VICE PRESIDENT SANTOS ON FARC, ELN AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 006874

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/27/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL PTER CO
SUBJECT: VICE PRESIDENT SANTOS ON FARC, ELN AND
PARAMILITARY DEMOBILIZATION


Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood, Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: In a wide-ranging conversation on July 25
with Ambassador Wood and selected European Ambassadors,
Vice-president Santos said the FARC is weakened, but more
military pressure will be needed before it considers engaging
the GOC in serious talks. He said the GOC must be more
aggressive in rebutting FARC and ELN efforts to portray
themselves and leftist political leaders as victims of GOC
repression. On extradition, Santos said in the short-term the
GOC needs AUC leaders, cooperation to ensure the continued
participation of AUC mid-level commanders in the
demobilization process. If these mid-level commanders were
to join the FARC or other criminal groups, it would lead to a
resurgence of violence that could not be contained by
Colombia,s security forces. Still, President Uribe
understands there must be limits on the AUC leaders,
actions, and will do what needs to be done. Santos asked for
help in building the GOC,s counterintelligence capacity.
End Summary


2. (U) Ambassador Wood met July 25 with Vice-President
Francisco Santos and Swiss Ambassador Thomas Kupfer, Spanish
Ambassador Carlos Gomez-Mugica Sanz, Dutch Ambassador Franz
Van Haren, and Swedish Polcouns Pia Meier. The event was
hosted by British Ambassador Haydon Warren-Gash.

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The FARC: Weakened but Still Dangerous
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3. (C) Santos said that despite GOC efforts to engage the
FARC, it harbors no illusions about the group. It recognizes
that GOC military action has weakened the FARC, leading to
supply, communications, and morale problems. FARC desertions
are increasing, and its military capacity is reduced. Still,
the FARC can and will do more damage. It is recruiting among
the indigenous in Cauca and returning to areas vacated by
demobilized paramilitary groups. The GOC will need to apply
more military pressure before the FARC seriously considers
entering into talks with the GOC. Santos said the GOC,s
proposed extension of the wealth tax will enable it to buy
precision guided weapons, unmanned aerial vehicles, and other
munitions needed to target FARC leaders.


4. (C) Santos said the GOC must be more aggressive in
rebutting FARC and ELN efforts*as highlighted in a genocide
case currently before the Inter-American Court on Human
Rights and arising from the killing of Union Patriotica
members in the 1980s*to portray themselves and their
political sympathizers as victims of GOC repression. The GOC
needs to show that the FARC and ELN continue to use labor,
non-governmental organizations and other political groups to
complement their military actions. Santos noted that the
Communist Party only broke with the FARC a little over ten
years ago, and leftist political leaders such as Carlos
Lozano were closely tied to the terrorist groups. The
Ambassadors cautioned Santos against playing into
misconceptions by creating the appearance of a left-right
confrontation.

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Extradition of Paramilitary Leaders: AUC Leaders,
Cooperation Needed in Short-Term
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5. (C) Pressed by Ambassador Wood on the extradition of
paramilitary leaders, Santos said that in the short-term, the
GOC position is clear. If paramilitaries comply with their
commitment under the demobilization process and the terms of
the Justice and Peace law, they will not be extradited. He
said the GOC needs the AUC leaders to keep mid-level AUC
commanders participating in the demobilization and
reintegration process. Without their cooperation, the GOC
fears that as many as 1000-2000 experienced mid-level AUC
fighters could join the ranks of the FARC or other criminal
groups. The GOC security forces would be unable to cope
with such a development, which could return the country to

the indiscriminate violence of the Pablo Escobar years.


6. (C) Ambassador Wood said the international community
understands the GOC,s situation, but warned that many
paramilitary leaders already appear to be violating the terms
of the Justice and Peace law. The GOC needs to be careful
not to give the paramilitary leaders too much latitude.
Santos said the GOC recognizes that it must impose limits on
the paramilitaries, but needs a "little bit more time" to
implement the demobilization process. Still, he stressed
that "when push comes to shove, President Uribe will do what
needs to be done."

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The Justice and Peace Law: Successful Demobilization Key
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7. (C) Ambassador Wood asked if the GOC would need to
issue regulations clarifying the recent Constitutional Court
ruling on the Justice and Peace law. He acknowledged that
the ruling had created rather than resolved ambiguities, but
voiced concern that these regulations would favor the
paramilitaries. Many in the international community perceive
the GOC as being soft on the right and tough on the left.
The regulations could reinforce this view. Santos confirmed
the GOC is working on implementing regulations and agreed
they would have a large political cost. He reiterated,
however, that the GOC wants to prevent mid-level AUC leaders
from abandoning the demobilization process. He said, " It,s
a law not only of justice but of peace. We want a process
that brings in 80% of mid-level AUC commanders and 100% of
AUC leaders." Santos said the GOC approach to the
paramilitary demobilization process reflects continued
weaknesses in its security force. He added, "If the
paramilitary peace process broke down, the FARC would be the
winner."

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Colombian Security Forces: We Need Help on
Counter-Intelligence
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8. (C) . The Colombian military and police are much
better than they were several years ago, but corruption
remains a significant problem. Terrorist and
narcotrafficking groups continue to buy individual commanders
and soldiers. He said the GOC needs to improve its
counterintelligence capability and asked the Ambassadors for
help in this regard.

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Eradication: Growing Doubts
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9. (C) Santos said there is a growing public perception
that the GOC,s counternarcotics strategy is not working.
Even within the GOC, there are doubts as to whether the GOC
will be able to achieve its counternarcotics goals by the end
of President Uribe,s second term. He said "a type of war
fatigue is setting in on counternarcotics, which poses
political problems for the government."

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Congress: Coalition Politics Complicated
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10. (C) Santos said recent maneuvering in the Congress
over the election of the Senate and House Presidents had
threatened the government coalition's majority. Cambio
Radical Party leader German Vargas Lleras had flirted with
creating an alternative coalition with the Liberal,
Conservative, Polo Democratico (PDA) and Convergencia
Ciudadana (CC) parties, prompting Uribe to accept the support
of CC despite its inclusion of two Senators previously
expelled from the U Party for alleged paramilitary ties.
(Cambio Radical remains part of the GOC coalition and has 14
senators and 20 deputies.) Such a coaltion would would have
cost Uribe his majority in Congress.

WOOD