JUSTICE AND PEACE LAW UNIT CHIEF SATISFIED WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 004987 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/30/2015 TAGS: KJUS PGOV PREL PTER CO SUBJECT: JUSTICE AND PEACE LAW UNIT CHIEF SATISFIED WITH CONSTITUTIONAL COURT'S PRELIMINARY PRONOUNCEMENT Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood. Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d) -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Justice and Peace (J&P) Law Specialized Unit Chief Luis Gonzalez on May 25 said Constitutional Court's May 18 and 19 press releases on the J&P Law had strengthened some of its key provisions and had "legitimized" the Unit's job. He said Court President Jaime Cordoba informed it would be issuing its complete, written decision during the week beginning May 29. Gonzalez's view, the Court's two principal holdings were making each demobilized person accountable for the information he "unintentionally" omits, and expanding victims' access to the legal process. Gonzalez estimated he would receive the first J&P list from the Ministry of Interior and Justice around 25 July. End summary. -------------- COURT'S DECISION LEGITIMIZES THE UNIT'S ROLE -------------- ¶2. (C) Gonzalez's initial impression was that the Constitutional Court's May 18 and 19 press releases on the J&P Law had strengthened some of its key provisions and had "legitimized" the Unit's job. Gonzalez was hesitant to give an official opinion until the Court announced its formal decision, which Court President Jaime Cordoba said would be released during the week beginning May 29. ¶3. (C) Gonzalez said the two fundamental outcomes of the Court's decision were making the demobilized person accountable for the information he "unintentionally" omits and expanding victims' access to the legal process. Gonzalez argued that the Court's decision to strengthen Article 25, thus eliminating the possibility that a demobilized person could seek Law 975 benefits for crimes he "inadvertently" omitted, legitimizes the Unit's work as it tries to prove that the process does not promote impunity. The Court's clarification that demobilized individuals must identify the disappeared or kidnapped, and all licit/illicit assets is also important. Moreover, involving the victim in Law 975 investigations (as they do under the ordinary criminal process) also helps validate the process. The only problem he saw was how the Unit was going to obtain the resources for victims' travel expenses for interviews and attendance at trials. ¶4. (C) Gonzalez emphasized the importance of reviewing the Court's full pronouncement before one could fully understand the reach of its decision. For example, Gonzalez believes, the Court clarified that prison time would be served in an actual prison. This could be another potential blow to the peace process as the GOC and paramilitary leaders have previously agreed on alternative places to serve time, such as in the leaders' own farms. Gonzalez also noted that it will be up to each Justice and Peace magistrate to interpret the Law. Moreover, the Colombian concept of "favorability" means that aspects of the Court's decision (it is unclear which aspects) will not be able to be applied to those who demobilized in reliance on the law as it existed prior to the Court's decision. According to Gonzalez, Vice Minister of Interior and Justice Ximena Penafort was looking into this aspect. -------------- NEXT STEPS FOR THE J&P UNIT -------------- ¶5. (C) The J&P Law Unit will start its official investigations upon receipt of the official list from the Ministry of Interior and Justice. That list has still not been forwarded, though the Peace Commissioner's Office sent an unofficial version, which the Unit is already using to begin its investigations (the Unit has approximately 140 investigators around the country collecting information for the investigations). Gonzalez informed that the Unit has been divided into teams focusing on the 35 demobilized blocs and their members. The Unit has requested and continues to receive information on the criminal activity of the blocs and their members from the Vice President's Office, DAS, National Police, Military, the Fiscalia National Units (e.g., Human Rights, Money Laundering, Narcotics, Anti-Kidnapping),and all the Sectional Prosecutor Offices around the country, as well as data searches of the information systems of the Fiscalia. In addition, Unit analysts have researched newspaper reports from "El Espectador" and "El Tiempo" on massacres and other criminal activity associated with paramilitary organizations. This search involves reporting dated back to 1976. This information is being collected and organized in matrices connecting the Blocs, individuals, and criminal activities. ¶6. (C) Gonzalez explained that the consensus is not to send the list with all the names at once (thus inundating the Unit with over 2,000 names). Instead, the list would be sent in different groups: the first group would be the list of the AUC's 21 peace "negotiators" (these are the leaders of the AUC groups). The second list would be of approximately 300 or so persons who demobilized and who had prior investigations pending for serious crimes at the time of their demobilization. The third list would be of the others who have demobilized, and do not have pending criminal cases. This latter list may be subdivided into groups corresponding roughly to the date their AUC group demobilized. Lastly, a list would be prepared of those sitting in jail who had been included in the "lists" of demobilized prepared by the group's leaders. ¶7. (C) Gonzalez said the Ministry of Interior and Justice must still "verify" the eligibility requirements on all the names before sending them to the Prosecutor General's Office (Fiscalia). This could take some time. For example, a Colombian government official close to Vice Minister Penafort told us that during their initial analysis of the lists, they had discovered that 377 individuals had not properly taken an oath required by the implementing regulations before they can request that their cases be processed under Law 975. Moreover, they have been able to identify 10 individuals on the list who never demobilized; two individuals that had the same identification number; four that have demobilized twice; and 32 that have pending extradition petitions. Gonzalez estimated that he would receive the first list around July ¶25. ¶8. (C) After the J&P Law Unit receives an official list, under the implementing regulations, it has up to six months to take the "version libre" statement (a full debriefing/confession) from these persons. Thus, depending on the date the list was received by the Fiscalia, there would be different deadlines for the taking of the respective "version libres". After the conclusion of the "version libre," the law required the Fiscalia to "immediately" start the legal process by filing preliminary charges against the demobilized person, thus starting the 60 day time period in the law to investigate (i.e., verify) the information provided by the demobilized person before bringing "formal charges." The Constitutional Court, however, clarified that the Fiscalia had an indefinite time period between the conclusion of the "version libre" and the filing of the preliminary charges, to allow the Fiscalia time to "thoroughly" investigate the confessions. ¶9. (C) After the Fiscalia concludes its investigation it would notify the J&P judge of its intent to file formal charges, and request a hearing to present these formal charges before the J&P judge. At this hearing, the demobilized person will have three choices: 1) accept all the charges in the Fiscalia's charging document, after which he proceeds to a sentencing hearing a few weeks later; 2) accept a part of the charges, in which case the charges he does not accept are severed and referred to the ordinary criminal process, and the alternative sentencing will proceed only on the accepted charges; and 3) deny all the charges, in which case he is not eligible for a alternative sentencing under the J&P law, and his case is sent to the ordinary criminal process. -------------- J&P UNIT RESOURCES CONSTRAINTS -------------- ¶10. (C) Gonzalez informed us he was encountering resistance in staffing the Unit because the J&P law did not create new prosecutor positions, but rather required re-assignment of prosecutors from other offices. He reported that the Unit still needed 8 of 20 appellate level prosecutors as required under the J&P law. He noted that the eight judges who would be responsible for J&P hearings have already been selected (four will be stationed in Barranquilla and the other four in Bogota). ¶11. (C) Gonzalez said his Unit had begun to collect raw data from its own internal system, and from other sources (including media),but he was extremely skeptical of his in-house ability to develop and fund a software program capable of storing and searching intelligence from the military, DAS, Peace Commissioner's office, etc. Gonzalez stated that none of the Fiscalia's agencies could spare a trained computer systems person to dedicate themselves full-time to this project because they are all too busy with the transition to the accusatory justice system and other responsibilities. (The Embassy plans to assist the J&P Unit in the development of an information database.) ¶12. (C) Gonzalez and others in the GOC clearly expect foreign donors, particularly the USG, to fund some, if not most, of the Unit's needs. Delays in authorizing U.S. funds for the demobilization process have slowed our ability to provide assistance to the J&P Unit. To date, DOJ has provided two training sessions for Unit prosecutors and investigators (USD 63,000),with a third planned in July/August for new Unit members. USD 53,000 in equipment has been provided to the Unit, with FY05 funding for USD 300,000 projected to establish the Barranquilla and Bogota offices, and another USD 500,000 projected for equipment (office and investigative equipment, vehicles, radios and cellular phones). In addition, USD 198,000 in FY05 funds is projected for technical assistance and training, USD 200,000 for forensic assistance and USD 200,000 for operational expenses. FY06 projected funding for the J&P Unit is USD 1.95 million and FY07 USD 1.85 million. These funds will be used to continue to enhance and develop the Unit, including operational expenses, data base development, technical assistance and training, equipment, and security. -------------- SUPPORT FOR J&P OVERSIGHT -------------- ¶13. (C) On May 19, USAID Deputy Director Susan Reichle opened the Inspector General's (IG) conference in Barranquilla to train staff on their role and responsibilities to provide oversight of the implementation of the J&P Law and the demobilization and reintegration process. The U.S. has provided USD 260,000 to support the work of the IG and in FY 05 an additional USD 200,000 is currently programmed for the IG. The issue raised most frequently by the IG was the treatment of child soldiers (those under 18) who were discarded from the AUC bloc just before demobilization. As a result, they are not receiving benefits and are outside the system. For example, none of the 3,000 demobilized soldiers in the AUC's North Bloc were below the age of 18. The IGO is of the opinion that child soldiers must not be prosecuted because they are victims rather than criminals. WOOD