A/S SHANNON MEETS WITH FOREIGN MINISTER BARCO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BOGOTA 005515 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/30/2026 TAGS: ECON ENRG ETRD PREL PTER SNAR CO SUBJECT: A/S SHANNON MEETS WITH FOREIGN MINISTER BARCO Classified By: Charg d'Affaires Milton K. Drucker. Reason: 1.4 (b,d) -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) A/S Thomas Shannon and Ambassador Wood met with Foreign Minister Carolina Barco on May 25. They exchanged views on Colombia's increasingly active regional diplomacy, Brazil's attitude toward Bolivia and Venezuela, Chavez's disruptive approach on the world stage, and relations with Chile. They also discussed assistance to the Caribbean states. Shannon gave a readout of his visit to Brazil. Barco reported that Peru was resisting attending an Andean Community meeting called by Bolivian President Morales to review the groups status following the EU-Latin American Summit. Barco noted some resistance by Chile's new president to establish closer relations with Colombia. End Summary. ¶2. (C) On May 25, A/S Tom Shannon and Ambassador Wood met with Foreign Minister Barco for over an hour at the MFA. Barco was accompanied by Vice Minister Reyes and Coordinator for U.S. Affairs Patricia Cortes. Polcouns was note taker. ¶3. (C) Shannon said his visit was meant to underscore U.S. confidence in the Colombian electoral process (presidential elections were the following day) and the deepening U.S.-Colombian relationship. He noted the important relationship between President Bush and Uribe, and hoped to build on that in Uribe's second term should he be elected. -------------- EFFECTIVE COLOMBIAN DIPLOMACY -------------- ¶4. (C) Shannon said he was impressed with the role Colombia had played at the EU-Latin American Summit in Vienna, especially in managing relations with Venezuela, Peru, Brazil and Bolivia. Colombian diplomacy had successfully persuaded the Europeans to remain understanding, patient and flexible toward the differing views among the Andean countries about a future trade relationship. Barco acknowledged that the Europeans softened their position during the Summit, agreeing to continue engaging those wanting to move forward, but not closing the door on others, such as Bolivia. She said the EU had agreed to give Bolivia until July 28 to take a preliminary decision on whether to proceed with trade talks and had expressed a willingness to work further with the GOB if it needed special conditions. The Summit demonstrated how complicated relations between countries in the region have become, she said. -------------- HIGH LEVEL MEETING ON HAITI IN BRASILIA -------------- ¶5. (C) Shannon noted that he had just arrived from Brasilia where he attended the High-Level Meeting on Haiti. The meeting had laid the foundation for a full-fledged international donors conference this summer. He said the international community needed to re-think how international aid should be delivered in a country in crisis. The current way was too slow and ineffective. The other issue was how to transform MINUSTAH, which initially focused on security and order in preparation for the elections, into a facilitator of stability and development. What the international community needed to aim at was something akin to Uribe's democratic security policy, which focused on building up state institutions. Barco agreed, but expressed concern that Haiti had also developed a large drug problem. Shannon responded that Colombia could be a useful voice for Haiti because of its experience in fighting narco-traffickers. Barco said Colombia had expressed a willingness to help its Caribbean neighbors with counter-narcotics police, and had been already approached by several countries. She and Vice President Santos planned to visit some of them in the next couple of months to share GOC expertise. She praised U.S. training of GOC public forces on counter-narcotics techniques, which in turn now gave Colombia the capacity to assist others. ¶6. (C) Shannon said Trinidad and Tobago had recently requested assistance with anti-kidnapping training (they average about five a month),and the U.S. and UK were working counter-terrorism issues with the West Indian nations in the run-up to the 2007 Cricket World Cup. Noting that the World BOGOTA 00005515 002 OF 003 Cup would attract participants and spectators from South Asian countries, Shannon said the U.S. wanted to focus on improving linkages between the security services of Caribbean states. -------------- BRAZIL, POST-PETROBRAS NATIONALIZATION -------------- ¶7. (C) Barco reported that she accompanied Uribe to Brazil a week after Chavez announced he was pulling out of the Community of Andean Nations (CAN). Uribe tried to persuade President Lula to play a calming role. Lula told Uribe he was "disappointed and fed up" with Chavez, and agreed to talk to him about the future of the CAN. Uribe and Lula agreed that they had to "listen to Morales carefully. He was talking to different audiences, responding to different constituencies, and was in campaign mode in the run-up to the July 2 Constituent Assembly elections. Lula told Uribe he wanted to approach Morales pragmatically but Bolivian nationalization of Petrobras was costing him at home. Political opponents were criticizing the conduct of Brazil's foreign policy. Barco said she had told U/S Burns during her last visit to Washington that it was a good moment for the U.S. to reach out to Brazil. Shannon commented that Lula continued to be criticized in the press for his handling of the Petrobras matter, but so far it was not affecting his campaign poll numbers. ¶8. (C) Shannon reviewed his meetings in Brazil with Foreign Minister Amorim and Under Secretaries Patriota and Felicio. The Brazilians had worked hard to contain the fallout of the Petrobras nationalization but remained "very upset" and expected more trouble. A key issue was the growing tension between Brazilian small landowners and the indigenous workers in Bolivia. The GOB was concerned that, as Bolivia began its land reform process, resident Brazilians would not be prejudiced. Shannon stressed that Brazilian investment in Bolivia was strategic leverage and not economically motivated. Given what had happened with Petrobras, the Brazilians told him they planned to move ahead with additional exploration to replace Bolivian gas by 2008. The GOB's message to Bolivia would be that it could make a choice between being linked to Brazil or not, but that Bolivia would lose out if it opted to reduce ties to its largest neighbor.. ¶9. (C) Shannon met with Amorim just after the FM's telephone call with Chavez. Shannon said Amorim told Chavez that Brazil was "out of patience" and that meddling with Brazil's economy was damaging to Lula and Brazilian-Venezuelan relations. Chavez's actions were presenting an image of the two countries competing for influence in the region, an optic unhelpful to both. At the same time, Amorim told Shannon he remained convinced that bringing Chavez into MERCOSUR would give Brazil an opportunity to influence and temper Chavez. Amorim, said Shannon, also encouraged the U.S. not to treat Bolivia as a lost cause. ¶10. (C) Barco agreed with Amorim's approach toward Bolivia. The GOC remained determined not to close the door on Morales just yet. Her biggest problem was Bolivian officials never returning phone calls. Shannon said the Brazilian authorities had recommended that foreign interlocutors speak directly to Morales. Barco noted that Morales appeared more willing to engage his neighbors and had called for a CAN meeting on Andean commitments coming out of the EU-Latin American Summit. Trade and Foreign Ministers would meet on June 13 in Ecuador and Presidents the following day. Barco reported that Peru still had not made up its mind about attending; President Toledo wanted to send a message. Shannon offered to follow up with Peru to encourage their attendance. -------------- VIEWS ON CHAVEZ: THE GREAT DISORGANIZER -------------- ¶11. (C) Shannon said Chavez had the same approach toward the CAN, the G-3, and MERCOSUR negotiations. He was the "great disorganizer." When operating in an organized, structured environment, he was at a disadvantage. When the environment was disorganized, his financial resources and ability to rally crowds gave him the advantage. This is what he did in Venezuela, and this is what he is trying to do abroad. Shannon stressed that the U.S. message continued to be that the institutions he was disrupting were important for BOGOTA 00005515 003 OF 003 stability in the region. ¶12. (C) Barco, citing Chavez's conciliatory comments toward Uribe earlier in the week (he praised Uribe as a man "deserving of respect" despite their ideological differences),agreed this was the right approach. Venezuelan Foreign Minister Rodriguez was talking to Peru and Ecuador, trying to mend fences, which could lead to a new policy of less belligerence. Shannon said that Chavez was also cycling down and assessing the damage he had done to himself. However, Chavez's introspective moment would not last long and ultimately would not change his behavior. He said the U.S. had tried to establish a dialogue with Venezuela, identifying four areas where cooperation might be possible - - energy, commerce, counter-drug and terrorism efforts. He had invited Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs Maria Pilar Hernandez to Washington to convey his interest in a dialogue, and four days after her return, Ambassador Brownfield's convoy was attacked. Brownfield had spoken to FM Rodriguez about a possible visit, only for Chavez to announce two days later that if A/S Shannon wanted to come, he was welcome if he behaved in a respectful way. Shannon said he would continue to try to find ways to dialogue. Tension makes people in the region uncomfortable. Barco agreed, noting that confrontation distracts from the economic and social programs we need. ¶13. (C) Barco continued that Chavez's conciliatory remarks toward Uribe are what he has been saying privately all along. The GOC was also trying to maintain a dialogue and planned to meet Rodriguez in the middle of June. Barco said she would "pick up" on the four topics Shannon identified in her conversations with Rodriguez, particularly on the energy theme given plans to jointly build an oil pipeline. She remained convinced that projects like this could help "knit things together." Barco underscored that maintaining the Colombian-Venezuelan commercial relationship was important to Colombia's economy. Chavez knows our "Achilles' heel" is a disruption in that trade," she said. -------------- -------------- CHILE: UNRESPONSIVE TO GOC OVERTURES; NON-COMMITTAL ON UNSC -------------- -------------- ¶14. (C) Barco asked Shannon for his views on Chile. The GOC had invited President Bachelet to visit Bogota but she had so far been unresponsive. Shannon said Bachelet would meet with President Bush on June 8. The U.S. would try to do everything to make the visit a success. He acknowledged that discussions with Chilean officials on the Venezuelan candidacy for the UN Security Council have been tough. GOC officials have not made a final decision, but they have made it clear they do not want to "be alone in the region" or provoke Chavez. Chile believes it needs good relations with MERCOSUR to retain any influence. With Morales now leading Bolivia, their other concern was renewed tensions over their long-standing border issue with the GOB, something Chavez could exploit. All this suggests that Chile will likely stick close to Brazil's position, or push for a third candidate but, noted Shannon, the window for that option was closing fast. ¶15. (C) He underscored that the U.S. remained very concerned about Venezuela on the Security Council. "Disorganizer" Chavez would approach it as he has approached every other summit or international meeting, and use the Council as a vehicle to attack the U.S. on Iraq and divide consensus on Iran. Ambassador recalled Venezuela's disruptive and unproductive behavior during the Sixth Regular Session of the Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism, which Colombia hosted in March. Barco noted that the Guatemalans were actively campaigning and had done well in elections to the Human Rights Council, where Venezuela failed to secure a seat. ¶16. (U) A/S Shannon cleared this message. DRUCKER