FARC/ELN: TERRORIST TAKEDOWNS REFLECT USG-GOC

S E C R E T BOGOTA 004983

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/24/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER CO
SUBJECT: FARC/ELN: TERRORIST TAKEDOWNS REFLECT USG-GOC
INTEL COOPERATION


Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood
Reasons: 1.4(a),(b),(d)


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Summary
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1. (S) The GOC captured or killed 29 key midlevel operatives
of the country's main guerilla insurgencies, the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the
National Liberation Army (ELN),from September 2005 through
April 2006. Takedowns were concentrated among three groups
-- front commanders, finance officers, and explosives experts
-- who are vital to guerilla activities and difficult to
replace. The operations were guided by intelligence packages
assembled with heavy USG support. Continued cooperation
between USG and GOC intelligence units aims to chip away at
the guerillas' middle management, as one element in a
concerted set of strategies to weaken these organizations
over time. End Summary.


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29 Key Operatives Netted
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2. (S) A review of 29 takedowns of key FARC and ELN
operatives from September 2005 through April 2006 gives a
flavor of the impact of U.S. intelligence assistance in the
GOC's fight against the two guerilla insurgencies. The
operations in question were guided by joint USG and GOC
intelligence work and executed by GOC security entities of
the armed forces (COLAR and COLNAV),police (Dijin and
DIPOL),and DAS (FBI equivalent). The strategic targets
comprising 18 members of the FARC and 11 of the ELN included:

- two members of the ELN's National Directorate (DINAL),
including the leader of a special commando unit orchestrating
kidnapppings;

- three front commanders and two deputy front commanders of
the FARC;

- four commanders and three deputy commanders of the ELN;

- four financial officers (three FARC and one ELN);

- five FARC explosives experts; and

- two urban militia leaders, one from each insurgent group.


3. (S) Of these, five were killed in combat during capture
attempts and 24 were taken alive. The latter are potentially
valuable sources of further intelligence for future
operations. Since targets are usually accompanied by
protective details, there is a multiplier effect of roughly
5x on headcount totals. Because these operations were guided
primarily by leads from human sources, most of the 29 were
nabbed in populous areas in Cundinamarca and Antioquia
departments or along the Caribbean coast, where sources can
operate undetected and GOC law enforcement has greater
leverage. These operations are thus distinct from those
aimed at HVTs in the jungle, which are typically guided by
signal or image intelligence and executed by military ambush
in remote areas of guerilla control.

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Impact on FARC & ELN
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4. (S) About half of those netted were front commanders.
These are vital links in the chain of command, implementing
instructions from top echelons to individual fronts and
controlling regional and tactical operations. Ideologically,
too, front leaders are vital bridges to inculcate the troops.
Front commanders often represent campaign experience of 15
years or more. Analysts claim guerilla groups are feeling
the pinch at this upper middle level due to battle casualties
and shorter tenures within the ranks of possible replacements
one level down.


5. (S) Finance officers make up another valuable set of
targets. They act as intermediaries in the coca trade,

establish front companies, launder money, and procure weapons
from across borders. This group is a highly trusted elite,
with authority over cash and arms and trusted business
contacts. Further, they often are caught carrying
coordinates of caches of money and arms. In deep terrain
they are specially protected, but their town visits to
conduct transactions make them vulnerable to capture in urban
operations.


6. (S) Losses of explosives experts, too, are very tough on
the guerillas. Master bomb makers take a long time to groom,
with high casualty rates as an occupational hazard; they are
difficult to replace. Explosives are a FARC weapon of
choice. Bomb specialists are often nabbed in towns in the
process of preparing specific actions; hence their takedowns
may have the most immediate impact of averting imminent
attacks. Finally, captures of militia leaders help to
preempt the guerillas' progress in urban areas where
historically they have had little traction but where they are
aspiring to expand networks.


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U.S. - Colombian Cooperation
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7. (S) The USG has worked closely with GOC intelligence
units in capacity building, and the two sides continue to
cooperate in planning specific operations. Of the 29 cases
discussed above, about 30% were carried out by the GOC
independently, while 70% were conducted with USG assistance.
Typically GOC entities in the field collect raw data,
filtered and prioritized by the USG into operational
packages, which the GOC in turn executes. This cooperation
has yielded a quantum increase in the volume of actions
undertaken, as well as higher-quality vetting of prospective
actions and tighter operational planning. The main drawback
is a perceived GOC dependency on U.S. support, no longer in
terms of skills but rather in motivational drive and sense of
urgency, which still derives from U.S. pushing. The
appointment of CamiloOspina as Minister of Defense earlier
this year has been a positive development in this regard: he
is a strong supporter of intelligence work and a catalyst for
increasing the volume of intel-guided activity.
WOOD