BRAZIL: MISSION RECOMMENDATION FOR RENEWAL OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRASILIA 002002

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/25/2016
TAGS: PREL SNAR BR
SUBJECT: BRAZIL: MISSION RECOMMENDATION FOR RENEWAL OF
BRAZIL'S ABD PROGRAM

REF: A. STATE 139897


B. STATE 102423

C. BRASILIA 1450

D. 05 BRASILIA 2683

Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR DENNIS HEARNE. REASONS: 1.4 (B)(D).


1. (SBU) Summary. Mission Brazil herewith recommends annual
recertification by the President of Brazil's Air Bridge
Denial Program (ABD),based on the information below, which
is formatted in paras 2-9 in accordance with Department's
instructions in ref A. End summary.

PART A: GOB ADHERENCE TO AGREED SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL
PROCEDURES:


2. (C) Per ref B instructions, PolCouns, Air Attache and
Assistant Air Attache met on 13 July at the Defense Ministry
with Major Brigadeiro do Ar (three star equivalent) Ricardo
Machado Viera, who commands Brazil's integrated air defense
and air traffic control system (COMDABRA),to consult on the
status of Brazil's air bridge denial ("shootdown") program.
Machado, who was accompanied by two other officers from the
ministry, has senior operational command authority over all
aspects of air defense and air traffic control in Brazil, and
has been involved in all discussions with the USG on the
shootdown issue for several years. Machado understands the
USG's process for renewal of the Presidential Determination
covering U.S. cooperation with Brazil in its ABD program, and
he provided (or undertook to provide) answers regarding
issues raised in reftel. On key points, he affirmed: (1)
that there have been no/no lethal force events in the program
over the past year, and (2) there have been no/no changes in
the operational and safety procedures referenced in the
September 2004 exchange of diplomatic notes between the GOB
and USG. Moreover, he offered a review of the program's
functioning in practice, reiterated that Brazil's program is
focused on dissuasion, and offered (in confidence) his
assurance that Brazil's air force would only use lethal force
in the context of a carefully pre-planned operation
coordinated with police authorities, in which there is
certainty about the criminal identity and intent of any
suspect, non-cooperative aircraft.


3. (C) With regard to ref B issues, Machado affirmed to
PolCouns and DAO officers that:

-- There have been no/no incidents of use of lethal force
since the advent of Brazil's ABD program until the present
date -- neither warning shots nor rounds fired with the
intent of disabling/destroying a suspect aircraft;

-- There have been no/no changes of any kind in the Brazilian
program's operational and safety procedures from those
referenced in the September 2004 exchange of notes between
the GOB and USG regarding Brazil's ABD program;

-- Brazil's ability to "see" and track unusual and suspect
air activity has improved dramatically with the full
implementation of the SIVAM Amazon surveillance system (which
uses both ground radar and Embraer R-99 AWACs-type aircraft),
introduction of the A-29 ALX "Super Tucano" fighter aircraft
and secure data links. As a result, there is an increase in
the number of "air tracks of interest" recorded by COMDABRA
over the past year. Machado undertook to provide asap his
command's statistics on ATOIs, interceptions, and force downs
from October 2005 to 30 July 2006.


4. (SBU) While the operational and safety procedures of
Brazil's program are unchanged from those referenced in the
September 2004 exchange of notes, the increased capacity and
sophistication of BRAF equipment and methods are enhancing
the program's efficiency and safety, Machado said. The R-99
airborne radar aircraft acquired for Brazil's SIVAM program
are providing vastly improved coverage, especially when
deployed for intensive patrols to areas where there is a

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perceived spike in irregular air activity. The R-99 aircraft
can interact seamlessly via data links with ground bases and
with the A-29 interceptors now coming on line with the BRAF,
which are faster, have longer range, and possess
sophisticated avionics and surveillance equipment. For
example, Machado said an R-99 can locate and track a suspect
aircraft beyond visual range, then "stand off" on station as
an A-29 moves into position to trail the suspect craft. The
A-29 can transmit video images of the suspect plane in real
time to both the R-99 and COMDABRA ground stations, and all
radio communications between the BRAF interceptor and the
suspect plane are also transmitted. Hence the type, tail
number and physical aspect of the plane can be seen,
facilitating identification by BRAF and the police. The
video and audio records are available for after-action
assessment or investigation.


5. (C) Machado said that the BRAF and COMDABRA now also have
superior data bases and modalities in operation for checking
suspect aircraft. COMDABRA center commanders are linked
directly by secure phones to senior Brazilian Federal Police
(DPF) officials in Brasilia and can instantly check tail
numbers or other data against police records. All
coordination with the DPF is centralized at DPF headquarters
in Brasilia, and the BRAF will not act on information or
requests for air force support coming from DPF field offices,
or from state police agencies. The BRAF also has its own
data base of tail numbers of civil aircraft that have
irregular or suspect flight histories in Brazilian air space.


6. (SBU) Emphasizing that the GOB's approach to its ABD
program has always been focused on its use as a tool of
dissuasion, Machado noted that, before implementation of the
shootdown legislation, narcotrafficking pilots would brazenly
ignore BRAF fighters' orders, and even non-criminal pilots
would sometimes take a nonchalant attitude toward responding
to air force hails. Now, aircraft intercepted, hailed and
interrogated by COMDABRA aircraft have a "100 percent" rate
of responding and obeying, he added.

PART B: SITE VISITS TO AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL CENTERS:


7. (SBU) Ref A requested site visits by Embassy officers to
at least two air traffic control facilities in Brazil, to
confirm the level of awareness among ATC personnel of
Brazil's ABD program and its procedures. Mission reiterates
ref C information that all/repeat/all air traffic control in
Brazil, including civil aviation, is handled by uniformed
Brazilian Air Force personnel. The ATC centers are
co-located with air defense centers at four BRAF facilities
which conduct ATC/air defense for the entire country. These
four regional BRAF Centers for Air Defense and Air Traffic
Control (CINDACTA's) are in addition to air traffic "towers"
at larger airfields which control only local take-offs and
landings. Hence unlike the U.S., civil air traffic control
in Brazil is not dispersed to various regional, state, and
municipal airports, but is concentrated exclusively in the
four air force centers. Embassy has received BRAF
authorization to visit two of the centers on 26-27 September:
CINDACTA II in Recife (covering northeastern Brazil) and
CINDACTA I in Brasilia (covering central Brazil). Embassy
DAO personnel will make the site visits and we will report
findings immediately thereafter via septel.

PART C: GOB EFFORTS TO PUBLICIZE ABD PROGRAM:


8. (U) On 16 September, PolCouns, Air Attache and Assistant
Air Attache again met with Brigadeiro Machado, COMBADRA
commander, at his headquarters in Brasilia. Per ref A
questions, Machado provided the following information on GOB
and BRAF measures to publicize the existence and procedures
of Brazil's ABD program since it entered into force in
October 2004:

-- Machado confirmed that the GOB had issued Notice to Airmen
(NOTAM) bulletins, per international procedures, when

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Brazil's program was publicly announced by then-Defense
Minister Viegas in October 2004. Per standard NOTAM
procedures, the NOTAM remained published for 56 days, until
such time as information about the ABD program was
permanently incorporated into Brazil's Aeronautic Information
Package (AIP). The information is now contained in the AIP,
and is available on the BRAF's website, Machado said, adding
that Brazil's civil aviation law has also been amended to
reflect the ABD program's existence and scope.

-- The GOB and BRAF also undertook a 30-day media campaign in
October 2004, with both the Defense Minister and Machado
conducting extensive interviews with national TV, radio and
print media, Machado said. In addition, posters outlining
the ABD program and its procedures have been posted in public
spaces and pilot ready rooms (where flight plans are logged)
at airports throughout Brazil, Machado said.

PART D: STATISTICS:


9. (SBU) In response to Mission request, the BRAF provided in
an official communique to the Mission the following
statistics for the Brazil ABD program, for the period from 1
September 2005 through 31 July 2006:


I. Unknown air tracks: 4,567

II. Suspect air tracks (i.e., considered suspect owing to
routes utilized, but not necessarily illegal); OBS: This
number is included in I: 108

III. Interceptions realized: 254

IV: Enforcement measures applied:
a. Change of route: 1
b. Obligatory landing: 1
c. Warning fire: 0
d. Destructive fire: 0


V. Quantity of drugs aprehended by police authorities as
consquence of realized interceptions: 564 kg.

VI. Statistic for daily average of unknown air tracks: 21.7

(Embassy Note: Machado confirmed that IV a and b, and V
refer to the joint BRAF-Federal Police operation described by
Machado in ref C. End Embassy note.)

MISSION RECOMMENDATION:


10. (SBU) It is this Mission's assessment that Brazilian Air
Force and GOB procedures for the Brazilian Air Bridge Denial
program continue to fully comply with the mutually agreed
terms referenced in the September 2004 USG-GOB exchange of
diplomatic notes constituting our bilateral understanding of
Brazil's program. On that basis, and subject to septel
provision of information deemed satisfactory by Department
for Part B above, this Mission recommends Presidential
recertification of the Brazil ABD program in October 2006.


CHICOLA