MINISTER PRETELT TO EXPAND MONITORING OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 004982 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/05/2015 TAGS: KJUS PGOV PREL PTER CO SUBJECT: MINISTER PRETELT TO EXPAND MONITORING OF DEMOBILIZED, SAYS JUSTICE AND PEACE LISTS TO FISCALIA SOON Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood. Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d) -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Minister of Interior and Justice Sabas Pretelt agreed with the Ambassador May 30 that GOC monitoring of demobilized paramilitaries should be strengthened by involving local authorities more systematically in the process. He asked Vice Minister Penafort to prepare a decree to this effect and committed to a conference and workshop on monitoring for the 50 mayors whose jurisdictions are most populated by the demobilized. Pretelt expected to present a series of Justice and Peace lists to the Fiscalia shortly to begin the investigation and prosecution phase. He briefed the Ambassador on GOC demobilization accomplishments to date but agreed that more needs to be done. End summary. -------------- --- AMBASSADOR: MONITORING AND DISMANTLEMENT ARE KEY -------------- --- ¶2. (SBU) In a friendly but frank meeting on May 30, Ambassador Wood told Minister Pretelt U.S. support to the peace process was strong and premised on demobilization, reintegration, dismantlement of paramilitary structures, and aggressive implementation of the Justice and Peace (J&P) Law. He highlighted that the USG had invested USD 12.33 million in Colombia's Demobilization and Reintegration (DR) program to date (mostly on OAS, monitoring, and child soldiers). Wood said the Embassy had received approval from Washington to provide USD 15.5 million to support Colombia's collective DR program. ¶3. (C) Wood said the U.S. developed a three-year plan to support Colombia's DR process (FY 05)07). If progress, certification and other requirements are met in FY06, the USG will provide USD 17.3 million and in FY07, the USG intends to provide USD 15.5 million. The three-year plan would provide approximately USD 48 million. The Embassy has already worked for over a year with the private sector to persuade it to support the GOC's reinsertion efforts. ¶4. (C) Wood said the GOC needed to do a better job of monitoring the activities of the beneficiaries of the Reinsertion Program. Moreover, the total dismantlement of the paramilitary structures was necessary; therefore, the Embassy did not support GOC manual drug eradication programs that appeared to maintain paramilitary command structures intact. Pretelt said manual eradication by former paramilitaries was a useful program and insisted that the police, and not paramilitary leaders, were in charge of the manual eradication effort. ¶5. (C) Wood suggested greater involvement of local governments in reinsertion efforts. In particular, he said the GOC should deepen the involvement of the 50 mayors and local police chiefs of the municipalities where most demobilized paramilitaries are located. This would facilitate the GOC's efforts to monitor the activities (and not just their monthly receipt of a check) of the demobilized in the field. Pretelt immediately agreed and instructed Vice Minister Ximena Penafort to prepare a decree to this effect. (The Embassy is working with Penafort on the decree and a monitoring protocol for the mayors.) Pretelt also agreed to call the mayors and police chiefs to Bogota to explain their responsibilities. He suggested involving NGOs in the monitoring process. -------------- J&P LEGAL PROCESSING MUST START SOON -------------- ¶6. (C) Wood said the upcoming one-year anniversary of the J&P law was approaching and the GOC should turn over the J&P lists to the Fiscalia (Prosecutor General's office) as soon as possible to begin legal processing. Pretelt noted the Ministry had delayed turning over J&P lists to the Fiscalia following the Constitutional Court's May 18 and 19 press releases upholding the constitutionality of the Law. He said the press releases were unclear on key issues and the Ministry preferred to wait for the Court's full opinion (expected in a few weeks, he said) and for the last two demobilizations (expected in June) before it acted on the lists. ¶7. (C) Vice Minister Penafort explained the J&P lists would be sent in different groups to avoid inundating the Fiscalia's J&P Unit with over 2,000 names: The first group would be the list of the AUC's 21 peace "negotiators" (these are the leaders of the AUC groups.) The second list would be of those who demobilized and who had prior investigations pending for serious crimes at the time of their demobilization. The third list would be of the others who have demobilized, and do not have pending criminal cases. This later list may be subdivided into groups corresponding roughly to the date their AUC group demobilized. Wood highlighted the importance of including all senior leaders early in the lists. -------------- -------------- DEMOBILIZATION: SHORT TERM SUCCESS, MORE REQUIRED -------------- -------------- ¶8. (C) Pretelt said the high number of former combatants that have demobilized to date highlighted the GOC's short-term accomplishment, but he agreed with Wood that more needed to be done. During the Uribe administration (August 2002 - May 2006),a total of 40,879 illegal armed group members had demobilized (39,915 collectively and 9,964 individually),compared to 1,720 during the Pastrana administration (August 1998 - July 2002). Under Pastrana, the GOC spent COP 132 billion on demobilization (USD 58 million),while the Uribe administration has thus far spent COP 498 billion (USD 221 million). -------------- WHO ARE THEY AND WHAT ARE THEY DOING? -------------- ¶9. (C) Pretelt gave the following demographic information on the demobilized population: PERCENTAGES Individual Collective -------------- Men 86 96 Under 30 years old 84 68 Single 63 49 Illiterate 50 12 Members of the FARC/ELN 67 -- ¶10. (C) Pretelt explained that the GOC's Collective Reincorporation Program has four phases that take six months each: -- Initiation: This initial phase provides documentation, humanitarian aid, healthcare, and psychological support. Sixteen paramilitary blocs that demobilized between December 12, 2005 through April 30, 2006 are in this phase, for a total of 19,858 beneficiaries. -- Evolution: This second phase provides healthcare, humanitarian aid, and academic and occupational training. Ten paramilitary blocs that demobilized from June 15, 2005 through October 22, 2005 are in this phase, for a total of 6,237 beneficiaries. -- Development: This third phase provides academic and occupational training. Eight paramilitary blocs that demobilized between November 25, 2004 through February 2, 2005 are in this phase, a total of 3,784 beneficiaries. -- Development: This fourth phase provides productive projects, life skills, and employment. Two paramilitary blocs that demobilized between November 25, 2003 through December 7, 2003 are in this phase, for a total of 1,036 beneficiaries. ¶11. (C) Pretelt said six Centers of Reference and Opportunities (CROs) located in Cali, Cucuta, Medellin, Monteria, Sincelejo, and Turbo assist the collectively demobilized. The GOC also had 11 liaison offices, 3 mobile CROs and a call center. The individually demobilized had access to 7 CROs in Bogota and 2 in Medellin. He noted that 71 percent of the demobilized paramilitaries are located in five Departments: Antioquia (32 percent),Cordoba (14 percent),Cesar (11 percent),Magdalena (9 percent),and Santander (5 percent). The remaining 18 percent are located in the Departments of Atlantico, Bolivar, Sucre, Boyaca, Valle del Cauca, and North Santander. ¶12. (C) According to Pretelt, approximately 25,000 of the beneficiaries have an occupation or are receiving educational training. The following is the breakdown: OCCUPATION -------------- Formal and informal employment 3,294 Civic auxiliaries 1,293 Productive projects 5,108 Eradication 530 Road guards 1,450 -------------- TOTAL 11,675 EDUCATION -------------- Initial module 6,336 Occupational formation 3,276 Academic formation 2,621 Civic auxiliaries 2,525 -------------- TOTAL 14,758 ¶13. (C) Pretelt said it was important to determine which of the demobilized paramilitaries needed immediate assistance and which would have an easier time reintegrating back into society. This identification process is critical because, of the 30,915 collectively demobilized paramilitaries, he estimated that 15,000 could be part of the armed wing of the paramilitaries, while the remaining were part of the support network (i.e. drivers, cooks, etc.) who would require less immediate attention. (Pretelt noted that 71 percent of former paramilitaries were employed prior to joining the AUC.) This would also explain the 2 to 1 ratio of people to arms that were turned in. ¶14. (C) Pretelt noted that he plans to use the land (thus far 130,000 hectares) that paramilitary leaders have handed over to the GOC for reinsertion projects. He stated that these territories should be turned over to the victims, the reinserted, and peasants. The problem he saw, however, was the potential obstacles for the usage of the lands resulting from lack of clear title. WOOD