POSSIBLE GOC-FARC TALKS: VIEW FROM THE COLOMBIAN

CO N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 005603

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/07/2016
TAGS: PTER PGOV MARR CO
SUBJECT: POSSIBLE GOC-FARC TALKS: VIEW FROM THE COLOMBIAN
LEFT

REF: BOGOTA 4662

Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood.
Reason: 1.4 (b,d)


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Summary
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1. (C) Reftel outlined reasons why some mainly leftist
interlocutors considered GOC-FARC peace talks possible in
President Uribe's second term. According to these contacts,
the FARC's top demands are land reform, political
reconstruction, and social welfare programs, along with a
need for personal security and "respect" for the FARC's
"struggle." They said the GOC should continue military
pressure and consider creative proposals to draw the FARC
leadership into talks. They also asserted U.S. engagement
would be vital to a successful process. End Summary.

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What the FARC Wants
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2. (C) Former peace commissioner Daniel Garcia Pena said the
FARC's priority is land reform. Academic Fernando Cubides
added the FARC wanted to reverse appropriations by
paramilitaries. Demobilized FARC commander alias 'Nicolas'
concurred, saying, "This is not about confiscation but about
redistribution." The guerillas' economic agenda has mellowed
over time, according to President Pastrana's peace
commissionerCamilo Gonzalez, from "a Stalinist to a Social
Democratic platform." Garcia Pena stressed that, "The FARC
define themselves as Marxists but their agenda is not."


3. (C) The FARC's agenda would include social issues. In a
2006 communique, FARC leader Manuel Marulanda referred to
FARC proposals at Caguan which the GOC did not address:
unemployment subsidies, money for social work projects, and
pilot programs for alternative crops to coca. Cubides
emphasized welfare programs to alleviate underlying problems
driving coca cultivation. Ex-FARC commander 'Nicolas' spoke
of the restructuring of wealth and social reinvestment,
applying the FARC adage "social justice is the name of peace"
to food, health, and jobs. Policy analyst Ana Teresa Bernal
recounted that at Caguan, "Marulanda said the most important
thing was employment.... a jump-start plan not profound
reforms. Mostly the FARC wanted to show the population that
their plans were of benefit."


4. (C) Politically the FARC wants "a reordering of the
political-administrative map" (said Cubides) and "a
government of national reconstruction" (said Garcia Pena).
The consensus view was that a constitutional assembly would
be essential to write any accord into law. Gonzalez noted
the FARC had no popular base and would demand a guaranteed
bloc in such a forum (on the order of 10-15 percent). Form
is as important as substance, he said: "It would be a fiction
but an important one." Reparations Commission chair Eduardo
Pizarro pragmatically agreed that an assembly is not a reform
per se, only a framework for future changes. It would
satisfy what several speakers signaled as the FARC's vital
need for recognition as political actors. In Pizarro's more
pointed phrasing, "The FARC will negotiate to save face.
They need to justify forty years of war."

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Policy: 'Push' and 'Pull'
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5. (C) Interlocutors recommended a combination of military
pressure and policy incentives to both push and pull the FARC
to the table. Despite the overall leftward leaning of the
group, none favored leniency; all agreed it was critical for
the GOC to sustain military operations against the FARC until
they agreed to negotiate. Ironically it was ex-FARC
commander 'Nicolas' who was most emphatic on this point:
"Continued military pressure is essential...to show the FARC
there is absolutely no possibility they can take power with
military action."


6. (C) All said military pressure must go hand in hand with
political, economic, and social incentives. (Embassy

MILGROUP says even COLMIL commanders echo the same
sentiment.) Gonzalez spoke at length on this theme,
stressing the need to break out of conventional molds and
explore "audacious ideas." With respect to agrarian reform,
for example, he commented positively on Marulanda'sCaguan
proposal that the GOC give the FARC lands to showcase
agrarian reforms, however unrealistic it might sound. For a
political agenda, he urged a dedicated planning task force,
on the same lines as MOD strategy teams.

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U.S. Role: Prestige, Mediation, and (Non-)Extradition
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7. (C) Marulanda'scommunique of January 2006 said, "The
gringos play a part in the conflict, and any solution must
pass through them." Several commentators stressed the
critical role of the U.S. in any peace process with the FARC.
A large part of this is related to prestige; according to
Gonzalez, "The FARC would only negotiate with those they
consider powerful, such as the U.S. Because they have a
simplistic conception of the U.S. as their enemy, they would
also respect it as an interlocutor. This would be the FARC's
biggest triumph."


8. (C) The U.S. role has practical ramifications, too,
particularly regarding the FARC's desire for guarantees of
personal security against the threat of extradition. Pizarro
advised that in coming months Washington's attitude should
"move from stick to carrot, from tough to talking." He
(echoed by 'Nicolas') said the U.S. "big incentive" is
extradition, and suggested U.S. mediation would be required
before a deal was struck. The presence of the international
community at peace talks would lend to the proceedings the
prestige the FARC leadership craves.

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How Might The FARC Respond?
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9. (C) The FARC leadership is marked by a high degree of
unity and unanimity, according to analysts, and would be
unlikely to split into factions during talks. Pizarro
stressed its "enormous internal cohesion" and lack of
infighting over decades. Garcia seconded this, saying the
Secretariat was "profoundly unified.... Decisions are by

SIPDIS
consensus." Marulanda is said to have the last word; but his
advanced age (around eighty) throws open the issue of
succession. Looking ahead, FARC behavior in peace talks is
difficult to predict, because it would depend on the
personalities in charge at the time.


10. (C) Garcia said FARC members of campesino origin (like
Marulanda and military leader alias Mono Jojoy) tend to be
most pragmatic, while those of urban origin and higher
education (e.g., ideologue Alfonso Cano) are most radical and
stubborn. Unfortunately, Pizarro predicted leadership in a
negotiation scenario would likely pass to the urban political
types, while military chiefs would take a back seat.
'Nicolas' summed up, "Mono was pragmatic only because he
doesn't believe in negotiation; he's a man of action. Cano
would never negotiate, for the opposite reason, that he's too
political.... Ivan Marquez would be disposed to peace. He
has said that after 40 years of fighting it's time to end it
but without betraying Marxist principles.... The Army should
get Cano and Mono, to allow Marquez to breathe and lead."

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Past Attempts: Lessons Learned?
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11. (C) Three sets of FARC talks have occurred in the last
25 years, each failing for distinct reasons:

- In 1983-6 at La Uribe, the FARC was more dogmatic than
pragmatic, says former negotiator Camilo Gonzalez; its
Marxist rhetoric has since mellowed.

- In 1991 the FARC broke off brief talks at Caracas/Tlaxcala;
Gonzalez cited excessive FARC demands for the failure, while
ex-EPL leader Alvaro Villaraga added FARC "outrage" at
parallel processes with other guerilla groups, heavy COLMIL
strikes including on the FARC's high command, and post-Soviet
communist disarray.


- The last attempt, in 1999-2002 at Caguan, was merely a
"pretense," said Gonzalez, with the FARC buying time to
strengthen its forces and the GOC launching Plan Colombia.
Analyst Alfredo Rangel said the GOC showed up with no plans:
"The government did not make any proposals at Caguan; all
proposals came from the FARC." FARC leader Marulanda
similarly attributed the 2002 collapse to GOC unpreparedness
and its failure to offer anything concrete in return for
demobilization.


12. (C) Historically the FARC has not negotiated in good
faith. Villaraga and ex-FARC commander alias 'Nicolas'
insisted the FARC was serious about peace and political
reform in 1983-1986, but academic Roman Ortiz said both were
proven wrong by the FARC's 1982 Conference resolution to
double its forces. 'Nicolas' confirmed that at the 2000
plenum the FARC's leading ideologue Alfonso Cano proposed
striking the oligarchy while its guard was down. With regard
to drugs, there is no evidence for the FARC's purported
interest in eliminating trafficking (reftel). The precedents
suggest a wary attitude towards FARC intent, as well as an
attitude of 'trust but verify' during any period of cease
fire.

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Comment
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13. (C) The interlocutors cited above either honestly or
dishonestly portray the FARC as serious about its political
agenda and depict peace talks as a forum for setting national
policies and programs. Unquestionably the FARC is to some
degree a captive of its political rhetoric, but we would
expect FARC policy interests to take a back seat to the
conditions and obligations of their demobilization in any
eventual peace talks. We also would expect the GOC to reject
any discussions of national policy beyond the conditions of
FARC re-insertion. We do not believe that the FARC is so
unified that no elements would seek a separate peace with the
government, but we agree that if talks ever begin with the
FARC as such, they will be able to maintain a consolidated
negotiating position. Finally, it was predictable that U.S.
direct involvement would be sought. We see no reason even to
contemplate such a step.
WOOD