EX-PARAS RETAIN INFLUENCE ON THE NORTH ATLANTIC

C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 009310

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/10/2016
TAGS: KJUS PGOV PINR PREL PTER CO
SUBJECT: EX-PARAS RETAIN INFLUENCE ON THE NORTH ATLANTIC
COAST: A LOOK AT MAGDALENA DEPARTMENT


Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood.
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d)

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SUMMARY
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1. (C) Magdalena government, Church, and international
representatives said the paramilitary reinsertion program in
the Department risks failure because it lacks organization
and political support. They reported complaints that many
ex-paramilitaries remained armed. Residents feared the
military presence in areas vacated by the paramilitaries
would not be sufficient, and that the FARC could try to
regain control. Center for Reference and Opportunities (CRO)
officials said the total demobilized paramilitaries living in
Magdalena Department were 2,413, but that the CRO was
monitoring only 1,547. This report is the second in a series
that focuses on the reinsertion process in what used to be
the paramilitary's area of greatest influence, the north
Atlantic coast. End summary.

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MAGDALENA DEPARTMENT: RECONCILIATION WORK NEEDED
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2. (C) Magdalena Department government, Church, and
international representatives agreed the reinsertion program
in Magdalena suffered a lack of organization and that the
situation was worsening. Bishop of Santa Marta Ugo Puccini
said Magdalena Governor Trino Luna, who the Bishop claimed
was "placed there by the paramilitaries," had organized only
one meeting between the Church, private sector, and
government to address demobilization and reinsertion.
Puccini said he had suggested creating a commission to assist
with reconciliation and reinsertion, but the Governor never
followed up. The Bishop, who has held his current position
for over 18 years, said the majority of the political class
in the department was corrupt and had links to the
ex-paramilitaries. He did not understand why these
politicians, who were supported by the paramilitaries, were
not more committed to reinsertion.


3. (C) The Bishop, Human Rights Ombudswoman Lizette
Penaranda, and OAS Regional Coordinator Victoria Figueroa
said they had received complaints that some demobilized
paramilitaries remained armed and that new criminal groups
were also emerging. Penaranda, who has been the Ombudswoman
for the Magdalena Department since 1998, said there were
paramilitary members who never demobilized and were still
operating in the department. For example, commander AKA
"Codasi" from the North Bloc still intimidated the
population. She had also heard that some demobilized
paramilitaries had formed a group of 30 members that were
conducting illegal activities in the area of Rio Frio. They
said they were AUC, but the group had no structure, operated
without a uniform, and charged the population for "security
services." Penaranda said this group was responsible for the
recent killing of six people. She complained the military
was "only 20 meters away" from the site of the killing, but
has done nothing. Figueroa noted most complaints she
receives come from Chivolo, Plato, and Pivijay.


4. (C) The Bishop and Penaranda said the people in the
Sierra Nevada were afraid the military presence was
insufficient and that the FARC would try to move back into
the area. Penaranda explained the military boosted its
presence and fought the FARC in the area starting in 2002,
but many groups wanted to control the area because of its
strategic location and corridors. Before the paramilitaries
won control, the FARC and ELN had dominated the area. The
paramilitaries took control by intimidating the population
and killing anyone suspected of being a FARC or ELN
sympathizer.


5. (C) Penaranda said the department was previously divided
among three former paramilitary leaders: Hernan Giraldo (NW),

Chepe Barrera (SW),and Jorge 40 (the remainder.) There was
"gruesome" infighting between Giraldo and Jorge 40 for
control over illicit crops in 2001. The people supporting
Giraldo were primarily farmers and Giraldo's extensive
family, while Jorge 40's people were more urban and educated.
Jorge 40 won control of the area, but Giraldo maintained a
larger popular following than his rival. Panaranda noted
Giraldo is the "para-version of Pablo Escobar" and people
"idolize" him. He used his wealth to build roads, schools,
drains, and electricity in the region. He was also known for
giving money to whomever needed help. Jorge 40 was more
strategic with his money, and had bought extensive land
holdings--often using the threat of force to drive down the
price.


6. (C) Penaranda said victims were now trying to reclaim
their territories, but they no longer own the lands because
of Jorge 40's purchases. In Chivolo municipality, for
example, there were 100 families claiming their lands, but
they no longer held legal title. Citizens were increasingly
speaking out against the ex-paramilitaries and leading
authorities to mass graves. She warned, however, there were
so many bodies in the Sierra that it will take years to
exhume them all. In San Pedro alone, paramilitaries had
allegedly killed 800 people. She said she heard that
ex-paramilitary leaders have ordered that as many bodies as
possible be "disappeared." Penaranda said even though she
feels she has the people's confidence, she does not have the
resources or the staff to assist in the population's numerous
claims.

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SANTA MARTA EXPERIENCING SECURITY PROBLEMS
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7. (C) Our contacts reported increased concerns about the
insecurity in Santa Marta, the department capital, which they
attributed to paramilitary demobilization. One major
contributor to increasing insecurity was score settling among
the demobilized. In Santa Marta, the Bishop and OAS
representatives reported complaints that ex-paramilitaries
were collecting fees or "vacunas" for security and other
services. Additionally, the sudden growth in
motorcycle-taxis in the city was a ex-paramilitary
phenomenon. Figueroa said she had received complaints that
the moto-taxi drivers were collecting intelligence on
residents. The Bishop said there should be a greater
investment in the demobilized because "the only thing these
individuals know how to do is kill and extort."

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READ-OUT FROM SANTA MARTA'S CRO
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8. (C) Santa Marta's Center for Reference and Opportunities
(CRO) was new and had a staff of five--one director, 3
professionals, and one technical assistant. Director Gabriel
Carrero said there were 2,413 demobilized paramilitaries
living in 28 of Magdalena's 30 municipalities. The CRO,
however, was monitoring only 1,547. Carrero said he knew
where the remaining 900 lived, but that they had not
registered with his office.


9. (C) Indira Berrocal, coordinator of the Tracking,
Monitoring and Evaluation System (SAME),said 1,700
demobilized were visiting the bank every month to collect
their government stipend. 1,110 were registered in the
initial training and 673 were registered in health services.
Of those, SAME only knew of 434 ex-paramilitaries who were
working--99 in the formal sector and 335 in the informal
sector. The majority were working in construction, sales,
tourism, and informal commerce. Eighty-six were working in
the GOC's civil auxiliaries program as road assistants or
park rangers, and two hundred more would soon start in the
program. They get 13,000 pesos a day (USD 6). SAME reported
that only 41 worked as moto-taxi drivers. Berrocal said
there were 24 agricultural projects run by the GOC for the

ex-paras, displaced persons, and campesinos in the
department, and all of these were being carried out on
expropriated properties. Seventy-eight demobilized were
participating in the projects. 156 had registered for
education programs, but only 23 were studying--16 in primary
and 7 in high school. There were 20 registered in training
courses on crafts, cooking, computers, and machine operations.


10. (C) Berrocal cited several problems facing the
reinsertion program. The reinserted were not well received
by their communities, few formal sector jobs were available,
and there were few reconciliation programs in the
communities. The demobilized lacked work skills, and the
training, education and psychological help they needed was
largely unavailable. To ameliorate this, Carrero and
Berrocal planned to visit all the mayors of the department to
try to involve them in the reinsertion process.
WOOD