INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT FOR

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 07 BOGOTA 000309 SIPDIS DEPT FOR INL/LP, RICHARD HAWKINS DEPT FOR WHA/AND, STU LIPPE E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: SNAR SENV KCRM PTER CO SUBJECT: INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT FOR COLOMBIA REF: 05 BOGOTA 209560 ¶1. Below you will find AmEmbassy Bogota's submission for the 2005- 2006 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report per Ref. ¶I. Summary ¶1. Colombia once again had a record year in eradication, interdiction, and extradition. These efforts have led to an increase in the U.S. pure gram price of cocaine and heroin and a reduction in purity for both. Despite continued impressive progress against narcotics trafficking during 2005, Colombia remains a major drug producing country. The country's Public Security Forces prevented hundreds of tons of illicit drugs from reaching the world market through interdiction, aerial spraying of coca and poppy crops, and manual eradication. Colombia's police and military forces captured a record 228 metric tons of cocaine and coca base. The U.S.-supported Anti-Narcotics Police Directorate (DIRAN) sprayed a record 138,775 hectares of coca during the year and 1,624 hectares of poppy. Manual eradication accounted for the destruction of an additional 31,285 hectares of coca and 497 hectares of poppy. Colombia's military forces are continuing the successful "Plan Patriota," a major campaign against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC),while the FARC continues to use the drug trade as its major financing source. Over 14,000 members of the paramilitary United Self Defense Forces (AUC) have demobilized, weakening its influence, although the AUC is still involved in the drug trade and continues to challenge the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) for control of key coca and poppy cultivation areas. In addition, almost 3,000 members of the FARC, AUC, and the National Liberation Army (ELN) deserted in 2005, providing invaluable intelligence. Colombia is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention. II. Status of Country ¶2. Colombia is the source of over 90 percent of the cocaine and almost 50 percent of the heroin entering the United States. It is also a leading user of precursor chemicals and the focus of significant money laundering activity. Developed infrastructure such as ports on both the Pacific and the Atlantic, multiple international airports, and an extensive highway system provide narcotics terrorists with many options. The presence of various illegal armed groups in Colombia that are involved in narcotics trafficking compounds the normal problems associated with narcotics trafficking. These groups include the FARC, the AUC, and the ELN. These groups control areas within Colombia with high concentrations of coca and opium poppy cultivation, and their involvement in narcotics continues to be a major source of violence and terrorism in Colombia. Drug use in Colombia is increasing, even though there are some very active demand reduction programs. The judicial system continues the transition to an oral accusatorial system, causing a change in the roles and responsibilities of the judges, prosecutors, and criminal investigators. The system is now functioning in Bogota and three municipal areas and is proving to be efficient and effective. Six new municipal areas will be added in 2006, including Medellin and Cali. Over 17,000 prosecutors, judges, and criminal investigators received intensive training in the new accusatory system by the end of 2005. The GOC plans to have the system installed nationwide by 2008. III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 2005 ¶3. Policy Initiatives. The Justice and Peace Law, passed in July of 2005, provides a legal mechanism for individuals to demobilize with certain legal protections and assurances. Narcotraffickers, terrorists, and human rights abusers are not able to take advantage of this law and will be prosecuted if captured. The new law has greatly accelerated the demobilization of AUC paramilitary groups, removing more than 14,000 members of armed groups enmeshed in narcotrafficking from the field. This decrease in armed narcoterrorists in the countryside bodes well for our bilateral efforts to battle narcotrafficking, even though some supposed paramilitary members will remain narcotraffickers outside the law. The GOC also increased the number of Manual Eradication Groups (GMEs) to 60 and is planning to implement a massive manual eradication operation in one of Colombia's largest national parks. Lastly, the Congress has approved a "shock" reform package for the military justice system. This package will improve the long-term functioning of the military, which is critical to successful efforts against narcoterrorists. ¶4. Demand Reduction. The Colombian government is developing a national Demand Reduction Strategy. The Ministry of Social Protection completed a comprehensive survey of school age drug use that will serve as a baseline for the strategy. Many private entities and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) work in the area of demand reduction, and the DIRAN has an active DARE program. The USG is currently coordinating with the National Directorate on Dangerous Drugs (DNE) to develop a registry of NGOs working in demand reduction. Once completed, the USG plans to sponsor a national demand reduction NGO conference to synchronize efforts across the country, and to assist in the formation of a demand reduction NGO network. ¶5. Culture of Lawfulness. The USG continues to support respect for rule of law and civic responsibility. The Culture of Lawfulness program has taught over 16,000 ninth-graders in 190 schools using over 320 teachers who stress the importance of lawfulness in society. The program is being integrated into Colombian National Police (CNP) basic training programs. Already in ten cities, the program will train additional teacher trainers in 2006 to move the program closer to self-sufficiency. ¶6. Port Security. Various USG agencies work with DIRAN and private seaport operators to prevent narcotrafficking in Colombia's ports. DIRAN provides police personnel, and the port authorities work to improve their own security and provide equipment and infrastructure support to the DIRAN units, while the USG provides coordination, technical assistance, and training. In 2005, almost 5 METRIC TONS of cocaine and 26 kilos of heroin were seized in the four principal Colombian ports with 38 arrests. The USG works separately with DIRAN and Airport Police to prevent Colombia's international airports from being used as export points for drugs. In 2005, airport agents confiscated 862 kilos of cocaine and 73 kilos of heroin, while making 55 arrests. ¶7. Hundreds of Colombian companies participate in a USG Business Alliance for Secure Commerce (BASC) program, which seeks to increase the effectiveness of law enforcement by deterring narcotics smuggling in commercial cargo shipments. All major port cities have an active BASC program. ¶8. Environmental Safeguards. The illicit crop eradication program follows strict environmental safeguards monitored permanently by several Government of Colombia agencies. The spray program adheres to all GOC laws and regulations, including the Colombian Environmental Management Plan. The USG also reviews the program on a yearly basis. The OAS published a study in 2005 positively assessing the chemicals and methodologies used in the aerial spray program. ¶9. Since the tracking of complaints began in 2001, the Government of Colombia has processed approximately 5,844 complaints of crop damage by spray planes, with some 3,069 complaints in 2005 alone. Only 28 complaints of accidental spraying of food crops or pastureland have been verified and compensation paid. To date, the program has paid a little more than $159,000 in total compensation for damaged crops. ¶10. All claims of human health damage alleged to have been caused by aerial spraying are aggressively investigated by the Government of Colombia. Since the spraying began, the Colombian National Institute of Health has not verified a single case of adverse health effects. ¶11. Extradition and Mutual Legal Assistance. The number of extraditions from Colombia to the United States has increased significantly in recent years. In President Uribe's administration, extraditions have increased dramatically with 304 Colombian nationals and 11 non-nationals extradited by the end of ¶2005. ¶12. In early 2005, Colombia extradited FARC leader Anayibe Rojas Valderama (aka "Comandante Sonia") and other criminal associates for drug trafficking and terrorism charges. Colombia also extradited Cali Cartel leader Miguel Rodriguez Orejuela in 2005. Other high-ranking drug trafficking targets arrested and/or extradited include Consolidated Priority Targets and members of the North Valley Cartel's Top 10 list, such as Gabriel Puerta Parra, Jose Rendon Ramirez, Jhon Cano Carrera, and Dagaberto Florez. ¶13. There is no bilateral mutual legal assistance treaty between the UNITED STATES and Colombia, but the two countries cooperate well via mutual legal assistance provisions in multilateral agreements and conventions, such as the OAS Convention on Mutual Legal Assistance. During 2005, 100 mutual legal assistance requests were submitted by the UNITED STATES and over 50 responses received from the GOC. We expect the responses to the other requests will be made in 2006. The Colombian government also provides extensive cooperation with regard to U.S. investigations and prosecutions. Several specialized Colombian law enforcement units work closely with U.S. law enforcement agencies to investigate drug trafficking organizations as part of our bilateral case initiatives, resulting in tremendous successes in the areas of intelligence information, illicit property and contraband seizures, and criminal prosecutions. ¶14. Demobilization. Colombia is home to three formally designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations. The Justice and Peace Law passed in 2005 accelerated the pace of demobilization of at least one, if not two of these organizations. Over 14,000 AUC members had demobilized collectively by the end of 2005. Diego Murillo Bejarano, also known as "Don Berna," a prominent paramilitary commander who was part of the original demobilization negotiations with the Colombian government in late 2002, turned himself in during May of 2005 to avoid his impending arrest. Shortly afterwards, he ordered the demobilization of more than 2,000 of his troops. The USG has provided limited assistance for the collective demobilization process and is being asked to do more by the Government of Colombia. The ELN with a little over 2,000 troops has recently begun peace talks with the government. ¶15. In addition, in 2005 almost 3,000 individual members of the FARC, AUC, and ELN voluntarily demobilized or deserted to government forces under a USG-supported MOD program that actively promotes desertion via information campaigns. The program trains military and police units on the proper handling of deserters; on interviewing them for intelligence value; and on certifying them for transfer to the Ministry of Interior and Justice program for reintegration into civil society. Since August of 2002, when President Uribe took office, almost 8,000 members of the terrorist groups have deserted individually, severely weakening the middle-management and rank and file of these organizations. The MOD estimates that at least 50 percent of all successful military and police operations are based on intelligence generated by this program. ¶16. Public Security. During 2005, the Colombian government continued consolidating control in all parts of the country, building on success in firmly establishing a police presence countrywide at the beginning of the Uribe Administration. There are now police in all of Colombia's 1,098 municipalities, limiting the influence of illegal armed groups and denying their sources of income. This increased government presence has contributed to the increasing desertion rates. Other security indicators also were very positive in 2005: homicides down by 13 percent, kidnappings down by 51 percent, overall terrorist attacks down by 21 percent, and the number of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) down by 15 percent. ¶17. Law Enforcement Efforts. The CNP, led by DIRAN, again broke all interdiction records in 2005, with over 94 metric tons of processed cocaine (HCl) and coca base seized, 104 HCl laboratories destroyed, and 773 base labs destroyed. In addition, combined public forces (Army, Navy, Air Force, and Police) seized a record total of 228 metric tons of cocaine and coca base and destroyed 200 HCl laboratories. DIRAN also conducted numerous joint operations with the military against high-value narcoterrorist targets. Asset seizures were up by more than 500 per cent in 2005. This included the drugstore chain owned by the Rodriguez Orjuela brothers valued at several hundred million dollars. ¶18. The CNP's Mobile Rural Police (Carabineros or EMCAR) reported impressive final results for 2005. EMCAR squadrons captured 275 narcotics traffickers and 1,639 guerrillas. The squadrons also captured 3,127 common criminals. They seized 1,655 weapons, 8.5 metric tons of coca base, 46,600 gallons of liquid precursors and 142.5 metric tons of solid precursors. A total of 52 EMCAR squadrons have now been trained and deployed and their work along with the "Municipio" or hometown CNP units was largely responsible for the continued improvement in public security throughout rural Colombia. ¶19. DIRAN's Jungle Commandos (Junglas) also had a great year. The Junglas are air mobile units that have received significant specialized USG training and are often the unit of choice for tough missions. The Junglas primary mission is the destruction of HCl labs and interdiction missions. The Junglas were responsible for the destruction of over half of the HCl and base labs destroyed by the CNP and a significant quantity of the seizures. ¶20. The Colombian Army Counter Drug (CD) Brigade (BDE) seized over 3 metric tons kgs of cocaine and destroyed 14 HCl labs and 209 base labs. Over 168 tons of liquid precursors and 180 tons of solid precursors were destroyed by the CD BDE. They also dismantled 22 narco-terrorist base camps and killed or captured 78 narcoterrorists. ¶21. Firewall Program. This program on Colombia's north coast was quite successful in targeting go-fast boats leaving Colombia for the transit zone. While DEA has the lead, a number of other USG agencies, as well as several European governments, have contributed to this program's success. A small USG-supported Colombian Navy unit (GREAS) is now providing targeting information on up to 80 percent of all maritime seizures along the north coast. The GREAS also received significant training, equipment, and support from the United Kingdom. During FY2005, Operation Firewall contributed to the seizure of over 47 metric tons of cocaine. ¶22. Kingpin or "Cabecillas" Group. The DIRAN permanent task force to target the Kingpin (Cabecillas) who are the leadership of the narcotics terrorist organizations continues to work towards capturing the more than 300 Kingpins. The special police teams gather intelligence against the Kingpins and the DIRAN intelligence fusion center analyzes the intelligence and participates in operational planning. Since the group was formed, numerous special operations have been conducted, resulting in the capture of several leadership targets. ¶23. Operation Knockout. In June of 2005, a multiagency operation seized 10.7 METRIC TONS of cocaine, 30 kilos of heroin, and over $142 million dollars worth of properties and currency. This intelligence driven operation that attacked the source, transit, and target zones was successful due to the leveraging of all intelligence and operational resources from the USG and the GOC. ¶24. High-Value Targets. In 2005, three FARC commanders were killed and many other important leaders were either killed or captured. In addition, important narcotraffickers like Johnny Cano, Wescenlao Caicedo, Gordo Lindo, and Carlos Robayo Escobar were arrested and are now awaiting extradition to the United States. ¶25. Corruption. The GOC does not encourage or facilitate illicit production or distribution of narcotic or psychotropic drugs or other controlled substances or related money laundering. The GOC has enacted appropriate legislation to combat money laundering and related financial flows associated with narcotics trafficking and has established a unit made up of officials of the Ministries of Justice and Finance that tracks the illegal flow of money. Allegations of corruption within the Office of the Prosecutor General have fallen off sharply in the last year. Widespread use of polygraph exams has been a constructive tool in the fight against corruption. ¶26. A specialized Anti-Corruption Task Force Unit exists to investigate and prosecute public corruption crimes. Corruption clearly plays a major role in the continued diversion of precursor chemicals. Colombia is party to the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption. Colombia has signed, but not ratified, the UN Convention against Corruption. ¶27. Agreements and Treaties. Colombia is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and the GOC's national counternarcotics plan of 1998 meets the strategic plan requirements of that convention. The GOC is generally in line with the other requirements of the convention. In September 2000, Colombia and the United States signed an agreement formally establishing the Bilateral Narcotics Control Program. This effort provides the framework for specific counternarcotics project agreements with the various Colombian implementing agencies. ¶28. Colombia and the UNITED STATES are signatories to the OAS Convention on Mutual Legal Assistance. The GOC and the United States are also parties to a Maritime Shipboarding Agreement signed in 1997, providing faster approval for shipboarding in international waters and setting guidelines for improved counternarcotics cooperation between the Colombian Navy and the U.S. Coast Guard. Colombia is a party to the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, along with the protocol on trafficking in persons. ¶29. Cocaine. Based on the most recent CNC cultivation estimates, along with the DEA coca yield and laboratory efficiency data, Colombia had the potential in 2004 to produce 430 METRIC TONS of 100 percent pure cocaine base from locally grown coca plants. This put estimated Colombian potential cocaine production below the historic levels of 1998. Although the Colombian coca crop estimate remained statistically unchanged between 2003 and 2004, reductions in coca productivity through eradication of mature crops resulted in an estimated six percent reduction in cocaine production during that timeframe. Based on average purities of bulk seizures in the United States, this equates to approximately 515 metric tons of "export quality" cocaine. Colombian counternarcotics efforts have reduced Colombia's capacity to produce cocaine by 43 percent since 2001. Export quality cocaine production has declined from 905 metric tons in 2001 to 515 metric tons in 2004. This success is reflected in the February to September 2005 19 percent increase in the price of cocaine. ¶30. Heroin. According to the latest USG estimates, Colombia had the potential to produce 3.8 metric tons of 100 percent pure heroin. Eradication has reduced Colombian opium poppy cultivation by 68 percent since 2001, from 6,540 hectares to 2,100 hectares. This marked reduction in opium poppy crop size in Colombia may be reflected in the most recent statistics on the price and purity of heroin in the United States: DEA's Domestic Monitoring Program Report published in 2005, indicates that South American heroin samples declined in purity by 22 percent and increased in cost per pure gram by 30 percent between 2003 and 2004. Longer- term trends demonstrate even greater progress. The Domestic Monitoring Program Report shows a 37 percent reduction in purity and a 40 percent increase in price per pure gram of South American heroin in the United States during the span of 2001 to ¶2004. ¶31. Synthetic Drugs. Both availability and consumption of Ecstasy in Colombia are steadily rising. The majority of Ecstasy found in Colombia enters from Europe in powder form and is locally pressed into pills. There has been no evidence of Ecstasy being smuggled from Colombia to the United States, and it is believed that almost all Ecstasy is for local consumption. Colombian production of Ecstasy is believed to be limited. The Colombian National Police raided one Ecstasy lab and one amphetamine pill press facility in 2005. ¶32. Drug Flow/Transit. Cocaine and heroin are transported by road, river, and small civilian aircraft from the Colombian Source Zone to the Colombian Transit Zone north and west of the Andes Mountains. Primary transportation nodes include the larger airports, clandestine airstrips, and seaports from which small go- fast vessels can transport cocaine. A smaller, but growing, cocaine smuggling method is to use small civilian aircraft from clandestine airstrips in eastern and southeastern Colombia to fly cocaine to Brazil, Suriname, Venezuela, or Guyana. From these countries the cocaine is either consumed domestically, or transferred to maritime vessels for shipment to the United States or Europe. ¶33. Colombia's coastal regions are major transshipment points for bulk maritime shipments of cocaine. The vast majority of the drugs shipped from the coastal regions originate from production areas in the south-central portion of the country, as well as from other less prolific growing areas in the northern third of Colombia. Most shipments are organized by well-established trafficking organizations based in Cali, Medellin, Bogota, and elsewhere. ¶34. Go-fast boats are then regularly used to on/off-load drugs onto fishing vessels or other "mother" ships at sea. Go-fast boats also transport drugs to Central American and Caribbean transshipment countries, using refueling ships to extend their range. Fishing vessels and commercial cargo ships continue to be used to transport large quantities of drugs via both Atlantic and Pacific routes. Fishing vessels usually travel to Mexico or Guatemala, while cargo ships can go directly to the United States or Europe. The drugs are hidden in container cargo, bulk cargo, or hidden compartments built into ships. ¶35. Cocaine is also transported from Colombia to the United States and other countries via commercial air cargo or concealed aboard commercial aircraft. The use of "mules" (couriers) traveling as passengers on commercial airlines is frequent, though the quantities transported in this manner are relatively small. ¶36. Heroin is often concealed in the lining of clothing or luggage. There is also ingestion by airline passengers, or "swallowers." The CNP/Airport Interdiction Group has experienced great success in identifying and arresting "swallowers" at the international airports in Bogota, Cali, and Medellin. There are also significant quantities of heroin being shipped from Colombia's Pacific Coast, particularly from Buenaventura. The trend of heroin shipments being combined with cocaine shipments on go-fast boats departing from the Atlantic coast continues. ¶37. Colombian heroin transportation organizations use trafficking routes through Argentina, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela to move heroin to the United States. In many cases, couriers depart from Colombia through the international airports in Bogota, Medellin, Cali, and to a lesser extent, Barranquilla, and then transit one or more countries before arriving in Mexico. From Mexico, the heroin is typically transported across the border into the United States and transported by courier to its final destination. IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs ¶38. U.S. Policy Initiatives. The aerial eradication spray program again set a new record in 2005. The program sprayed some 138,775 hectares of coca and 1,624 hectares of poppy in 2005, surpassing 2004's total for illicit crops. The illicit coca cultivation eradicated would have yielded over 150 METRIC TONS of cocaine with a street value of over $15 billion. Continued closer intelligence coordination and more intensive utilization of the CD Brigade has kept the number of hostile fire impacts on spray aircraft below historic levels, even though the program sprayed more hectares. Maintaining hits below historic levels has helped to sustain the operational tempo of aerial eradication operations by reducing time lost to repair damaged aircraft. During the year, one pilot was shot to death while engaged in a spray operation, and the spray plane was also lost. ¶39. The Plan Colombia Helicopter Program (PCHP),consisting of UH- 1N, UH-1H II, UH-60, and K-Max helicopters, continued to provide dedicated support to the CD Brigade and, when available, provided other support to human rights-certified Colombian military and Public Security Forces. In 2005, PCHP aircraft flew 29,054 hours, carried 36,782 passengers, transported 1,788,400 pounds of cargo, and conducted 188 medical evacuations of military and civilian personnel. This year the program lost one UH-60 and one UH-1H II. PCHP also participated in a number of high value target (HVT) missions. The nationalization of the PCHP continues with more than 100 contract American pilots and mechanics leaving the program in 2005 to be replaced by Colombian Army (COLAR) personnel. ¶40. The interdiction programs set new records in 2005, by seizing 228 metric tons of cocaine, along with 718 kilos of heroin. These 228 metric tons are equivalent to 75 percent of the estimated amount of cocaine that enters the UNITED STATES and would have sold on the streets of the UNITED STATES for almost $23 billion. These numbers combined with those from eradication mean that our eradication and interdiction efforts kept 378 METRIC TONS of cocaine off the streets of the UNITED STATES with an estimated street value of over $38 billion. ¶41. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and Customs Border Patrol (CBP) continue to provide training and technical assistance to improve the ability of border control agencies in Colombia to combat money laundering, contraband smuggling, and commercial fraud. The emphasis has been on seaports and airports. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) provides technical assistance and training to numerous GOC entities to ensure that they can deal with the threat of explosive devices, and the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) has a small program that provided technical assistance and training to its GOC counterpart. ¶42. The USG continues to support DIRAN's aviation unit (ARAVI), comprised of 19 fixed-wing and 61 rotary-wing aircraft. In addition to counternarcotics missions, ARAVI has, with Embassy approval, used USG-supported assets for humanitarian missions, targeted intelligence gathering, antiterrorism, antikidnapping, HVT missions, and public order missions. As part of our nationalization efforts, the USG continues to help ARAVI train more pilots and mechanics within Colombia and perform more maintenance and repairs in Colombia. USG funds financed a modern state of the art maintenance hangar that allows ARAVI to perform depot-level maintenance on the 31 Huey IIs, reducing downtime due to shipment of aircraft back to the United States. In addition, two of seven American technical advisors have been replaced with Colombians. With USG assistance, ARAVI began training for Night Vision Goggle (NVG) use in 2005 after a long hiatus in their program due to previous accidents and aircraft losses. Long-term work on the fleet to ensure full NVG compatibility is ongoing. ¶43. The Air Bridge Denial (ABD) program completed 28 months of operations in 2005. ABD operations in 2005 contributed to the destruction of two aircraft, the capture of five aircraft in Colombia and three others in Central America, and the seizure of almost four metric tons of cocaine. ¶44. USG and GOC joint efforts are having a major impact on illicit agriculture. To encourage farmers to abandon the production of drug crops, USG programs have supported the cultivation of over 76,000 hectares of legal crops and completed more than 1,000 social and productive infrastructure projects in the last five years. More than 64,000 families in 17 departments have benefited from these programs. ¶45. In addition to combating drug production and trafficking, the USG is assisting Colombians in the areas that have been most ravaged by the drug trade. For example, the USG has improved the delivery of public services in 156 municipalities, including the delivery of potable water and sewage treatment. To date, the USG has provided non-emergency support for over two million Colombians internally displaced by narcotics terrorism, including aid for over 2,600 former child soldiers. A total of nine peaceful-coexistence centers have been created in small municipalities to provide onsite administrative and legal assistance, educational opportunities, and a neutral space for community meetings, discussions, and events. Additionally, the GOC's presence in rural areas was expanded by the creation of 40 Justice Houses, which offer access to justice and peaceful conflict resolution. ¶46. The USG, through the Justice Sector Reform Program and rule of law assistance, is helping Colombia in reforming and strengthening its criminal justice system. DOJ, USAID, and other USG agencies have provided training, technical assistance, and equipment to enhance the capacity and capabilities of the Colombian system and to make it more transparent to the public. In addition to the more than 17,000 police, prosecutors, and judges trained in the new accusatorial system, another 36,000 have been trained in investigative and forensic areas like human rights, financial investigations, maritime interdiction, counterfeiting, anti-kidnapping, and VIP protection. ¶47. The Road Ahead. Colombia and the United States, working together, have had considerable successes against narcoterrorism since Plan Colombia began in late 2000. Colombia and its President have demonstrated the political will to deal with the scourge of narcoterrorism. If this joint effort is sustained, the trends of decreased cultivation and increased interdictions will continue favorably. That, combined with the improved governance and decreasing criminality, continued demobilizations and desertions, and general economic and developmental improvement, will continue to weaken the illicit drug producing industry and reduce the flow of drugs into the United States, while diminishing the power and influence of narcoterrorist organizations. ¶48. Challenges for 2006 include continuing transfer of greater responsibilities in counternarcotics funding and operations to the GOC, while maintaining operational results; countering the rapid replanting of coca in areas sprayed by program; dealing with increased illicit cultivation in Colombia's national parks; supporting the GOC's efforts to demobilize and reintegrate ex- combatants, while advancing reconciliation and victim reparations processes; increasing the number of police to deal with the power vacuum created by the demobilization of the AUC; maintaining political will; helping the Colombians gain control of the vast Pacific coastal zones; and maintaining an aging air fleet that is required to fly more hours every year. ¶49. The benefits of USG efforts in Colombia are not limited to law enforcement and counternarcotics successes. Democracy, economic stability, respect for the rule of law and human rights, and regional security are all enhanced by our bilateral counternarcotics programs in Colombia. WOOD