ELN DISARMAMENT CRUCIAL, AMNESTY LIKELY, SAY

C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 008840

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/25/2016
TAGS: PTER PGOV PREL MARR CO
SUBJECT: ELN DISARMAMENT CRUCIAL, AMNESTY LIKELY, SAY
MEDELLIN CONTACTS

REF: BOGOTA 8649

Classified By: Political Counselor John S. Creamer
Reason: 1.4 (b,d)

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Summary
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1. (C) Center-left activists in Medellin told us the ELN
would have to disarm before participating in political
activity on a broad scale. They said the ELN's electoral
support was negligible in Colombia and predicted the
terrorist group would struggle to appeal to voters even if it
disarmed. Most said an ELN amnesty was inevitable, even if
that meant paramilitaries obtained similar benefits. A group
of businessmen is preparing to address ELN "post-conflict"
issues when the ELN commits to a cease-fire. End summary.

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ELN Must Disarm
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2. (C) The ELN must turn in its weapons before engaging in
widespread political activity, according to a range of
government, academic, Catholic Church, media, and business
contacts in Medellin who have been associated with the ELN
"House of Peace" in Antioquia department. Gustavo Villegas,
Secretary of Government in the Office of the Mayor, who has

SIPDIS
extensive experience on ELN peace issues, said the terrorist
group is reluctant to disarm, primarily because it fears FARC
attacks. Still, Villegas insisted the GOC should not allow
the ELN to proselytize for long without at least a
disarmament plan. Alonso Salazar, a center left mayoral
candidate, said the ELN should realize its time had passed
and begin the disarmament process. Salazar confided that ELN
negotiator at the House of Peace, Francisco Galan, offered to
enlist ELN sympathizers in support of Salazar's mayoral
candidacy but Salazar refused, telling Galan the support
would be the kiss of death. Galan seemed surprised but
agreed to stay quiet.


3. (C) Maria Teresa Uribe, professor of political science at
the University of Antioquia and a longtime observer of the
ELN, said a transitional period in which the ELN retained its
arms and started a fledgling political movement was
foreseeable but should be limited to 6 months. A longer
period would create fears the ELN was involved in the classic
communist process of "combining all forms of struggle" (todas
las formas de lucha),preserving the option of "returning to
the mountains" if it did not obtain its desired results at
the bargaining table. Father Horacio Arango, a GOC-ELN civil
society guarantor, said it would be "impossible" to imagine a
prolonged transition period in which the ELN freely
participated in politics while retaining its arms. All
contacts said they were considering "creative" options to
persuade the ELN to disarm.


4. (C) Villegas and Salazar noted the ELN's obsessive
concern with being compared with paramilitaries and suggested
GOC negotiators use language other than ELN "disarmament and
demobilization" as the peace process advances. Salazar said
the ELN preferred to charecterize the process as its "return
to legality." He saw no reason to avoid this term.

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ELN Political Options Limited
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5. (C) The ELN has negligible electoral support in the
country; no one predicted the ELN would form a political
party. Uribe said the ELN might accept a handful of
congressional seats granted to it for a limited period but
would be more interested in local representation and/or the
establishment of additional Houses of Peace throughout the
country. All recognized the democratic left would reject a
close association with the ELN for fear that such a link
would undermine the left's recent gains in regional and
municipal elections. Villegas and Salazar suggested the ELN
would try to promote "social change" through a broad-based
civil society movement, but regarded the ELN's likelihood of
success as slight. El Colombiano Director Ana Mercedes Gomez
said her newspaper was prepared to give the ELN and its
opponents platforms to discuss issues, repeating a project

the paper had recently completed with the ELN and
paramilitaries in Uraba. She said the ELN needed political
space to get its ideas across, but predicted it would soon
discover the democratic left had little time for ELN
theoretical discussions, focusing instead on the concrete
challenges of governing.

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ELN Amnesty Raises Few Questions
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6. (C) Uribe was the only contact who expressed discomfort
with a possible ELN amnesty; all others said it was
inevitable, even if the amnesty was later extended to
paramilitaries. Father Arango was the most vocal on the need
for reconciliation. He said a critical problem in the
paramilitary demobilization process was the lack of genuine
reconciliation, which was likely to cause Colombia problems
in the future. He promoted Medellin as the best possible
crucible in which to push ELN reconciliation with the broader
society. Medellin had no strong ELN presence and so no recent
history of enmity towards the organization; it had
experienced government and private sector personnel and
strong financial resources; and it always wanted to show the
rest of the country it was more capable than they were.

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Preparing for "Post-Conflict"
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7. (C) Businessman Manuel Santiago Mejia said he was one of
8 Antioquia businessmen who had formed a group to prepare for
an ELN "post-conflict" in which ensuring jobs and educational
opportunities for the demobilized would be critical. The
same group had recently submitted a proposal to President
Uribe on paramilitary reintegration. Their model was the
structure the private sector created to address the
devastation caused by the 1999 earthquake in Armenia, which
destroyed over half the homes in the city. The private
sector divided the affected area into 35 parcels and assigned
responsibilities for clean up and reconstruction, ensuring no
company was responsible for restoring more than a few
thousand homes. Still, the business group would not get
involved in the GOC-ELN process until the ELN had committed
to a cease-fire. If similar private sector groups could not
be formed in areas of ELN influence, such as Arauca, Norte de
Santander, Bolivar, and Cesar, Santiago suggested drafting
Antioquia expertise to manage reintegration projects.
WOOD