COLAR PREDICTS ESCALATION BEFORE NEGOTIATION

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BOGOTA 005497

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/13/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER CO FARC
SUBJECT: COLAR PREDICTS ESCALATION BEFORE NEGOTIATION

Classified By: CDA Milton K. Drucker
Reason: 1.4 (b,d)


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Summary
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1. (S) Commanders of Joint Task Force Omega (JTF-O),the
Colombian military's elite force at the core of the Plan
Patriota campaign, see the conflict with the FARC entering a
phase of more direct confrontation. They contend the FARC
has determined it cannot withstand four more years under
re-elected President Uribe, and hence it will try to gain a
position of strength from which to enter peace negotiations.
Commanders believe the FARC wants to pressure Bogota, by
regaining territory lost in the first phase of Plan Patriota.
An escalating campaign would pose tough challenges to
COLMIL's stretched resources, especially in helicopter
mobility, as well as to its internal coordination and
underemphasized civil affairs work. End Summary.

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Renewed FARC Assertiveness
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2. (S) On June 8 US MILGROUP Commander visited the command
of Joint Task Force Omega (JTF-O),which prosecutes Plan
Patriota in FARC heartlands, to discuss ongoing operations
and near-term outlook. JTF-O commanders anticipate that a
new and more direct phase of the conflict is approaching.
Instead of the COLMIL's active pursuit of the FARC in
defensive retreat, the pattern will shift to one in which the
FARC will move to the strategic offensive, trying to regain
territory in the JTF-O area of operation (AO) and provoking
head-on confrontation. Current intelligence already
indicates movement of some 500 guerrillas into JTF-O's AO on
the Sumapaz plateau in Cundinamarca Department, a strategic
gateway to Bogota.

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FARC Sights on Bogota
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3. (S) Seizure of Bogota remains the FARC's principal
objective, according to JTF-O commanders. They believe the
struggle now occurring west of La Macarena around La Uribe is
aimed at the establishment of an intermediate rear-guard in
sufficient strength to project and support an effort directed
against Bogota. The FARC's principal rear-guard remains in
its historic safe haven further south, but in the early days
of Plan Patriota, the FARC learned from hard experience that
lines of communication from the despeje were too long to
protect its operations in Cundinamarca.

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Maneuvering for Talks
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4. (S) The FARC's new assertiveness is ironically born of
weakness. Plan Patriota deprived the FARC of its safe haven
(despeje) and dispersed its forces. Under sustained COLMIL
operations the FARC has suffered higher casualties, forced
mobility, and inability to aggregate. Its supply and
communication lines are interdicted. These factors have
taken a heavy toll on FARC morale and discipline, as well as
hindering recruitment and boosting desertion. In JTF-O
commanders' view, the about-face from a FARC defensive to an
offensive posture is triggered by President Uribe's
re-election and by the FARC's strategic determination that it
cannot withstand another four years of this military
pressure. The FARC's drive to regain territory, according to
the commanders, is motivated by a desire to enter peace talks
-- in a position of greater military strength and hence
greater negotiating leverage.

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COLMIL Challenges
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5. (S) The commanders said the GOC shares the same goal of
entering talks in a dominant position, and it will fight to
sustain pressure on the FARC. The next phase of the conflict
will be about stamina and staying power, which poses tough
challenges for the COLMIL:

- Helicopters: this is a long-standing issue. Already
stretched, Omega's helicopter assets have been drawn off to
support other areas, including high value target (HVT)
missions.
- U.S. support: this concern applies most to the logistical
area. Although U.S. support meets only about 24 per cent of
COLMIL requirements, this assistance enables movement of
supplies as well as troop evacuations and rotations, which
are vital to morale and discipline.

- Organizational hurdles: commanders retain the mind set of
war fighters within their respective armed services rather
than providers to a collaborative joint force. The COLAR
cares little, the commanders said, for the Mobile Brigades
that fight in the Omega area. Continued duplication by units
pursuing the same HVT targets is evidence of this phenomenon:
whichever service develops target information is the one to
pursue it on any given occasion. Sister services are often
unaware of one anothers' activities.

- Civil affairs: JTF-O commanders stressed that social and
economic development work by the GOC's USAID-equivalent
Accion Integral was the key to defeating the FARC. Omega
officers lamented the lack of GOC development programs in
their AO. The COLMIL, they said, can improve the security
situation but cannot sustain that progress without
significant GOC local presence.

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An Alternate View
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6. (S) There are observers who believe the FARC, having
waited over 40 years, may wait four more years in the hope
that Uribe's successor will be someone of the left who would
be easier to deal with. Meanwhile, the drug trade is so
lucrative they can afford to wait. These observers usually
point out the FARC "do not think like us," and therefore it
is difficult to predict their actions.

DRUCKER