRATE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS -------------- -------------- ¶15. (C) On other foreign policy issues, Paska launched into a spirited condemnation of those using violence to protest depictions of the prophet Muhammed in the European media. The entire episode demonstrated to Paska that the west and the Muslim world truly were very different civilizations and that a "clash" was unavoidable. IRAQ -------------- ¶16. (C) Fico reiterated, as he has told us privately in the past, that if he was PM, he would not try to remove Slovak troops from Iraq. He added this time that there is not even any clamoring for such a move within Smer circles. FICO WANTS TO COME TO WASHINGTON -------------- ¶17. (C) When the Ambassador raised the issue of Fico's desire to travel to the U.S. in late March, Fico asked what PM Dzurinda would get from the USG on the visa issue if/when he visited in March (Note: Apparently aware of the confidential nature of the plans, Fico quipped "see how much SIPDIS we know about the PM's plans?" End Note). He downplayed progress on any aspect of the visa issue as not really important (in terms of vote getting) to the Slovak population at large, only to a small minority of people who could afford to travel to the United States. However, both Fico and Paska seemed suspicious that the PM's proposed visit to the White House next month might create a "visa surprise." ¶18. (C) Fico did not push for particular appointments during his Washington visit, saying he would defer to our advice on whom and at what level he should meet with USG reps. COMMENT: FICO MORE RELAXED -------------- ¶19. (C) In contrast to our last meeting, during which he was intense and serious, Fico was more engaged and friendly, obviously trying to look like Prime Minister material. He reiterated at the end of the dinner that he would not make PM Dzurinda's close ties with the U.S. a target for his campaign rhetoric. END COMMENT. VALLEE