The October 17 Meeting of the U.S.-Brazil Bilateral

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 BRASILIA 002314 SIPDIS STATE PASS USTR:EISSENSTAT/BROADBENT/SCRONIN USDOC FOR 3134/USFCS/OIO/WH/SHUPKA USDOC FOR 4332/ITA/MAC/WH/OLAC/JANDERSEN/ADRISCOLL/MWAR D USDOC ALSO FOR USPTO STATE PASS OPIC FOR MORONESE, RIVERA, MERVENNE STATE PASS EXIM FOR NATALIE WEISS, COCONNER STATE PASS USTDA FOR AMCKINNEY AID/W FOR LAC/AA TREASURY FOR OASIA - JHOEK DOE FOR GWARD/SLADISLAW DOJ FOR CMERRIAM DHS FOR CBP SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ETRD KIPR EINV ENRG WTRO BEXP BR SUBJECT: The October 17 Meeting of the U.S.-Brazil Bilateral Commercial Mechanism ¶1. (SBU) Summary and Introduction. On October 17, a USG delegation met with the Brazilian interagency economic players in a session of the two countries' Bilateral Consultative Mechanism (BCM) meeting. The wide-ranging agenda covered a variety of issues, including WTO matters (the Doha Round, current and potential future disputes, anti-dumping methodology, etc.),agriculture (subsidies, the Farm Bill),prospects for renewal of the USG's GSP program, possible cooperation on biofuels, current U.S. and GOB international trade negotiations, and intellectual property rights. The USG delegation, chaired by A/USTR Everett Eissenstat emphasized that many of the items on the agenda were long-standing controversies and could not be resolved in a single meeting. For its part, the GOB side, chaired by Acting Ministry of External Relations (MRE) U/S for Economic Affairs Roberto Azevedo, made the point that it was worthwhile taking stock where we were bilaterally. ¶2. (SBU) A/USTR Meredith Broadbent, USTR Southern Cone Director Sue Cronin, WHA/EPSC Economist Joseph Salazar, and Embassy/Sao Paulo Consulate officers rounded out the USG delegation. Over 40 officials attended for the GOB, including representatives from the MRE; the Ministry of Development, Industry, and Commerce; the Ministry of Agriculture; the Ministry of Finance; the Ministry of Health; the Ministry of Justice; the Ministry of Culture; ANVISA (Brazil's FDA-equivalent); INPI (Brazil's Patent/Trademark agency), the Federal Police; and the Federal Highway Police. End Summary and Introduction. Multilateral Trade Talks -------------- ¶3. (SBU) In addition to the October 17 Bilateral Consultative Mechanism discussions with Azevedo et. al., Eissenstat, Broadbent, and Cronin met the previous day with the MRE's Chief of International Trade Negotiations, Amb. Regis Arslanian. In the meeting Arslanian painted a positive picture of the Mercosul's ongoing trade talks. Arslanian said that the Mercosul/Israel and Mercosul/South Africa Customs Union (SACU) negotiations were well advanced and that the final goods-only agreement would cover 100% of products traded. (Note: it is unclear whether Arslanian was including agriculture in his calculation of product coverage or not.) With respect to talks with Mexico, he stated that discussions on a Mercosul-Mexico FTA were in the very preliminary stages and that, despite press reports to the contrary, Brazil had absolutely no intention of seeking a bilateral agreement with Mexico -- as opposed to the pact contemplated under the aegis of Mercosul. ¶4. (SBU) Arslanian was similarly hopeful regarding the Mercosul/EU FTA talks, stating that what was currently on the table reached 88% of goods traded. (Excluded were machines, chemicals, electronics, and certain auto parts; agriculture was included in the 88% although the EU contemplated that sensitive products would be subject to quotas.) Besides the phase-in period, where the EU sought 10 years and Brazil 18 years, the principal areas in contention, he said, were services (where Brazil was on the defensive) and agriculture (where the EU was on the defensive). Brazil had offered 100% national treatment to the EU and, on investment, was willing to open almost all areas to the EU, including manufacturing and agriculture. Arslanian argued that the GOB was similarly forthcoming on services, although, in general, it much preferred mode 1 over mode ¶3. If the EU could be more flexible on agriculture, Arslanian declared, the upcoming November 6-7 talks in Rio could bring an agreement within reach. He cited the EU's offer on beef as an BRASILIA 00002314 002 OF 006 example of its intransigence. Currently, under an onerous 175% tariff Brazil exports 222,000 tons of beef per year to the EU. However, the EU's present offer would establish a quota system under which Brazil would only be able to export 116,000 tons per year. Indeed, Arslanian said, the EU would have to improve its offer on 12-13 agricultural items, including sugar, poultry, wheat, ethanol and dairy. ¶5. (SBU) Finally, Arslanian expounded on Brazil's current situation regarding Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs). While the GOB has signed 14 such agreements with countries such as Germany, Spain, Belgium, Italy, Chile, and Korea, the Brazilian Congress has either rejected them or put them on hold - principally because of provisions subjecting parastatals to binding international arbitration. To get the investment agenda moving again, Arslanian reported that the GOB was now consulting with the legislature on a new model BIT (which excluded controversial items such as transfer of royalties, expropriation, and, of course, binding international arbitration for state-owned enterprises). A/USTR noted that in any BIT protection for investors in disputes with state parties would be of critical importance to the USG. ¶6. (SBU) The next day U.S. del explored Brazil's international trade scenario with Azevedo as well. With respect to the EU-Mercosul talks, Azevedo echoed many of Arslanian's statements, noting that the two sides were testing to see if progress could be made on agriculture, services, and flexibilities. Notwithstanding the expectations of some, he said, non agricultural market access (NAMA) had not proven to be a great stumbling block nor had the imminent accession of Venezuela to Mercosul. What had proven to be a problem, he continued, was the EU's insistence on the concept of Doha Round "downpayments" in the context of the agriculture discussions. Under this concept, if whatever the EU offered under an eventual Doha Round agreement was greater than what Brazil received under the Mercosul-EU FTA, then Brazil would have to make further concessions to pay for the difference. Azevedo characterized this as negotiating twice for the same benefit, adding that this was unfair. Azevedo also noted that Mercosul was discussing a trilateral agreement with India and the SACU (a long-term goal),looking at broadening its bilateral goods-only pact with India to include greater product coverage, and moving forward on bilaterals with Pakistan and India. ¶7. (SBU) Finally, both Arslanian and Azevedo (the latter in informal remarks on the margins) stated that in Brazil's multilateral and Mercosul trade negotiations the country was doing all that it could to be forward-leaning. Doing more on services, Arslanian noted, would require the GOB to amend up to 33 statutory and constitutional provisions. For his part, Azevedo opined that opening up Brazil's manufacturing sector to greater competition could end up knocking the country's macro-economic adjustment off-track. Brazil would do what it could, he continued, but would be careful not to sign up to commitments that politically it could not deliver. WTO Issues -------------- ¶8. (SBU) AUSTR Eissenstat's emphasized the rationale for the creation of the Bilateral Consultative Mechanism, that is to work towards solution of problems. The agenda proposed by Brazil did not provide many opportunities to find solutions, as most issues raised BRASILIA 00002314 003 OF 006 were being dealt with in the WTO or were beyond the scope of USTR to resolve. ¶9. (SBU) Leading off the discussion on WTO, Azevedo raised issues which the GOB has broached with the USG a number of different times during the past year. He stated that the GOB was concerned about the need to make progress on the Doha Round, and saw several critical events upcoming: i.e., both the U.S. and Brazilian elections, expiration of TPA in mid-2007, and U.S. congressional consideration of the Farm Bill. He declared that for Brazil, it was essential that the USG improve its offer on agricultural subsidies and ensure that our Doha commitments included compliance with the WTO cotton panel ruling. A/USTR Broadbent noted that to date, the USG felt that it had been unable to get substantive commitments from Brazil on NAMA and services and that in the end a balanced package would be necessary. Azevedo said that a successful Doha Round would allow the U.S. and EU to lock in lower Brazilian tariffs and that we should not underestimate the value of binding Brazilian tariffs at a particular level. While during the recent 20 years Brazil tariffs had fallen, he observed, it could well be that in the wake of a failed Doha Round protectionist elements within the country managed to reverse this trend. A/USTR Eissenstat replied that the USG has consistently embraced the concept of an ambitious Doha Round and that we would need something beyond binding lower tariffs to be successful. He noted the frustrations in Congress regarding movement on tariffs, in particular bills that would raise tariffs. AUSTR Broadbent noted that U.S. industry does not view percent cuts in bound tariff rates that do not penetrate applied tariffs as a significant tariff concession in the NAMA negotiations. To earn the support of U.S. manufacturers for the Doha Round, Brazil will need to offer cuts in real tariffs paid at the border, cuts that are large enough to increase trade flows. Cuts in bound tariffs are not enough. ¶10. (SBU) Turning to the issue of trade remedies, Azevedo stated that the GOB had concerns about the methodology the ITC used in anti-dumping cases. In ONE recent case, he said, in calculating anti-dumping margins the ITC had not acknowledged the possibility of the exporter recouping the value added (ICMS) tax paid. While he did not definitively state that the GOB would challenge this in the WTO, he characterized this agenda item as "early warning" for the USG. Azevedo went on to complain about the continued used by the USG of "zeroing" methodology after it had been outlawed by the WTO. Eissentat noted that WTO rulings on zeroing were complex and that under certain circumstances zeroing was permissible. On the issue of USG pre-privatization subsidies, Azevedo stated that as time passed this was becoming much less of a problem in countervailing duty cases. On orange juice, Azevedo observed that next year the GOB might seek to argue that Hurricane Katrina had changed circumstances with respect to past USG anti-dumping determinations. On shrimp, he said that the GOB had a number of complaints about the USG methodology in its anti-dumping determinations (zeroing, definition of injury, definition of domestic industry, etc.) and would participate in the India/Thailand/Ecuador WTO case as a third party. And on cotton, Azevedo opined that the USG had not complied with the previous WTO panel decision and if the Doha Round remains stalled, the GOB "could not sweep this under the rug." Finally, Azevedo declared the rules negotiations in the Doha Round were "not a minor issue" for the GOB. Part and parcel of its desire for gains on market access, he said, was the need to protect these gains through a good package on rules. BRASILIA 00002314 004 OF 006 ¶11. (SBU) Responding to the concerns on GOB's trade remedies, Eissenstat noted that all these matters had been in dispute for some time and it was clear that the USG viewed the rights and obligations on rules differently from the GOB. Specifically, that the United States would reserve that right to use its trade remedy law to ensure fair trade practices. On the rules negotiations he made the point that this was an important area for the USG as well. He also noted that the U.S. and Brazil have found areas where their interests converge in the rules negotiations and that we shared Brazil's desire for a balanced package. On cotton, Eissenstat noted that the United States had taken significant steps to comply with the WTO ruling. Eissentat went on to observe that the USG was concerned that recently someone had leaked to the press the story that the U.S. had objected to ONE of the proposed judges on the WTO cotton compliance panel. Such a leak was counter to long-standing WTO norms. After consulting with his colleagues, Azevedo replied that the GOB also was concerned that such a leak had occurred but assured the U.S. side that no ONE in Brasilia was responsible for it. Agriculture/GSP -------------- ¶12. (SBU) Leading on agenda item of agriculture, Eissenstat stated that while some had focused on the impending expiration of TPA, both the GSP and the Farm Bill would soon expire as well. The USG has recognized that given the upcoming review of the Farm Bill, some reform of U.S. programs was in order. In response to Azevedo's query as to how Doha Round talks could proceed without TPA in place -- i.e., foreign negotiating partners could not be sure that the U.S. Congress wouldn't change any deal agreed to --, both Eissenstat and Broadbent reiterated that for Doha to succeed, all parties must move together. Eissenstat emphasized that it would not make sense to put something on the table in the negotiation if the other side could simply pocket it and move on. Broadbent added that we were looking for reciprocal progress, that U.S. industry does not feel that it has much to gain at this juncture. Azevedo replied that based upon his reading of the consensus of analysts, it did not appear that the U.S. was ready to move on agriculture. ¶13. (SBU) With respect to GSP renewal, Broadbent explained that the U.S. was conducting the first review of this program in 20 years. In 2005 the USG had completed its first stage review, she said, and the second stage review (focusing on 13 large GSP beneficiary countries, including Brazil) was now ongoing and looking at, inter alia, the 83 current competitive need limit waivers (CNLs). During this process over 800 parties had submitted public comments, including nearly 200 from, or associated with, Brazil. Broadbent noted that the results of USTR's review would soon go to Congress and that we hoped to persuade the legislature to extend the program. Azevedo stated the Brazilian Ambassador Abdenur was following the GSP debate closely. The GOB would take it very badly, he declared, if it appeared that the country had lost GSP eligibility because of: 1) a misperception in Congress that it had not been helpful on WTO, 2) discrimination on the part of the USG, or 3) some sort of WTO-inconsistent act. A/USTR Broadbent assured the Brazilians that the USG decision on GSP would be non-discriminatory and consistent with WTO rules. ¶14. (SBU) Closing out the discussion of GSP, Azevedo stated that the GOB had an ongoing issue with the USG's import classification of BRASILIA 00002314 005 OF 006 Brazilian cachaca - which was being treated the same as rum even though its taste was "distinctively different." USTR Southern Cone Director Cronin replied that the United States was aware of Brazil's interest in getting cachaca designated as a beverage typical of Brazil (i.e., a designation similar to that done for Irish whiskey) but that under the CFR this required a 60-day public comment period. She noted that domestic spirits manufacturers would certainly submit comments, and that it was not clear that they would support such a designation. Ethanol -------------- ¶15. (SBU) Azevedo turned to Claudia Vieira Santos, Deputy Chief of the MRE's Energy Department, to brief on the GOB's efforts on ethanol. Santos stated that Brazil saw ethanol as a strategic issue on which it could cooperate with both the developing and the developed countries. Joint initiatives on ethanol could have a positive effect on bilateral relations in general, she continued, with increased trade represent just ONE possible impact. (Santos promised to provide the U.S. del - through the Brazilian Embassy in Washington - a list of areas on which the Brazilian government was moving forward on bilateral international cooperation.) Santos pointed to President Bush's early October speech to the Renewable Energy Conference in St. Louis as evidence that other countries shared this vision. Azevedo seconded this assessment, noting that biofuels cooperation could possibly be a major element in Brazil's agenda with the U.S. Still, he characterized the USG's imposition of a 54 cent per gallon tariff on imported ethanol as an area of concern for Brazil. In addition, he made clear that Brazil would oppose any efforts by the USG to exclude this levy from any general tariff reduction formulas agreed to in the Doha Round. Such a move would set a dangerous precedent, he said, which Brazil would "forcefully seek to correct." ¶16. (SBU) A/USTR Eissenstat made it clear that the USG viewed the 54 cent per gallon tariff as a national security measure and had no intention of making this issue part of any tariff-cutting discussions in the Doha Round or that it was subject to discussion in the biofuels initiative. The Commercial Dialogue -------------- ¶17. (SBU) Embassy Commercial Attache Dinah McDougall briefed the group on the progress made to date in the bilateral Commercial Dialogue initiated in June 2006 by Secretary Gutierrez and Minister of Development, Industry, and Commerce Luiz Fernando Furlan. McDougall noted that the Dialogue and its four Working Groups (Business Facilitation, Investment Promotion, IPR, and Standards) did not overlap with the BCM process as the Dialogue focused on doing business issues not trade negotiations. She stated that the two ministers - Gutierrez and Furlan - were set to meet in early November in Washington; thereafter, a Brazilian delegation planned to travel to the United States pursuant to a U.S. Customs-related program on "Moving Goods Efficiently." MDIC staffer Mauricio do Val echoed McDougall's remarks, declaring that the GOB was happy with how the Dialogue was evolving. Intellectual Property Rights -------------- ¶18. (SBU) On IPR, the Brazilian side had its MRE IPR Office Director brief on the status of the GOB's efforts. In addition, BRASILIA 00002314 006 OF 006 officials from the public-private Anti-piracy Council, the Federal Police, and the Federal Highway Police spoke on their individual agency's workplans. Eissenstat stated that the USG applauded the progress that Brazil had made over the past year on copyright piracy. He asked whether the Brazilian government would be willing to receive a USTR delegation later this year to look at IPR issues in greater depth. Azevedo responded that the GOB felt that the U.S. was unwilling to recognize what Brazil had done on IPR. It was extremely frustrating, he said, for Brazil to constantly be subject to scrutiny from the USG but not receive any credit for its achievements. Typical of this, he stated, was the USG's unwillingness to downgrade Brazil's Special 301 status from Priority Watch List to Watch List in the wake of the January 2005 dismissal of industry's copyright piracy petition. Eissenstat noted that copyright piracy was an important issue for the USG and that notwithstanding the GOB's efforts the size of the problem remained immense. In the end, Azevedo appear to acquiesce to the travel of the proposed USTR IPR delegation. USTR Comment -------------- ¶19. (SBU) Brazil asked for this meeting of the BCM. Given the offensive nature of its proposed agenda, it is not clear what Brazil hoped to achieve, other than to rehash issues that trouble the bilateral and multilateral trade relationship. At the lunch that followed the meeting, Azevedo made it clear that he did not expect to chair subsequent meetings of the BCM, so it does not seem the meeting was called in order to establish Azevedo as AUSTR Eissenstat's new counterpart. In terms of Brazil's trade policy, the meeting with Arslanian, the BCM, and the lunch all pointed to a continuation of a trade policy that does not lend itself to finding solutions to bilateral problems or additional, significant common ground in the multilateral negotiations. USTR will, of course, continue to engage - but is not overly optimistic. End USTR Comment ¶20. (U) This cable was cleared by USTR prior to transmission. SOBEL