GOC AND FARC CONTINUE MEDIA EXCHANGE ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 009277 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/06/2016 TAGS: MARR PGOV PREL PTER CO FR SP SZ SUBJECT: GOC AND FARC CONTINUE MEDIA EXCHANGE ON HUMANITARIAN ACCORD REF: BOGOTA 8946 Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood. Reason: 1.4(b,d) ¶1. (C) Summary: The GOC and FARC have exchanged media statements in recent days on the possibility of creating an "encounter zone" to discuss a humanitarian exchange of FARC-held hostages for FARC terrorists imprisoned by the GOC. President Uribe insists any such talks be a prelude to substantive peace discussions with the FARC, a prospect the terrorist group heavily conditioned but did not discount. The public exchanges have generated intense media speculation on prospects for a humanitarian accord, but both sides appear to remain far apart on the conditions for launching substantive talks. End summary. ¶2. (C) Uribe announced September 27 that he was willing to discuss with the FARC a proposal on a humanitarian accord. Reading from a prepared text, Uribe said the GOC would consider an exchange of hostages, including a FARC proposal that the GOC withdraw armed forces from two municipalities in the state of Valle del Cauca to create an "encounter zone" for discussions. Casa Narino Communications Director Jorge Mario Eastman told us Uribe's response was prompted by a September 26 FARC statement criticizing the GOC's intransigence. Eastman explained that Uribe wanted to "open the door" to a humanitarian deal and to highlight GOC flexibility. He reiterated that Uribe is eager to start direct talks with the FARC, but not at any price. Uribe wants to avoid any similarities to former President Pastrana'sdespeje and to also link any humanitarian accord to the start of broader peace talks. ¶3. (U) The FARC tossed the ball back to the GOC in an open letter from the FARC Secretariat on October 1. The letter listed FARC requirements for humanitarian exchange talks and included a laundry list of additional issues the FARC insists are prerequisites to negotiations on a "political solution to the social and armed conflict." The GOC responded with a communique on October 2. The communique reiterated the GOC's commitment to discuss talks on a humanitarian accord, linked the creation of an "encounter zone" to a cease-fire, establishment of deadlines and the FARC's acceptance of specific security conditions, and noted the GOC's willingness to convoke a "constituent assembly" as part of a broader peace process. ¶4. (U) Uribe elaborated on the GOC position in an October 3 radio interview. He made it clear that the GOC is willing to meet with the FARC, but emphasized that any humanitarian accord needs to be part of a broader peace process. Uribe said a peace agreement with the FARC might require constitutional amendments to provide amnesty for more serious crimes. In that case, it should be expected that the paramilitaries would ask for similar consideration rather than treatment under the Justice and Peace Law. ¶5. (C) Longtime political operative and former presidential candidate Alvaro Leyva told us October 2 that he has met three times with President Uribe since August 7 to discuss ways to start GOC-FARC negotiations. He said the FARC's October 1 letter should be read positively, since it is the first time that the FARC has accepted the notion of broader peace talks with the Uribe government. He suggested that a demilitarized "encounter zone" could be created by the end of October, but stressed that the GOC and FARC would need to overcome their mutual distrust and agree to defer consideration of difficult issues (such as the repatriation of "Simon Trinidad" and "Sonia" and the freeing of the US hostages). He is working to generate confidence between the two parties, and suggested that the international community could help in this regard. In this context, he has spoken with representatives of the Swiss Government, the Vatican, and the International Committee of the Red Cross. Polcouns noted we remain skeptical about the FARC's intentions and stressed President Uribe's commitment that the U.S. hostages would be included in any humanitarian exchange. ¶6. (C) Eastman confirmed Leyva's role as GOC interlocutor with the FARC, but said it is difficult to work with him. The GOC never knows if Leyva is transmitting a message from the FARC or is operating on his own account. Eastman said the GOC's lack of reliable, discreet interlocutors with the FARC forces the GOC to use the media to talk to the group. He added that the need for public negotiations greatly complicates communications and reduces prospects for success. WOOD