Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BOGOTA7199
2006-08-08 21:11:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bogota
Cable title:
PRESIDENT URIBE ADVISOR ON GOC OUTREACH TO THE FARC
VZCZCXYZ0000 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHBO #7199 2202111 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 082111Z AUG 06 FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7713 INFO RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA IMMEDIATE 7025 RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS IMMEDIATE 8033 RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ AUG 8131 RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA IMMEDIATE 4102 RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO IMMEDIATE 0329 RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO IMMEDIATE 4757 RUMIAAA/USCINCSO MIAMI FL IMMEDIATE RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 007199
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/04/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL PTER CO
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT URIBE ADVISOR ON GOC OUTREACH TO THE FARC
REF: BOGOTA 6874
Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood, Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 007199
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/04/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL PTER CO
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT URIBE ADVISOR ON GOC OUTREACH TO THE FARC
REF: BOGOTA 6874
Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood, Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C) Summary: Presidential Advisor Fabio Valencia
outlined President Uribe,s efforts to convey to the FARC his
willingness to discuss a humanitarian accord or a broader
peace deal, but was skeptical the FARC would enter serious
negotiations without further GOC military pressure. He
agreed the ELN and FARC could receive an amnesty as part of
any eventual peace deal, and said such terms would then be
extended to the demobilized paramilitaries. End Summary
2. (C) Presidential Advisor on Economic Competitiveness and
informal advisor on the FARC Fabio Valencia told Ambassador
Wood August 1 that President Uribe is reaching out to the
FARC through the Catholic Church, the international
community, and other interlocutors to convey the GOC,s
willingness to discuss with the FARC either a humanitarian
accord or a broader peace deal. Uribe wants to end the
conflict, but in a way that is consistent with his
&democratic security8 strategy. Valencia*who participated
in President Pastrana,s peace negotiations with the FARC
from 1998-2002*said communications with the FARC are
difficult, and voiced skepticism about the group,s
willingness to seriously engage the GOC at this time. He
said the GOC would need to put more military pressure on the
FARC, before it would enter into talks.
3. (C) Valencia said it is key that the international
community support the GOC and resist FARC overtures. A
positive result of the failed Pastrana process was the
tougher stance taken by European and Latin countries toward
the FARC. The recent FARC letter to the European Union asking
to be removed from the EU,s list of terrorist organizations
was a classic FARC attempt to receive something for nothing.
If the international community responded positively, it would
undercut the GOC,S efforts. He said the international
community should stress to the FARC that any improvement in
relations would be linked to FARC actions in a peace process
with the GOC.
4. (C) The Ambassador said the refusal of the FARC and ELN
to accept the Justice and Peace Law could contaminate the
current AUC peace process. If demobilized ELN or FARC
members received amnesty as part of a peace process, the
demobilized paramilitaries would expect the same treatment.
Valencia agreed the ELN and FARC would insist on better terms
than the paramilitaries, and would likely receive a better
deal. Under the principle of favorability, the GOC would be
forced to extend these terms to the former paramilitaries. He
asked the United States to help prepare the international
community to accept such an eventual outcome.
WOOD
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/04/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL PTER CO
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT URIBE ADVISOR ON GOC OUTREACH TO THE FARC
REF: BOGOTA 6874
Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood, Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C) Summary: Presidential Advisor Fabio Valencia
outlined President Uribe,s efforts to convey to the FARC his
willingness to discuss a humanitarian accord or a broader
peace deal, but was skeptical the FARC would enter serious
negotiations without further GOC military pressure. He
agreed the ELN and FARC could receive an amnesty as part of
any eventual peace deal, and said such terms would then be
extended to the demobilized paramilitaries. End Summary
2. (C) Presidential Advisor on Economic Competitiveness and
informal advisor on the FARC Fabio Valencia told Ambassador
Wood August 1 that President Uribe is reaching out to the
FARC through the Catholic Church, the international
community, and other interlocutors to convey the GOC,s
willingness to discuss with the FARC either a humanitarian
accord or a broader peace deal. Uribe wants to end the
conflict, but in a way that is consistent with his
&democratic security8 strategy. Valencia*who participated
in President Pastrana,s peace negotiations with the FARC
from 1998-2002*said communications with the FARC are
difficult, and voiced skepticism about the group,s
willingness to seriously engage the GOC at this time. He
said the GOC would need to put more military pressure on the
FARC, before it would enter into talks.
3. (C) Valencia said it is key that the international
community support the GOC and resist FARC overtures. A
positive result of the failed Pastrana process was the
tougher stance taken by European and Latin countries toward
the FARC. The recent FARC letter to the European Union asking
to be removed from the EU,s list of terrorist organizations
was a classic FARC attempt to receive something for nothing.
If the international community responded positively, it would
undercut the GOC,S efforts. He said the international
community should stress to the FARC that any improvement in
relations would be linked to FARC actions in a peace process
with the GOC.
4. (C) The Ambassador said the refusal of the FARC and ELN
to accept the Justice and Peace Law could contaminate the
current AUC peace process. If demobilized ELN or FARC
members received amnesty as part of a peace process, the
demobilized paramilitaries would expect the same treatment.
Valencia agreed the ELN and FARC would insist on better terms
than the paramilitaries, and would likely receive a better
deal. Under the principle of favorability, the GOC would be
forced to extend these terms to the former paramilitaries. He
asked the United States to help prepare the international
community to accept such an eventual outcome.
WOOD