MINISTER PRETELT TO EXPAND MONITORING OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 004982

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/05/2015
TAGS: KJUS PGOV PREL PTER CO
SUBJECT: MINISTER PRETELT TO EXPAND MONITORING OF
DEMOBILIZED, SAYS JUSTICE AND PEACE LISTS TO FISCALIA SOON


Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood.
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d)

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SUMMARY
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1. (C) Minister of Interior and Justice Sabas Pretelt agreed
with the Ambassador May 30 that GOC monitoring of demobilized
paramilitaries should be strengthened by involving local
authorities more systematically in the process. He asked
Vice Minister Penafort to prepare a decree to this effect and
committed to a conference and workshop on monitoring for the
50 mayors whose jurisdictions are most populated by the
demobilized. Pretelt expected to present a series of Justice
and Peace lists to the Fiscalia shortly to begin the
investigation and prosecution phase. He briefed the
Ambassador on GOC demobilization accomplishments to date but
agreed that more needs to be done. End summary.

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AMBASSADOR: MONITORING AND DISMANTLEMENT ARE KEY
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2. (SBU) In a friendly but frank meeting on May 30,
Ambassador Wood told Minister Pretelt U.S. support to the
peace process was strong and premised on demobilization,
reintegration, dismantlement of paramilitary structures, and
aggressive implementation of the Justice and Peace (J&P) Law.
He highlighted that the USG had invested USD 12.33 million
in Colombia's Demobilization and Reintegration (DR) program
to date (mostly on OAS, monitoring, and child soldiers).
Wood said the Embassy had received approval from Washington
to provide USD 15.5 million to support Colombia's collective
DR program.


3. (C) Wood said the U.S. developed a three-year plan to
support Colombia's DR process (FY 05)07). If progress,
certification and other requirements are met in FY06, the USG
will provide USD 17.3 million and in FY07, the USG intends to
provide USD 15.5 million. The three-year plan would provide
approximately USD 48 million. The Embassy has already worked
for over a year with the private sector to persuade it to
support the GOC's reinsertion efforts.


4. (C) Wood said the GOC needed to do a better job of
monitoring the activities of the beneficiaries of the
Reinsertion Program. Moreover, the total dismantlement of
the paramilitary structures was necessary; therefore, the
Embassy did not support GOC manual drug eradication programs
that appeared to maintain paramilitary command structures
intact. Pretelt said manual eradication by former
paramilitaries was a useful program and insisted that the
police, and not paramilitary leaders, were in charge of the
manual eradication effort.


5. (C) Wood suggested greater involvement of local
governments in reinsertion efforts. In particular, he said
the GOC should deepen the involvement of the 50 mayors and
local police chiefs of the municipalities where most
demobilized paramilitaries are located. This would
facilitate the GOC's efforts to monitor the activities (and
not just their monthly receipt of a check) of the demobilized
in the field. Pretelt immediately agreed and instructed Vice
Minister Ximena Penafort to prepare a decree to this effect.
(The Embassy is working with Penafort on the decree and a
monitoring protocol for the mayors.) Pretelt also agreed to
call the mayors and police chiefs to Bogota to explain their
responsibilities. He suggested involving NGOs in the
monitoring process.

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J&P LEGAL PROCESSING MUST START SOON
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6. (C) Wood said the upcoming one-year anniversary of the
J&P law was approaching and the GOC should turn over the J&P

lists to the Fiscalia (Prosecutor General's office) as soon
as possible to begin legal processing. Pretelt noted the
Ministry had delayed turning over J&P lists to the Fiscalia
following the Constitutional Court's May 18 and 19 press
releases upholding the constitutionality of the Law. He said
the press releases were unclear on key issues and the
Ministry preferred to wait for the Court's full opinion
(expected in a few weeks, he said) and for the last two
demobilizations (expected in June) before it acted on the
lists.


7. (C) Vice Minister Penafort explained the J&P lists would
be sent in different groups to avoid inundating the
Fiscalia's J&P Unit with over 2,000 names: The first group
would be the list of the AUC's 21 peace "negotiators" (these
are the leaders of the AUC groups.) The second list would be
of those who demobilized and who had prior investigations
pending for serious crimes at the time of their
demobilization. The third list would be of the others who
have demobilized, and do not have pending criminal cases.
This later list may be subdivided into groups corresponding
roughly to the date their AUC group demobilized. Wood
highlighted the importance of including all senior leaders
early in the lists.

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DEMOBILIZATION: SHORT TERM SUCCESS, MORE REQUIRED
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8. (C) Pretelt said the high number of former combatants
that have demobilized to date highlighted the GOC's
short-term accomplishment, but he agreed with Wood that more
needed to be done. During the Uribe administration (August
2002 - May 2006),a total of 40,879 illegal armed group
members had demobilized (39,915 collectively and 9,964
individually),compared to 1,720 during the Pastrana
administration (August 1998 - July 2002). Under Pastrana,
the GOC spent COP 132 billion on demobilization (USD 58
million),while the Uribe administration has thus far spent
COP 498 billion (USD 221 million).

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WHO ARE THEY AND WHAT ARE THEY DOING?
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9. (C) Pretelt gave the following demographic information on
the demobilized population:

PERCENTAGES
Individual Collective
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Men 86 96
Under 30 years old 84 68
Single 63 49
Illiterate 50 12
Members of the FARC/ELN 67 --


10. (C) Pretelt explained that the GOC's Collective
Reincorporation Program has four phases that take six months
each:

-- Initiation: This initial phase provides documentation,
humanitarian aid, healthcare, and psychological support.
Sixteen paramilitary blocs that demobilized between December
12, 2005 through April 30, 2006 are in this phase, for a
total of 19,858 beneficiaries.

-- Evolution: This second phase provides healthcare,
humanitarian aid, and academic and occupational training.
Ten paramilitary blocs that demobilized from June 15, 2005
through October 22, 2005 are in this phase, for a total of
6,237 beneficiaries.

-- Development: This third phase provides academic and
occupational training. Eight paramilitary blocs that
demobilized between November 25, 2004 through February 2,
2005 are in this phase, a total of 3,784 beneficiaries.


-- Development: This fourth phase provides productive
projects, life skills, and employment. Two paramilitary
blocs that demobilized between November 25, 2003 through
December 7, 2003 are in this phase, for a total of 1,036
beneficiaries.


11. (C) Pretelt said six Centers of Reference and
Opportunities (CROs) located in Cali, Cucuta, Medellin,
Monteria, Sincelejo, and Turbo assist the collectively
demobilized. The GOC also had 11 liaison offices, 3 mobile
CROs and a call center. The individually demobilized had
access to 7 CROs in Bogota and 2 in Medellin. He noted that
71 percent of the demobilized paramilitaries are located in
five Departments: Antioquia (32 percent),Cordoba (14
percent),Cesar (11 percent),Magdalena (9 percent),and
Santander (5 percent). The remaining 18 percent are located
in the Departments of Atlantico, Bolivar, Sucre, Boyaca,
Valle del Cauca, and North Santander.


12. (C) According to Pretelt, approximately 25,000 of the
beneficiaries have an occupation or are receiving educational
training. The following is the breakdown:

OCCUPATION
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Formal and informal employment 3,294
Civic auxiliaries 1,293
Productive projects 5,108
Eradication 530
Road guards 1,450
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TOTAL 11,675

EDUCATION
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Initial module 6,336
Occupational formation 3,276
Academic formation 2,621
Civic auxiliaries 2,525
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TOTAL 14,758


13. (C) Pretelt said it was important to determine which of
the demobilized paramilitaries needed immediate assistance
and which would have an easier time reintegrating back into
society. This identification process is critical because, of
the 30,915 collectively demobilized paramilitaries, he
estimated that 15,000 could be part of the armed wing of the
paramilitaries, while the remaining were part of the support
network (i.e. drivers, cooks, etc.) who would require less
immediate attention. (Pretelt noted that 71 percent of
former paramilitaries were employed prior to joining the
AUC.) This would also explain the 2 to 1 ratio of people to
arms that were turned in.


14. (C) Pretelt noted that he plans to use the land (thus
far 130,000 hectares) that paramilitary leaders have handed
over to the GOC for reinsertion projects. He stated that
these territories should be turned over to the victims, the
reinserted, and peasants. The problem he saw, however, was
the potential obstacles for the usage of the lands resulting
from lack of clear title.




WOOD