VICE PRESIDENT SANTOS ON FARC, ELN AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 006874 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/27/2016 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL PTER CO SUBJECT: VICE PRESIDENT SANTOS ON FARC, ELN AND PARAMILITARY DEMOBILIZATION Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood, Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: In a wide-ranging conversation on July 25 with Ambassador Wood and selected European Ambassadors, Vice-president Santos said the FARC is weakened, but more military pressure will be needed before it considers engaging the GOC in serious talks. He said the GOC must be more aggressive in rebutting FARC and ELN efforts to portray themselves and leftist political leaders as victims of GOC repression. On extradition, Santos said in the short-term the GOC needs AUC leaders, cooperation to ensure the continued participation of AUC mid-level commanders in the demobilization process. If these mid-level commanders were to join the FARC or other criminal groups, it would lead to a resurgence of violence that could not be contained by Colombia,s security forces. Still, President Uribe understands there must be limits on the AUC leaders, actions, and will do what needs to be done. Santos asked for help in building the GOC,s counterintelligence capacity. End Summary ¶2. (U) Ambassador Wood met July 25 with Vice-President Francisco Santos and Swiss Ambassador Thomas Kupfer, Spanish Ambassador Carlos Gomez-Mugica Sanz, Dutch Ambassador Franz Van Haren, and Swedish Polcouns Pia Meier. The event was hosted by British Ambassador Haydon Warren-Gash. -------------- -------------- The FARC: Weakened but Still Dangerous -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) Santos said that despite GOC efforts to engage the FARC, it harbors no illusions about the group. It recognizes that GOC military action has weakened the FARC, leading to supply, communications, and morale problems. FARC desertions are increasing, and its military capacity is reduced. Still, the FARC can and will do more damage. It is recruiting among the indigenous in Cauca and returning to areas vacated by demobilized paramilitary groups. The GOC will need to apply more military pressure before the FARC seriously considers entering into talks with the GOC. Santos said the GOC,s proposed extension of the wealth tax will enable it to buy precision guided weapons, unmanned aerial vehicles, and other munitions needed to target FARC leaders. ¶4. (C) Santos said the GOC must be more aggressive in rebutting FARC and ELN efforts*as highlighted in a genocide �A;case currently before the Inter-American Court on Human Rights and arising from the killing of Union Patriotica members in the 1980s*to portray themselves and their political sympathizers as victims of GOC repression. The GOC needs to show that the FARC and ELN continue to use labor, non-governmental organizations and other political groups to complement their military actions. Santos noted that the Communist Party only broke with the FARC a little over ten years ago, and leftist political leaders such as Carlos Lozano were closely tied to the terrorist groups. The Ambassadors cautioned Santos against playing into misconceptions by creating the appearance of a left-right confrontation. -------------- -------------- Extradition of Paramilitary Leaders: AUC Leaders, Cooperation Needed in Short-Term -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) Pressed by Ambassador Wood on the extradition of paramilitary leaders, Santos said that in the short-term, the GOC position is clear. If paramilitaries comply with their commitment under the demobilization process and the terms of the Justice and Peace law, they will not be extradited. He said the GOC needs the AUC leaders to keep mid-level AUC commanders participating in the demobilization and reintegration process. Without their cooperation, the GOC fears that as many as 1000-2000 experienced mid-level AUC fighters could join the ranks of the FARC or other criminal groups. The GOC security forces would be unable to cope with such a development, which could return the country to the indiscriminate violence of the Pablo Escobar years. ¶6. (C) Ambassador Wood said the international community understands the GOC,s situation, but warned that many paramilitary leaders already appear to be violating the terms of the Justice and Peace law. The GOC needs to be careful not to give the paramilitary leaders too much latitude. Santos said the GOC recognizes that it must impose limits on the paramilitaries, but needs a "little bit more time" to implement the demobilization process. Still, he stressed that "when push comes to shove, President Uribe will do what needs to be done." -------------- -------------- The Justice and Peace Law: Successful Demobilization Key -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) Ambassador Wood asked if the GOC would need to issue regulations clarifying the recent Constitutional Court ruling on the Justice and Peace law. He acknowledged that the ruling had created rather than resolved ambiguities, but voiced concern that these regulations would favor the paramilitaries. Many in the international community perceive the GOC as being soft on the right and tough on the left. The regulations could reinforce this view. Santos confirmed the GOC is working on implementing regulations and agreed they would have a large political cost. He reiterated, however, that the GOC wants to prevent mid-level AUC leaders from abandoning the demobilization process. He said, " It,s a law not only of justice but of peace. We want a process that brings in 80% of mid-level AUC commanders and 100% of AUC leaders." Santos said the GOC approach to the paramilitary demobilization process reflects continued weaknesses in its security force. He added, "If the paramilitary peace process broke down, the FARC would be the winner." -------------- -------------- Colombian Security Forces: We Need Help on Counter-Intelligence -------------- -------------- ¶8. (C) . The Colombian military and police are much better than they were several years ago, but corruption remains a significant problem. Terrorist and narcotrafficking groups continue to buy individual commanders and soldiers. He said the GOC needs to improve its counterintelligence capability and asked the Ambassadors for help in this regard. -------------- Eradication: Growing Doubts -------------- ¶9. (C) Santos said there is a growing public perception that the GOC,s counternarcotics strategy is not working. Even within the GOC, there are doubts as to whether the GOC will be able to achieve its counternarcotics goals by the end of President Uribe,s second term. He said "a type of war fatigue is setting in on counternarcotics, which poses political problems for the government." -------------- -------------- Congress: Coalition Politics Complicated -------------- -------------- ¶10. (C) Santos said recent maneuvering in the Congress over the election of the Senate and House Presidents had threatened the government coalition's majority. Cambio Radical Party leader German Vargas Lleras had flirted with creating an alternative coalition with the Liberal, Conservative, Polo Democratico (PDA) and Convergencia Ciudadana (CC) parties, prompting Uribe to accept the support of CC despite its inclusion of two Senators previously expelled from the U Party for alleged paramilitary ties. (Cambio Radical remains part of the GOC coalition and has 14 senators and 20 deputies.) Such a coaltion would would have cost Uribe his majority in Congress. WOOD