BRAZIL - CENTRAL BANK RESOLUTE IN FACE OF INTEREST RATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRASILIA 000961 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR CRONIN TREASURY FOR OASIA - DAS LEE, DDOUGLAS STATE PASS TO FED BOARD OF GOVERNORS FOR ROBITAILLE USDOC FOR 4332/ITA/MAC/WH/OLAC/JANDERSEN/ADRISCOLL/MWAR D USDOC FOR 3134/ITA/USCS/OIO/WH/RD/SHUPKA STATE PASS USAID FOR LAC E.O. DECL:05/16/2016 TAGS: ECON EFIN PGOV PREL BR SUBJECT: BRAZIL - CENTRAL BANK RESOLUTE IN FACE OF INTEREST RATE FLAK FROM FINANCE MINISTER REF: A) BRASILIA 0665 B) BRASILIA 0790 C) BRASILIA 0888 and previous Classified by Economic Counselor Bruce Williamson, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Over the weekend of May 6-7, newly-appointed Finance Minister Guido Mantega made statements to the press which appeared to condition positive relations between the Finance Ministry and the Central Bank (BCB)on continued CB interest rate reductions. The Bank's Monetary Policy Director, Rodrigo Azevedo, told Emboff that the CB was confident of its direct line to President Lula and is not allowing political pressure to play a part in interest rate decisions. Another Bank official stated to us that the CB no longer pays any attention to Mantega's "artless" declarations. While the markets have taken all this in stride and appear to have discounted occasional Mantega outbursts on interest rates as inconsequential, there is a more serious subtext here, involving the debate over policies to be pursued in a potential second Lula administration. While Lula is unlikely to meddle much with the broad outlines of macroeconomic policy were he to win a second mandate, his ability to pursue substantial microeconomic reform, particularly to address urgent fiscal and tax reforms, is in doubt. Under this scenario, look for the Brazilian economy to continue simply muddling through. End Summary. ¶2. (U) Over the weekend of May 6-7, Finance Minister Mantega, who has been in the job for about a month-and-a-half, made remarks to the press suggesting that the tenor of his relationship with the Central Bank would depend on continued decisions by the BCB to reduce the overnight benchmark rate (the SELIC),which currently stands at 15.75%. The BCB has reduced rates in each of its meetings since September 2005, when the SELIC stood at 19.75%, in response to falling inflation expectations. Most analysts expect the cycle of monetary loosening to continue. According to a May 12 Central Bank survey, financial market institutions expect the SELIC to be lowered to 14% by the end of 2006. (Note: Given market inflation expectations of 4.5% for 2007, this would still mean a forward-looking real interest rate of almost 10%.) ¶3. (C) During his first couple of weeks on the job, Mantega was careful to minimize his previous criticisms of BCB interest rate policy, made while in his prior positions as Planning Minister and then as President of the National Development Bank (BNDES) (Ref A). More recently, however, he has made some remarks that Central Bank Investor Relations Department Head Pedro Fachada termed "artless." In a joint television interview with Bank Monetary Policy Director Rodrigo Azevedo, Mantega stated the only problem with Brazil's economy right now was the appreciated exchange rate, a statement which Fachada said had led to elicited pointed questioning on what Brazil's future exchange rate policy might be. This was followed by Mantega's May 6-7 pronouncement, which appeared to premise good institutional relations between the Finance Ministry and BCB on continued rate hikes. Bank President Meirelles, who at the time was in Basel for Bank for International Settlements (BIS) meetings, reportedly stated that the Central Bank listens to the Finance Minister but makes its interest rate decisions based on technical criteria, not political ones. Does Mantega's Mouthing-Off Matter? -------------- ¶4. (C) Azevedo told Econoff May 9 that the Central Bank is confident of its new, direct line to President Lula. Even BRASILIA 00000961 002 OF 003 though the Bank "heard" Mantega's statements, monetary policy decisions, he affirmed, would continue to be made on technical grounds. Fachada was dismissive of Mantega in a later conversation with Econoff, stating that the Bank was, essentially, ignoring Mantega. What Mantega says about exchange rates and monetary policy, Fachada declared, is no longer relevant. The nominations of the two new Central Bank directors (both reputable economists) were moving forward without political interference; they should have confirmation hearings soon, according to Fachada. IMF Resident Representative Max Alier stated to Econoff May 16 that Mantega was simply a caretaker in the portfolio, and would not be allowed to affect BCB policy decisions. ¶5. (C) UN Economist Carlos Mussi reinforced these points in a May 10 meeting, noting that Meirelles has become a de facto cabinet minister, reporting directly to the President. Moreover, since Meirelles is expected to leave at the end of the year when the new administration takes office, Mussi stated, he has little to lose in asserting forcefully the BCB's independence. Financial markets, moreover, have hardly batted an eye, with the Real remaining strong and measures of Brazil risk fluctuating little. Mussi argued that the stage is set for interest rate and exchange rate policy to continue as they have through the elections. On the fiscal side, the GoB would be practicing more expansionary fiscal policy on the margin as Mantega would ensure the GoB did not over-perform the 4.25% of GDP primary surplus target, according to Mussi. Mantega, however, is not politically strong enough to lower the 4.25% target, as perhaps he and other PT cadre would like, Mussi argued. But longer Term is a Question Mark -------------- ¶5. (C) But the public jockeying back and forth has raised questions about economic policy in a second Lula term. In Mussi's evaluation, Mantega either fails to understand or does not really care about the importance of reducing the debt-to-GDP ratio. He noted that Former Finance Minister Palocci had been able to manage the natural tensions of Lula's "Popular Orthodoxy" economic policies, i.e., orthodox macroeconomic policies combined with increased spending on social programs. Lula and Palocci had been aided by a benign inflationary environment as well, Mussi stated, which allowed freer spending. Without Palocci, however, and with only de facto Central Bank independence, Mussi was concerned that there were no candidates to step in and play the role of advocate for sound orthodox policies in a potential Lula second term. Meanwhile, other analysts have expressed misgivings to Post about Mantega's economic instincts should a crisis occur. ¶6. (C) There are several "structural" problems which may create rougher sledding ahead for Lula's second term, according to Mussi. First is the potential shortfall in power generation capacity foreseen for the 2009/2010 time frame (this could happen earlier if a gas cutoff or shortage results from the current impasse with Bolivia - ref B.) Second, Mussi is worried that agricultural producers, whose earnings have been squeezed by the appreciated exchange rate, might increase acreage devoted to cash crops at the expense of production of low-margin staple foods. This would create inflationary pressure on food prices. Next, Mussi pointed out, continued exchange rate appreciation could well trigger a consumption boom, fed by ballooning imports. Finally, on the fiscal side, revenue growth is falling off while obligatory expenditures, fed in particular by the government's wage bill and the social security deficit, have been growing apace. Lula, Mussi stated, would require sound BRASILIA 00000961 003 OF 003 economic advice to deal with these problems but it was unclear who would provide such unfiltered counsel. ¶7. (C) Although Lula already is openly campaigning for re-election despite not having officially declared his candidacy, his stump speech does not address the critical need for microeconomic reforms. No one knows, Mussi stated, what his proposal for tackling the social security deficit is, or what he plans to do about the byzantine and burdensome tax system and the interlocking fiscal reforms necessary to reform the budgetary straitjacket imposed by constitutional earmarks and revenue sharing requirements (ref C). The IMF's Alier pointed out that the end-2007 expiration of the temporary de-earmarking legislation (the DRU, which exempts 20% of federal revenues from the constitutional earmarks and revenue sharing requirements), along with the expiration of the financial transactions tax (CPMF),would force fiscal issues to the center of public debate. (Note: without the DRU, the federal government would not have the cash to meet its debt-service obligations.) During a second mandate, however, Lula is expected to have less political capital and a weaker congressional base, thus reducing his capacity to use the opportunity presented by the expiration of these measures to push more extensive reforms through Congress. Mussi suggested that in the absence of leadership on reforms from the federal government, reform-minded state governments, depending on the outcome of the gubernatorial races in several key states -- especially Sao Paulo -- might become a force pushing for fiscal/budgetary reform. Separately, Alier was dismissive of the idea that the state governments could lead reform efforts. ¶8. (C) Comment: Although the Central Bank is confident of its independence from Finance Minister Mantega and can be expected to continue to pursue an apolitical monetary policy, Mantega's recent statements exacerbate the questions about the coherence of economic policy to be pursued in a possible second Lula administration. Lula understands the importance of Central Bank independence and likely would maintain the current arrangements, i.e. de facto BCB policy-making independence and a line of authority directly to himself. Nor do we expect any radical departures on fiscal policy, which would face significant institutional resistance from the finance and planning ministry senior technical staff and legal hurdles imposed by the fiscal responsibility law. But maintaining the status quo on the broad outlines of macroeconomic policy is insufficient to move Brazil to the higher growth rates necessary to addressing entrenched poverty and economic disparities between regions and social classes. ¶9. (C) Comment Continued: Progress on microeconomic and structural reforms, which could contribute to increasing potential growth rates, is a much more difficult question. We do not expect action to grant formal Central Bank independence, even though the Mantega case has highlighted its importance. And while it's too early to foresee the coalition politics of the next Congress, at this point it's hard to imagine Lula being strong enough in his second term to push through broad-based fiscal, tax and labor market reform, arguably the highest priorities for any incoming administration. That is not to say that Lula would be hamstrung, as the GoB could implement less comprehensive measures, such as the 2004 payroll-deduction loan program which successfully reduced lending spreads and sparked credit growth. Barring strong pressure for reforms from unexpected quarters, such as reformist state governments, the Brazilian economy under any Lula II administration looks likely to continue simply muddling through. CHICOLA