RESTREPO WARNS OF NEED TO START JUSTICE AND PEACE

C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 007955 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/29/2016 TAGS: KJUS PGOV PINR PREL PTER CO SUBJECT: RESTREPO WARNS OF NEED TO START JUSTICE AND PEACE LAW PROCESS REF: A. BOGOTA 7602 ¶B. BOGOTA 7495 Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood. Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: GOC Peace Commissioner Restrepo told the Ambassador August 29 the GOC must quickly start Justice and Peace Law (JPL) debriefings (version libres) of paramilitary leaders if it is to capitalize on the political space created by President Uribe's August 16 ultimatum requiring them to surrender to GOC custody. Still, he said inter-agency rivalries, legal disputes, and lack of political courage are undermining efforts to start the version libre process. He said the GOC will seek public comments before issuing substantive draft implementing regulations for the JPL. The GOC will not give para leaders unlimited time to comply with Uribe's ultimatum, but it does not want to close the door on those who still might surrender voluntarily. Restrepo's comments on the ELN and FARC processes are reported septel. End Summary. ¶2. (C) GOC Peace Commissioner Luis Carlos Restrepo told the Ambassador August 24 that President Uribe's August 16 ultimatum to paramilitary leaders to turn themselves in or lose their eligibility for Justice and Peace Law (JPL) benefits created political space for the paramilitary process. If this opportunity is not to be lost, the JPL's truth, reparations and justice process must start quickly. With the GOC's delivery of the list of 2,695 paramilitaries seeking JPL benefits to the Prosecutor General's Office (Fiscalia) on August 17, it is key that the Fiscalia start taking version libres as soon as possible. ¶3. (C) Restrepo said the start of the version libre process -- coupled with the GOC's holding of paramilitary leaders in controlled sites -- would deflect public criticism that the GOC is allowing the paramilitaries to run the process to their benefit. He conceded that the political cost to the GOC of including narcotraffickers Juan Pablo Sierra and the Mellizos (Victor Manuel and Miguel Angel Mejia) among paramilitary leaders eligible for JPL benefits has been high. "With each step forward in the process the paras are weaker," Restrepo said, "but that is not the public perception." The GOC needs rapid progress on holding the paramilitaries accountable for their crimes to maintain the process' credibility. ¶4. (C) Restrepo said he is pushing the Fiscalia to start the version libre process immediately but faces resistance. Fiscal Mario Iguaran is delaying the start of the process, arguing that his office must verify the eligibility of paras on the list before it can take any version libres. Restrepo dismissed the Fiscal's claim, saying the verification of eligibility is an ongoing responsibility shared by the executive, the Fiscalia and the Courts. He said Iguaran is trying to avoid political responsibility for the process, but noted that President Uribe has ordered Iguaran to proceed. (Comment: Iguaran is not a member of the executive branch and is not subject to presidential authority, but the President's order will have political effect.) Restrepo said Colombian Prison authorities and police are also reluctant to act. The National Institute of Prisons and Penitentiaries (INPEC) did not want to maintain La Ceja facility where the GOC is holding the paramilitary leaders who turned themselves in. The National Police (CNP) has been unable to capture those paramilitaries who have yet to comply with Uribe's ultimatum. Restrepo said problems in coordinating action among different GOC agencies are severely undermining the para process. ¶5. (C) Restrepo said the GOC is changing its approach to the implementing decree to facilitate the launch of the JPL process. With the para's rejection of the decree drafted by former Interior and Justice Minister Sabas Pretelt, there is no need for the GOC to issue a substantive decree that conflicts with the Constitutional Court's May 19 ruling on the law. Instead, the GOC would issue a short, procedural decree that would help the Fiscalia to focus its resources in the version libre process on key para leaders, and to better manage JPL deadlines. The GOC would also publish a decree stating that it would count time served by para leaders in La Ceja toward alternative sentences issued under the JPL. The Ambassador objected sharply to such a provision, noting that Le Ceja is not a prison. Restrepo agreed the GOC would not issue such a decree at this time. ¶6. (C) In addition to the procedural decree, Restrepo said the GOC would post a draft substantive decree on the Presidencia's web site on August 29 for a week of public reaction. He said the draft would try to preserve the JPL provision -- struck down by the Court -- allowing up to 18 months of the time spent by paras at Ralito to be applied to their alternative sentences. Restrepo said the GOC would also post a draft decree dealing with sedition; it could also include the proposed decree on time spent at La Ceja. Restrepo said GOC would solicit public comments on the drafts, triggering a national debate on these issues. He agreed such a debate would not end quickly, but was not concerned the paramilitaries would use this to stall the version libre process. Restrepo said he has commitments from 30 para leaders and 220 mid-level para commanders to immediately give version libres to the Fiscalia. ¶7. (C) Asked if the GOC would set a deadline for para leaders to turn themselves in under Uribe's ultimatum, Restrepo said the GOC would not give para leaders who remain at large unlimited time to comply. Still, it does not want to close the window to para leaders who still might surrender voluntarily. This is especially true since the GOC's security forces have found it difficult to locate and detain them. Jorge 40 and Vicente Castano have not yet surrendered to police custody, but they have also not resorted to violent resistance. Restrepo said Jorge 40 has indicated he will turn himself in soon; the Mellizos say they want to surrender at the same time and place as Jorge 40. He has heard nothing from Vicente Castro in eight days, but GOC intel predicts Castano will eventually comply. Restrepo said his efforts to persuade para leaders surrender -- backed by Uribe's ultimatum -- led to 23 of the 28 paramilitary leaders now in GOC custody turning themselves in. He concluded that a mix of pressure and persuasion is the best way to bring para leaders under GOC control. ¶8. (C) The Ambassador repeated our concerns about the Vengoechea, Sierra and Mellizo cases, and urged the GOC to extradite a paramilitary leader who is not meeting the JPL conditions. Restrepo agreed it would be useful to do so. In this context, it might be good if the Mellizos did not turn themselves in. This would enable the GOC to arrest and extradite them. ¶9. (C) Comment: The GOC issued the procedural decree on August 29 and also posted the draft decrees on the JPL law and on the presidencia's website for public comment. The draft decrees will be available for comment until 6:00 PM on September 3. We will provide more detailed review of the draft decrees septel. WOOD