PETROBRAS WILL PLAY BALL WITH BOLIVIA OR ELSE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BRASILIA 000142 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS STATE PASS USTR TREASURY FOR OASIA USDOC FOR 4332/ITA/MAC/WH/OLAC USDOC FOR 3134/ITA/USCS/OIO/WH/RD DOE FOR SLADISLAW E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ENRG EINV ECON PGOV BR SUBJECT: PETROBRAS WILL PLAY BALL WITH BOLIVIA OR ELSE REF: A) Brasilia 24, B) 05 Brasilia 1503, C) 05 Brasilia 943, D) 05 Sao Paulo 721 ¶1. (U) The information provided is industry sensitive. Please protect accordingly. ¶2. (SBU) Summary. Banco Pactual energy analyst Pedro Batista, commenting on the recent visit of Evo Morales to Brazil and what it means for Petrobras, told us that the partially privatized Brazilian petroleum parastatal Petrobras has no choice. It must play ball with Morales, even if that means taking a less than optimal offer in the newly proposed partnership with the soon-to-be reconstituted YPFB, the defunct Bolivian petroleum parastatal. According to Batista, accommodation of Bolivia in the near-term will help Brazil maintain a leadership role in the region and guarantee much needed gas supply in the long-term. He foresees a possible reduction of output from the Bolivia-Brazil gas pipeline from the current 24 million cubic meters to 19 million because, for now, even investment on maintenance of production wells has been frozen. While Petrobras has announced positive initial results from the Mexilhao and BS-500 fields in the Santos basin, Batista believed the projections of an extra 12 million cubic meters per day by 2008 from these fields (and 30 million cubic meters by 2010) are ambitious at best. If rain shortfalls were to occur, gas-powered thermoelectric production would stress gas supply even more, causing a 40 percent shortfall in gas supply for uses other than power generation. Batista also predicted that increased demand for gas will necessitate spin off of Petrobras gas production into a separate entity by 2015. End Summary. NOT PLAYING WOULD BE TOO HIGH A PRICE -------------- ¶3. (SBU) During a January 18 conversation with Econoff, Banco Pactual energy analyst Pedro Batista said that the long term needs of Brazil are better served by Petrobras' short term concessions to Bolivian President Pedro Morales. The costs of a combative Petrobras stance, both to Brazil and to the region, would be too high. Simply stated, if gas supply from Bolivia completely stopped flowing to Brazil, Bolivia would lose its best paying customer, 10-15 percent of its GDP and would be forced to seek other means to raise cash. The resulting deep energy crisis in Brazil would cause GDP to shrink significantly, dampen foreign direct investment in Brazil and more than likely cause capital flight. The region would lose its economic leader -- Brazil -- and sink into an economic hole that would risk political instability. ¶4. (SBU) While Batista did not speculate what form an accord with the Morales government would take, the bottom line would be Petrobras acceptance of a smaller profit margin in Bolivia. This would not be especially harmful to Petrobras since its assets in Bolivia represent only about 2 percent of the company's total assets. Moreover, accepting such a deal would not be the first time Petrobras has acted more like a government entity than a profit seeking independent company, Batista pointed out. Recent domestic price increases notwithstanding, since 2003 Petrobras has kept domestic gas prices below international market prices, foregoing about 5 billion Reals (about US$2.1 billion) in potential income. This would be a problem if Petrobras could not afford such a haircut, but according to Batista, it can. He speculated that Petrobras would be willing to accept an overall loss of 200 million Reals (US$86 million) per month on its gas operations (an extra 62 million Reals, or US$26 million, more than its current, monthly losses). Batista stated he has discussed this scenario with Brazilian government officials and they have confirmed his conclusion, i.e. that Petrobras' good relations with Morales means a lot more than profit margins to Brazil. A LOOK AT FUTURE AMBITIONS BRASILIA 00000142 002 OF 003 -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Pactual is expecting a potential fall in supply from Bolivia from its actual 24 million cubic meters/day to 19 million cubic meters/day over the next 12 months, even though Petrobras would like to expand its production capacity in Bolivia from 30 MCM a day to 34 MCM. Batista was sure Petrobras would not attempt further capacity expansion above 34 MCM since that would require more than tripling its current 1.5 billion dollar investment in Bolivia -- something Petrobras is not willing to do. To further shore up its supply of gas, Brazil would have to rely on imports from Argentina. However, Argentina's own energy supply difficulties, which Batista expected would worsen, and its contracts with other countries, complicate the Argentine picture. ¶6. (SBU) Brazil's most viable option is looking inward, with some caution. First, it could convert its gas-field power plants to diesel - a step which is already in train - though this could be a costly process. Second, Batista said, the country could rely upon increased domestic production. Petrobras, Batista said, had recently forecast increased production from two gas fields in the offshore Santos basin, Mexilhao and BS-500. Batista qualified the forecast of 12 million cubic meters per day by 2008 and 30 million by 2010 as "ambitious at best." Petrobras' engineering partners and other analysts agree with Batista's assessment that significant technical difficulties would have to be overcome to reach those production levels. HARD TO PREDICT THE FUTURE -------------- ¶7. (SBU) If any drop in rainfall over the next few years resulted in electricity generation shortfalls (over 70% of Brazil's current power is generated by hydroelectric power plants),Brazil would increasingly need to rely on thermoelectric power, with a projected 11 percent of the thermoelectric supply coming from gas-fired plants. Combined with a projected 11 percent per year increase in gas consumption for non-power generation uses (due to its effective encouragement of gas consumption, including as a fuel for vehicles), Petrobras finds itself facing a difficult choice. If it continues to promote reliance on natural gas, at some point it will severely cut into its own core petroleum business. ¶8. (SBU) Batista speculated that by 2015, the growth in gas consumption would require that Petrobras spin off gas production into an entirely separate entity. Otherwise, Petrobras will increasingly rob Peter to pay Paul, limiting the growth of its core petroleum business. More importantly, current and projected national production and imports will not be sufficient to supply demand. Batista's worst case scenario: if Brazil were forced to rely on all of its installed capacity of gas-fired thermoelectric power generation, then natural gas supply (imports and national production) would only meet 60 percent of non-power-generation demand by the end of 2007. ¶9. (SBU) Comment: It is clear that Petrobras' approach to Bolivia is more that of an arm of Brazilian foreign policy than that of a profit-seeking company. Moreover, high oil prices have earned Petrobras record profits over the last two years, giving it some significant ability to take losses on its Bolivian operations. Should oil prices fall, however, expect some tension as the partially privatized company (Petrobras shares trade on the BOVESPA and NYSE) attempts to balance shareholders' insistence on profit margins with the demands of its regional stabilization role. End Comment. ¶10. (U) This cable was coordinated with AmConsulate Rio de Janeiro. BRASILIA 00000142 003 OF 003 CHICOLA