FIGHTING TERRORISM AND ESTABLISHING STATE

UNCLAS BOGOTA 009606 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV CO SUBJECT: FIGHTING TERRORISM AND ESTABLISHING STATE PRESENCE: THE COLMIL'S 5TH DIVISION Sensitive but unclassified. Not for Internet distribution. -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (SBU) COLAR 5th Division operations in three departments reflect distinct phases of GOC efforts to fight terrorism and establish state presence. In Tolima, the Division is breaking FARC control over rural areas; in Boyaca it is providing security for GOC institutions and services; and in Cundinamarca it has defeated the FARC, enabling the police to provide security to enable legitimate private sector activity. End Summary. -------------- -------------- TOLIMA: Breaking the Enemy; Introducing the State -------------- -------------- ¶2. (SBU) 5th Division operations in the historical FARC heartland of South Tolima focus on killing entrenched guerrilla forces and eliminating their logistical bases. The COLAR's campaign early in 2006 marked its first re-entry into the area in 20 years and met fierce resistance. Near Marquetalia, troops took six months of sustained combat operations to progress 20 miles, with 23 soldiers killed and 36 wounded from enemy attacks and land mines. As FARC fronts grew weaker, their casualties were surpassed by desertions. Tolima has had the highest FARC desertion rate in all of Colombia. Still, the FARC continues to resist COLAR forces in the area. ¶3. (SBU) Accion Integral, the military's "hearts and minds" civil affairs team, was critical in Tolima to gain the trust and cooperation of local populations. Its programs provided free medical care and build shelters, schools, and hospitals. Unarmed military psyops teams visited the skeptical, and sometimes hostile, rural population to humanize the COLAR's image by "shaking hands all day in Apache territory." In former FARC strongholds like Gaitana and San Miguel, the psyops teams persuaded jailed guerrillas to encourage their peers to desert, and they obtained intelligence from demobilized guerrillas that helped the COLAR to strengthen its hold in the area. -------------- -------------- BOYACA: Military Consolidation; Government Expansion -------------- -------------- ¶4. (SBU) In Boyaca, the 5th Division is further advanced in controlling territory and the FARC is debilitated. The COLAR estimates the five FARC and two ELN fronts in the area have dwindled to only about 50 fighters, most of them driven to remote areas. COLAR offensive action is limited, as the remaining FARC and ELN forces avoid engagement. The COLAR is holding territory, moving from a bunkered presence to active patrols and control. The professional soldiers have handed off to fixed territorial units (70% of the COLAR) and secondary forces -- police in urban areas, mobile "carabinero" police squadrons on roads, regular army conscripts guarding infrastructure, and "hometown" soldiers for localized control of small rural towns. ¶5. (SBU) In most of Boyaca, the confidence and support of local populations have tipped in the GOC's favor. Informer networks ('redes de cooperantes') supply public forces with intelligence to counter the remnants of FARC militias. State-sponsored security is welcomed, because it helps free a legitimate economy -- based on emerald mining and agriculture -- from FARC attacks and extortion. The government's focus is on strengthening municipal institutions (mayoralties and councils, courts, tax collection),improving infrastructure (roads, schools, health care),and encouraging economic development. Accion Integral no longer operates at this stage; it hands over to public/private partnerships. -------------- CUNDINAMARCA: Security, Governance, Growth -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Cundinamarca and Bogota represent the final stage of COLMIL and GOC efforts. The FARC and ELN presence has been largely eliminated -- converting a military problem of national security to a police matter of public security. The COLMIL plays a static support role in guarding infrastructure; police agencies take the lead on law enforcement. FARC and ELN recruitment of leftist political sympathizers continues in public university communities, but efforts to mobilize them for terrorist attacks have had little tangible effect. Effective security and civil governance have created an opportunity for private sector investment and growth, providing a model for GOC efforts elsewhere. DRUCKER